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SOUTH CAROLINA
LAW REVIEW
VOLUME 39 SUMMER 1988 NUMBER 4
SAYONARA TO MINIMUM CONTACTS:
ASAHI METAL INDUSTRY CO. V.
SUPERIOR COURT
HOWARD B. STRAVITZ*
I. INTRODUCTION
In Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court1 the Su-
preme Court returned to the ever more elusive and complex
topic of state court personal jurisdiction.2 The Asahi decision
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of South Carolina School of Law. B.A.,
1969, Brooklyn College of the City University of New York; J.D., 1972, Rutgers Univer-
sity School of Law-Camden.
1. - U.S. -, 107 S. Ct. 1026 (1987).
2. The terms "personal" or "in personam" jurisdiction will be used in this Article to
describe the jurisdictional concept discussed because the Supreme Court generally uses
these terms. E.g., Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 464 (1985) ("The
United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida, sitting in diversity,
relied on ... [the Florida long-arm statute] in exercising personal jurisdiction over a
Michigan resident ... .") (emphasis added); World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson,
444 U.S. 286, 287 (1980) ("The issue before us is whether, consistently with the Due
Process Clause of the fourteenth Amendment, an Oklahoma court may exercise in per-
sonam jurisdiction over a nonresident automobile retailer and its wholesale distributor in
a products-liability action ... .") (emphasis in original); Kulko v. Superior Court, 436
U.S. 84, 91 (1978) ("The existence of personal jurisdiction, in turn, depends upon the
presence of reasonable notice to the defendant that an action has been brought, and a
sufficient connection between the defendant and the forum State to make it fair to re-
quire defense of the action in the forum.") (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
Other terms for this jurisdictional concept include "judicial jurisdiction," which is
used in RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 24-91 (1969), "territorial juris-
729
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was the eleventh time3 in ten years that the Court gave exten-
sive consideration to this gradually evolving doctrine. The quan-
tity of jurisdictional decisions in the most recent decade stands
in marked contrast to the prior almost twenty-year period in
which the Supreme Court failed to decide a single significant
personal jurisdiction case.4 The recent opinions have, however,
failed to harmonize divergent doctrinal trends, and the result of
this failure is evident in Asahi, in which the Court, although
unanimous in its judgment, 5 was otherwise deeply divided.6
The Asahi Court held that California could not assert juris-
diction over a Japanese component part manufacturer on an in-
demnity claim by a Taiwanese manufacturer of a product incor-
porating the component part after settlement of the original
plaintiffs' claims, even though the Japanese manufacturer was
aware that its product would reach California in the stream of
commerce, and even though the accident giving rise to the litiga-
tion occurred in California. All that can be stated confidently
about the Asahi holding is that California was precluded from
exercising jurisdiction because to do so would be "unreasonable
and unfair."17 This uncertainty resulted from the Court's division
into two four-justice pluralities' over whether the Japanese com-
ponent part manufacturer established minimum contacts with
California. Although unable to agree on minimum contacts, eight
justices concurred in the "fairness" conclusion.9 Even though
"fairness" has been part of jurisdictional analysis since Interna-
tional Shoe Co. v. Washington'° first articulated the minimum
diction," which is used in RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS §§ 4-10 (1980), and
"adjudicatory jurisdiction."
3. See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797 (1985); Burger King, 471 U.S.
462; Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408 (1984); Calder v.
Jones, 465 U.S. 783 (1984); Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770 (1984); Insur-
ance Corp. of Ireland, Ltd. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694 (1982);
Rush v. Savchuk, 444 U.S. 320 (1980); World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444
U.S. 286 (1980); Kulko, 436 U.S. 84; Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
4. The Supreme Court decided no personal jurisdiction cases between Hanson v.
Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958), and Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
5. See infra notes 306-312 and accompanying text.
6. See infra notes 310-318 and accompanying text.
7. 107 S. Ct. at 1035.
8. See infra notes 313-317 and accompanying text.
9. See infra note 311 and accompanying text.
10. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
730 [Vol. 39
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contacts test," and even though it has taken on added impor-
tance recently,12 fairness alone has never been outcome determi-
native in any Supreme Court jurisdictional decision until Asahi.
Asahi is significant, then, because it is the first case in which
fairness considerations were not merely dicta in an opinion oth-
erwise grounded on conventional views of minimum contacts.' 3
To understand the significance of Asahi's departure from
prior case law, and to make reasonable predictions about future
developments, a review of the development of minimum con-
tacts in Supreme Court jurisprudence is appropriate. Accord-
ingly, Part II of this Article traces the evolution of the Court's
current due process test for state court personal jurisdiction.
Part III of the Article describes and analyzes the various opin-
ions of the distressingly fragmented Asahi Court. The thesis of
this Article is in Part IV. While recognizing its theoretical merit,
the Article criticizes the Court's current two-branch approach to
jurisdiction, and urges a return to the simpler due process analy-
sis previously employed,'4 coupled with increased emphasis on
discretionary motions to dismiss under the common-law doctrine
of forum non conveniens.
II. 1945-1985: THE MODERN EVOLUTION OF JURISDICTIONAL
DUE PROCESS
A. 1945-1958: Doctrinal Origins
A logical point of departure is to review the development of
the Supreme Court's current approach to state court personal
jurisdiction. 5 Although this section is not intended to rehash
what has been said by many eminent scholars before, some over-
lap and repetition is unavoidable. The object, however, is to
identify the divergent doctrinal trends that have influenced the
Court's jurisdictional decision making.
The seminal case of the modern era is, of course, Interna-
11. Id. at 316.
12. See infra text accompanying notes 138-50, 219-24, 242-60.
13. See, e.g., Burger King, 471 U.S. 462, 478-84; World-Wide, 444 U.S. 286, 295-99.
14. The pre-World Wide approach was not consistent. See infra text accompanying
notes 83-90.
15. For more detailed discussions of this historical development, see infra notes 16,
17, and 22.
19881
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tional Shoe Co. v. Washington,"6 in which the Court attempted
a clean break with the rigid jurisdictional principles of Pennoyer
v. Neff.1 7 Under Pennoyer a state could not exercise in personam
jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant unless the defendant
either voluntarily consented to jurisdiction or was found and
served with process within the borders of the state.18 Thus, a
state's adjudicatory authority was limited to persons or property
found within its geographic borders. This strict territorial view,
largely adopted from international law,19 soon proved too limit-
ing.20 The restrictive approach of Pennoyer was particularly
troublesome for corporations engaged in business activity
outside their state of incorporation.21 In an effort to maintain at
16. 326 U.S. 310 (1945). For a general discussion of the various bases of asserting
personal jurisdiction, see 4 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE §§
1064-1073 (2d ed. 1987); Developments in the Law-State-Court Jurisdiction, 73 HARV.
L. REV. 909, 916-48 (1960).
17. 95 U.S. 714 (1878). Some question surrounds the date when Pennoyer was de-
cided. It was no doubt decided during the 1877 Term. The official United States Re-
ports, however, does not provide a specific date. The Supreme Court Reporter and the
United States Supreme Court Reports give the date as "Jan. 21, 1878." Recent Supreme
Court opinions tend to cite Pennoyer as having been decided in 1878. E.g., Helicopteros
Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414 (1984); World-Wide, 444 U.S.
286, 291; Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 196 (1977).
The case and its doctrinal principle have been the subject of extensive critical com-
mentary. See, e.g., Hazard, A General Theory of State Court Jurisdiction, 1965 Sup. CT.
REV. 241; Nordenberg, State Courts, Personal Jurisdiction and the Evolutionary Pro-
cess, 54 NOTRE DAME LAW. 587, 588-93 (1973); Ross, The Shifting Bases of Jurisdiction,
17 MINN. L. REV. 146 (1933). For a recent reexamination of, and delightful account of the
personalities involved in, this venerable case, see Perdue, Sin Scandal and Substantive
Due Process: Personal Jurisdiction and Pennoyer Reconsidered, 62 WASH. L. REV. 479
(1987).
18. 95 U.S. at 733.
19. See Hazard, supra note 17, at 252-62.
20. In dicta Pennoyer recognized that a state may determine the civil status of a
citizen with respect to a nonresident. 95 U.S. at 734-35. As Pennoyer was decided at a
time when business activity was starting to cross state lines, the court suggested that a
state may require a nonresident entering a business transaction within the forum to ap-
point an agent for service of process. Id. at 735. Of course, from a technical perspective,
service on an agent was intended to occur within the territory of the state, and, there-
fore, was consistent with Pennoyer's view of territorial power. Consequently, even as
Pennoyer was announcing its jurisdictional principles, the seeds of change were sown.
21. Another problem area concerned torts committed by nonresident motorists who
departed the state after an accident. This jurisdictional concern was substantially re-
solved in 1927 when the Court upheld a Massachusetts statute providing for implied
consent to jurisdiction by any motorist who used the state's highways provided that the
cause of action arose out of that use. Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352 (1927). Since service
of process was effected under the typical nonresident motorist statute upon a public
4
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least technical compliance with Pennoyer, the Court developed
principles subjecting nonresident corporations to jurisdiction
based on fictional concepts of "implied" consent, corporate
"presence," or "doing business" within the forum state.2
In an attempt to free the states from the pitfalls and fic-
tions inherent in the earlier doctrines, the Court in Interna-
tional Shoe announced that when in personam jurisdiction is as-
serted over a nonresident defendant "due process requires only
that . . [the defendant] have certain minimum contacts with
[the forum] such that the maintenance of the suit does not of-
fend 'traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.' ",23
Although perhaps containing the most celebrated language in all
of jurisdictional jurisprudence, the minimum contacts test
proved easier to state than to apply because it was deliberately
cast in extremely general language. 4
In one sense the emphasis on defendant's contacts was a
substitute for the discarded "presence" or "doing business" fic-
tions,25 but, unlike those theories, the minimum contacts analy-
sis was vitally concerned with fairness and reasonableness. The
articulation of the test itself required defendant contacts with
the forum "such that" assertion of jurisdiction comported with
official within the forum state, Pennoyer's limitations were again at least technically
observed.
22. For historical accounts of pre-International Shoe jurisdiction over corporations,
see 4 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 16, § 1066; Kalo, Jurisdiction as an Evolution-
ary Process: The Development of Quasi In Rem and In Personam Principles, 1978 DuKE
L.J. 1147, 1176-82; Kurland, The Supreme Court, The Due Process Clause and the In
Personam Jurisdiction of State Courts, 25 U. CHL L. REV. 569, 577-86 (1958); Develop-
ments, supra note 16, at 919-23.
23. 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)).
24. Chief Justice Stone, in an opinion joined in by all participating justices except
Justice Black, candidly acknowledged that the dividing line between activities that reach
the jurisdictional threshold and those that do not "cannot be simply mechanical or quan-
titative." 326 U.S. at 319. Recently, the Court reiterated this view in observing:
Like any standard that requires a determination of "reasonableness," the
"minimum contacts" test of International Shoe is not susceptible of mechani-
cal application; rather, the facts of each case must be weighed to determine
whether the requisite "affiliating circumstances" are present. We recognize
that this determination is one in which few answers will be written "in black
and white. The greys are dominant and even among them the shades are
innumerable."
Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84, 92 (1978) (citations omitted) (quoting Estin v.
Estin, 334 U.S. 541, 545 (1948)).
25. See Lilly, Jurisdiction Over Domestic and Alien Defendants, 69 VA. L. REV. 85,
89 (1983).
1988]
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"fair play. '26 Later in the opinion Chief Justice Stone empha-
sized that the demands of due process require "contacts of the
corporation with the state of the forum as make it reasonable
... to require the corporation to defend the particular suit
which is brought there. '2 7 Although fairness or reasonableness
may have been an underlying theme, the Court appeared to as-
sume fairness and reasonableness if the contact element of the
test was satisfied. 8 In any event, the Court failed to identify any
criteria by which to evaluate fairness or reasonableness apart
from contacts, or how those considerations otherwise indepen-
dently impacted on the basic test.2" This was understandable.
Well-settled doctrine, even if fictional, is difficult to change all
at once. International Shoe represented a definitive step away
from "consent" and "doing business," but it certainly was not a
total departure from prior doctrine.
In addition, as Professor Kurland aptly noted thirty years
ago, "the Court was not overruling the earlier precedents, but
was substituting an appropriate rationale to demonstrate their
consistency." 30 The Court divided its prior jurisdictional deci-
sions into four general categories. 1 Although these categories,
and their underlying principles, did not define minimum con-
tacts per se, they attempted to describe permissible and prohib-
ited assertions of in personam jurisdiction by reference to the
relationship among the forum, the defendant, and the litiga-
tion.3 2 The categories are divided first into "specific" and "gen-
26. 326 U.S. at 316.
27. Id. at 317 (emphasis added).
28. The juxtaposition of "due process" and "minimum contacts" with "traditional
notions of fair play and substantial justice" seemed to imply that if a defendant estab-
lished minimum contacts with a forum, the assertion of jurisdiction complied with due
process. See 326 U.S. at 316.
29. One sentence in the opinion, however, suggested that the contact element is
evaluated "in relation to" fairness. 326 U.S. at 319.
30. Kurland, supra note 22, at 589.
31. 326 U.S. at 317-18.
32, Discussing the impact of International Shoe in Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186
(1977), the Court concluded "the relationship among the defendant, the forum, and the
litigation . . . became the central concern of the inquiry into personal jurisdiction." Id.
at 204. The International Shoe categories are four permutations of these three elements.
They may be summarized as follows:
(i) When the activities of the nonresident defendant in the forum state are continuous
and systematic, and the cause of action arises out of those activities, assertion of in per-
sonam jurisdiction is almost always permissible, 326 U.S. at 317-18; (ii) When the activi-
[Vol. 39
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eral" jurisdiction, and then subdivided by the quantum of forum
ties of the nonresident defendant in the forum state are casual and occasional, and the
cause of action does not arise out of those activities, assertion of in personam jurisdiction
is almost always inappropriate, id.; (iii) When the activities of the nonresident defendant
in the forum state are so continuously and systematically substantial, it may be appro-
priate to assert in personam jurisdiction over such a defendant even for a cause of action
that does not arise out of those activities, id. at 318; (iv) When the activities of the
nonresident defendant in the forum state are casual and occasional, including single acts,
but the cause of action arises out of those activities, it may be appropriate to assert in
personam jurisdiction over such a defendant, depending on the nature, quality, and cir-
cumstances of the activities. Id.
A four-box chart in which the vertical line describes the nature and scope of the
nonresident defendant's activity in the forum state, and the horizontal line describes the
relationship between the litigation and those activities is useful in visualizing the rela-
tionships among the categories. Other commentators have used similar devices. See, e.g.,
McDermott, Personal Jurisdiction: The Hidden Agendas in the Supreme Court Deci-
sions, 10 VT. L. REv. 1, 39-40 (1985); Comment, Jurisdiction Over Foreign Corporations
in Tennessee, 42 TENN. L. REv. 325, 332-33 (1975).
RELATIONSHIP OF LITIGATION
(Arises Out Of) (Does Not Arise Out Of)
CS
Q
aI (i) (iii)
CZ
Boxes (i) and (iv) represent instances of "specific" or "transactional" jurisdiction
because a specific forum state activity or transaction of the nonresident defendant gives
rise to the litigation in which personal jurisdiction is asserted over the defendant. Boxes
(ii) and (iii) represent instances in which a state is exercising "general" jurisdiction over
the nonresident defendant because the cause of action does not arise out of any of the
defendant's forum state activities. Professors von Mehren and Trautman are generally
credited with articulating the distinction between general and specific jurisdiction. See
von Mehren & Trautman. Jurisdiction to Adjudicate: A Suggested Analysis, 79 HARV. L. 7
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state activity in which the nonresident defendant engaged."3 The
two categories of activity were described as "continuous and sys-
tematic" and "casual and occasional." It was sometimes difficult
to classify a case as falling squarely in one or the other cate-
gory.3 4 Moreover, the basic categories alone did not test reasona-
bleness or fairness. Perhaps recognizing this weakness, the Court
observed:
But to the extent that a corporation exercises the privilege
of conducting activities within a state, it enjoys the benefits
and protection of the laws of that state. The exercise of that
privilege may give rise to obligations, and, so far as those obli-
gations arise out of or are connected with the activities within
the state, a procedure which requires the corporation to re-
spond to a suit brought to enforce them can, in most instances,
hardly be said to be undue.3 5
This language attempts to link a defendant's contact with the
forum state to the concepts of fairness and reasonableness. If
the defendant's activity permits the defendant to enjoy benefits
and protections of the forum state, then imposing a concomitant
obligation to be held accountable within the forum is not unrea-
sonable, at least in connection with causes of action that arise
out of the forum state activities.
Having articulated a new test and having classified its prior
case law into loose categories, the Court had little trouble decid-
ing the jurisdictional issue presented in International Shoe it-
self."6 It characterized defendant's activity as being systematic
REv. 1121, 1136 (1966).
33. See supra note 32.
34. Professor Perschbacher recently observed that "the categories were left as a leg-
acy to bedevil a generation of courts, commentators, and lawyers." Perschbacher, Mini-
mum Contacts Reapplied: Mr. Justice Brennan Has It His Way in Burger King Corp. v.
Rudzewicz, 1986 ARIz. ST. L.J. 585, 592.
35. 326 U.S. at 319.
36. The entire analysis is contained in one paragraph, in which the Court concluded
as follows:
Applying these standards, the activities carried on in behalf of appellant
in the State of Washington were neither irregular nor casual. They were sys-
tematic and continuous throughout the years in question. They resulted in a
large volume of interstate business, in the course of which appellant received
the benefits and protection of the laws of the state, including the right to re-
sort to the courts for the enforcement of its rights. The obligation which is here
sued upon arose out of those very activities. It is evident that these operations
establish sufficient contacts or ties with the state of the forum to make it rea-
[Vol. 39
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and continuous, and noted that the cause of action arose out of
those activities. Accordingly, the case came within the category
in which jurisdiction was almost never in doubt.
International Shoe thus set in motion a new theoretical
framework by which to analyze due process limitations on per-
sonal jurisdiction. Its emphasis on contacts, however, retained
elements of the discarded "presence" and "doing business" tests
because International Shoe's contacts through its agents were
physical. Moreover, although reasonableness was an underlying
theme, the Court failed to explain how it was to be factored spe-
cifically into jurisdictional analysis.
While International Shoe was primarily concerned with de-
fendant's contact with the forum, the next significant case" in
the developmental line, McGee v. International Life Insurance
Co.,38 had a decidedly plaintiff orientation. In holding that
Texas had to give full faith and credit to a California judgment
in which service of process on the Texas defendant was effected
by registered mail across state lines, a unanimous Court identi-
fied several new elements of the jurisdictional equation.
Having assumed the obligations of a predecessor company,
including one life insurance policy with a resident of California,
the defendant offered to renew the California policy.3 9 The writ-
ten renewal offer was mailed to the insured in California. ° The
offer was accepted41 by the insured, who paid premiums for two
years by mail from California to the Texas office of the
defendant.42
After noting the general trend to expand the reach of state
sonable and just, according to our traditional conception of fair play and sub-
stantial justice, to permit the state to enforce the obligations which appellant
has incurred there. Hence we cannot say that the maintenance of the present
suit in the State of Washington involves an unreasonable or undue procedure.
Id. at 320.
37. Between International Shoe and McGee the Court decided two other jurisdic-
tional cases: Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437 (1952); and Travelers
Health Ass'n v. Virginia, 339 U.S. 643 (1950). Travelers Health did not break any new
ground, and Perkins, although some disagree, see McDermott, supra note 32, at 11 &
n.47, traditionally is considered a general jurisdiction case, which raises issues beyond
the scope of this Article. See infra notes 210-13 and accompanying text.
38. 355 U.S. 220 (1957).
39. Id. at 221.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 222.
1988]
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court jurisdiction, 3 the Court concluded that California properly
exercised personal jurisdiction over the Texas defendant because
"the suit was based on a contract which had substantial connec-
tion with [California]." 44 In reaching its conclusion the Court fo-
cused on the interest of the forum state,45 the plaintiff's inter-
est,4 6 and general litigation considerations.47 It also considered
defendant's interest in avoiding an inconvenient forum.4 Collec-
tively, these elements strongly favored the exercise of jurisdic-
tion by California. Unfortunately, the Court failed to provide
any guidance regarding how these various elements are to be
factored into the jurisdictional calculus.49 In addition, while em-
phasizing the substantial connection that the insurance contract
43. The Court observed as follows:
Looking back over this long history of litigation a trend is clearly discern-
ible toward expanding the permissible scope of state jurisdiction over foreign
corporations and other nonresidents. In part this is attributable to the funda-
mental transformation of our national economy over the years. Today many
commercial transactions touch two or more States and may involve parties sep-
arated by the full continent. With this increasing nationalization of commerce
has come a great increase in the amount of business conducted by mail across
state lines. At the same time modern transportation and communication have
made it much less burdensome for a party sued to defend himself in a State
where he engages in economic activity.
Id. at 222-23.
44. Id. at 223 (citations and footnote omitted).
45. The Court observed: "The contract was delivered in California, the premiums
were mailed from there and the insured was a resident of that State when he died." Id.
at 223. It, therefore, concluded: "It cannot be denied that California has a manifest in-
terest in providing effective means of redress for its residents when their insurers refuse
to pay claims." Id.
46. The plaintiff's interest was expressed as follows:
These residents would be at a severe disadvantage if they were forced to follow
the insurance company to a distant state in order to hold it legally accounta-
ble. When claims were small or moderate individual claimants frequently could
not afford the cost of bringing an action in a foreign forum-thus in effect
making the company judgment proof.
Id.
47. The litigational interest was stated as follows: "Often the crucial witnesses-as
here on the company's defense of suicide--will be found in the insured's locality." Id. at
223.
48. The only reference to defendant's interest was that "there may be inconvenience
to the insurer if it is held amenable to suit in California where it had this contract but
certainly nothing which amounts to a denial of due process." Id. at 224 (citation
omitted).
49. Cf. Perschbacher, supra note 34, at 594 ("Plaintiff's convenience, defendant's
convenience, and the forum state's interest in providing a forum all receive roughly equal
weight.").
10
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had with California, thus implicating "minimum contacts," the
Court otherwise avoided the analytical framework of Interna-
tional Shoe. In particular it avoided classifying McGee under
the four International Shoe categories, or assessing whether the
Texas insurance company had invoked the benefits and protec-
tions of California law. Both of these factors figured prominently
in Chief Justice Stone's International Shoe opinion. Accord-
ingly, many commentators view McGee as originating the inter-
est-balancing approach to jurisdictional due process.51 Neverthe-
less, McGee could have easily been decided by stricter adherence
to International Shoe. Defendant voluntarily entered into an in-
surance contract with a forum state resident. The cause of ac-
tion arose out of that contract and defendant, a foreign insur-
ance company, surely invoked the benefits and protections of
the forum state law.
Viewed from the temporal perspective of McGee, the evolu-
tion of personal jurisdiction was clouded at best. International
Shoe stressed defendant's activity in connection with the forum,
50. See supra note 36.
51. See, e.g., Clermont, Restating Territorial Jurisdiction and Venue For State and
Federal Courts, 66 CORNELL L. REV. 411, 418 (1981) ("The opinion indicated that courts
should decide ... jurisdictional issues by balancing the interests of the public, the plain-
tiff, and the defendant.") (footnotes omitted); Perschbacher, supra note 34, at 593-94.
Professor Perschbacher uses the phrase "multi-interest balancing approach" to describe
McGee's contribution to jurisdictional analysis. Id.; cf. Lilly, supra note 25, at 90 (Pro-
fessor Lilly reads McGee as foreshadowing the two-branch balancing approach of Burger
King). Unlike Professors Clermont and Perschbacher, who view McGee as a pure balanc-
ing case, Professor Lilly views McGee as continuing to emphasize, consistent with Inter-
national Shoe, the contacts of a defendant with the forum state. His trenchant summary
of McGee states as follows:
The McGee opinion can be read as a clear indication of the Court's will-
ingness to apply a flexible constitutional standard to issues of in personam ju-
risdiction. Assessing the defendant's contacts with the forum state remained
a significant part of McGee's jurisdictional inquiry, but other factors ap-
peared to play an equally important role. Consistent with McGee, a court de-
termining jurisdiction could take account of the actual burden of conducting a
defense, the situs of the evidence, and the interests of the plaintiff and the
forum state. Presumably, a court influenced by McGee would be receptive to
an argument that International Shoe's requirements of fair play and substan-
tial justice are met by slight or infrequent contacts if other factors--suggesting
reasonableness-are present. Thus, McGee represented not only the further
weakening of territoriality, but it also realigned the fairness calculus of Inter-
national Shoe. McGee suggested that courts should assess the defendant's in-
terests in the broader context of the interests of the plaintiff and the forum
state.
Id. at 90-91 (footnote omitted) (emphasis added).
11
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and the relationship of that activity to the litigation. McGee em-
phasized the multifold interests of the forum, the plaintiff, the
litigation, and the defendant. The Court's next attempt to refine
jurisdictional analysis tilted decidedly toward International
Shoe and away from McGee.
Only six months after it decided McGee, the Court con-
fronted the problem of personal jurisdiction in the distressingly
complex case of Hanson v. Denckla.52 Ignoring McGee's multi-
ple-interest, fairness analysis, the Court focused sharply on the
nonresident defendant's relationship with the forum state. As
Hanson was the first case decided by the Supreme Court after
International Shoe in which an assertion of jurisdiction by a
state court was overturned, many contemporaneous commenta-
tors viewed it as abberational,53 and attributed its result to an
unorthodox concern with the merits by Chief Justice Warren. 4
In Hanson, the settlor of a trust created in Delaware later
moved to Florida.55 While a resident of Florida during the eight
years preceding her death, the settlor continued to have contact
with the trustee, a Delaware bank, concerning administration of
the trust.56 She also executed a will and exercised a power of
appointment determining the distribution of the trust assets af-
ter her death.5 7 The only other contact between the Delaware
bank and Florida was the distribution of trust income there to
the settlor. 8 After the settlor's death, a dispute arose regarding
the disposition of trust assets by the inter vivos power of ap-
pointment. Almost all of the potential beneficiaries were domi-
ciliaries of Florida.59 One group of beneficiaries claimed that the
appointment was invalid and that the trust assets in question,
52, 357 U.S. 235 (1958). For an extensive description and analysis of Hanson, see
Kurland, supra note 22, at 610-23; Scott, Hanson v. Denckla, 72 HARV. L. REV. 695
(1959).
53, See, e.g., Hazard, supra note 17, at 243-44; von Mehren & Trautman, supra note
32, at 1174-79; cf. Carrington & Martin, Substantive Interests and the Jurisdiction of
State Courts, 66 MICH. L. REV. 227, 234-35 (1967).
54. See, e.g., J. COUND, J. FRIEDENTHAL, A. MILLER & J. SEXTON, CIVIL PROCEDURE
104-105, note 1 (4th ed. 1985); J. LANDERS & J. MARTIN, CIVIL PROCEDURE 78, note 1
(1981); McDermott, supra note 32, at 13-20.
55. 357 U.S. at 238-39.
56. Id. at 252 n.24.
57. Id. at 239.
58. Id. at 252.
59. Id. at 254.
[Vol. 39
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therefore, passed pursuant to the residuary clause of the settlor's
will.60 The Florida courts upheld this position.6 After the Flor-
ida litigation commenced, but before judgment was entered, a
competing group of claimants brought suit in Delaware, situs of
the trust assets, seeking a declaration that the trust assets were
validly appointed by the settlor pursuant to the inter vivos ap-
pointment.62 Delaware refused to accord full faith and credit to
the Florida decree 63 and ruled that the trust assets passed pur-
suant to the power of appointment. Hearing both cases under its
certiorari jurisdiction, 4 the Court squarely faced the one issue
on which the entire controversy turned: Did the Florida courts
properly exercise jurisdiction in the dispute concerning the dis-
position of the trust assets physically located in Delaware?
6 5
Swiftly rejecting any form of in rem jurisdiction,66 the Court
focused on whether the Florida courts had properly exercised
personal jurisdiction over the Delaware trustee.6 7 The analogy to
McGee, decided earlier in the same Term, seemed obvious and
strongly pointed toward jurisdiction. A nonresident corporate
trustee had contact, albeit intermittently, with a Florida citizen
over several years. In McGee the nonresident insurance com-
pany had what appeared to be a similar relationship with a Cali-
fornia citizen. While recognizing the trend since International
Shoe to expand state court jurisdiction, the Court was quick to
note the continued existence of territorial limitations on the ex-
60. Id. at 240.
61. Id. at 238.
62. Id. at 242.
63. Id. at 243.
64. Id. at 238, 244.
65. See id. at 243-44.
66. Id. at 246-50.
67. There were actually two Delaware corporate fiduciary defendants: The Wilming-
ton Trust Company, the trustee of the trust established by the settlor in Delaware, id. at
238, and the Delaware Trust Co., the trustee for two trusts that were appointed to re-
ceive $200,000 each under the intervivos appointments and which were actually paid a
total of $400,000 upon the settlor's death. Id. at 239. Both were named defendants in the
Florida litigation. Id. at 241.
Substantial controversy existed over whether the Wilmington Trust Comapny was
even an indispensable party to the Florida litigation. The Court repeated its understand-
ing that a trustee is an indispensable party to litigation concerning the validity of the
trust. Id. at 245, 254-55. The Court seemed to go out of its way to decide this issue of
Florida law. Id. at 255-56; see also Kurland, supra note 22, at 613-17.
19881
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ercise of jurisdictional power over nonresident defendants."8
The Court seemed to recognize implicitly that McGee may
have misplaced emphasis on convenience, and it appeared deter-
mined to return jurisdictional analysis to a defendant orienta-
tion. O Finding no physical ties between the Delaware trustee
and Florida,7 0 Chief Justice Warren, writing for a bare majority,
attempted to distinguish McGee. First, he found that no agree-
ment had had a substantial connection to Florida.1 Unlike the
insurance contract in McGee, which was solicited in California,
the trust agreement in Hanson was executed many years earlier
in Delaware.72 Florida had a relationship with this agreement
because the settlor moved there. Second, while California's man-
ifest regulatory interest over nonresident insurance companies
was obvious, Florida had no similar regulatory concern.73 Third,
Chief Justice Warren recognized that, although Florida might
choose its own law for determining the validity of the trust
agreement, 74 the question of personal jurisdiction over a nonresi-
dent defendant was different.75 Concluding this part of the opin-
68. The Court's language seems to have taken direct aim at McGee, and focused
squarely on power and territorial restriction. The Court observed:
But it is a mistake to assume that this trend heralds the eventual demise of all
restrictions on the personal jurisdiction of state courts. Those restrictions are
more than a guarantee of immunity from inconvenient or distant litigation.
They are a consequence of territorial limitations on the power of the respec-
tive States. However minimal the burden of defending in a foreign tribunal, a
defendant may not be called upon to do so unless he has had the "minimal
contacts" with that State that are a prerequisite to its exercise of power over
him.
357 U.S. at 251 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
69. Id. at 252 ("But the record discloses no instance in which the trustee performed
any acts in Florida . . . .") (emphasis in original); id. at 254 ("The issue is personal
jurisdiction, not choice of law. It is resolved in this case by considering the acts of the
trustee.") (emphasis added).
70. Id. at 251.
71. Id. at 251-52.
72. See supra note 55.
73. 357 U.S. at 252.
74. Id. at 253-54 & n.27; see also id. at 258 (Black, J., dissenting).
75. Id. The Court has never really explained why personal jurisdiction and choice of
law, which involve similar factors, should necessarily be decided separately. Over the
years there has been much scholarly criticism of the Court's compartmentalization of
these related problems. See generally L. BRILMAYER, AN INTRODUCTION TO JURISDICTION
IN THE AMERICAN FEDERAL SYSTEM 37 (1986); Hill, Choice of Law and Jurisdiction in the
Supreme Court, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 960 (1981); Silberman, Shaffer v. Heitner: The End of
an Era, 53 N.Y.U.L. REV. 33, 79-90 (1978); Stein, Styles of Argument and Interstate
Federalism in the Law of Personal Jurisdiction, 65 TEx. L. REv. 689, 739-48 (1987); von
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ion, the Chief Justice stated:
The unilateral activity of those who claim some relationship
with a nonresident defendant cannot satisfy the requirement of
contact with the forum state. The application of that rule will
vary with the quality and nature of defendant's activity, but it
is essential in each case that there be some act by which the
defendant purposefully avails itself of the privilege of con-
ducting activities within the forum state, thus invoking the
benefits and protections of its laws.
76
Although originally thought to be aberrational," Hanson's
"purposeful availment" requirement is now commonly viewed as
the critically significant element in jurisdictional due process.
78
The Delaware trustee in Hanson did not reach out to Florida in
the same way the Texas insurance company voluntarily affiliated
itself with California in McGee. It was the "unilateral activity"
of the settlor in moving to and exercising the power of appoint-
ment in Florida that caused the nonresident defendant to have a
relationship with Florida. Notwithstanding its turn away from
McGee's interest-balancing approach, Hanson did not represent
a fundamental recasting of personal jurisdiction. Rather, it was a
Mehren, Adjudicatory Jurisdiction: General Theories Compared and Evaluated, 63
B.U.L. REv. 279, 312-13, 323-31 (1983); von Mehren & Trautman, supra note 32, at 1128-
1133; Weintraub, Due Process Limitations on the Personal Jurisdiction of State Courts:
Time for Change, 63 ORE. L. REV. 485, 493, 496 (1984); Note, Considerations of Choice of
Law in the Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens, 74 CALiF. L. REV. 565, 590-601 (1986).
The Court has reiterated its separation of choice of law and jurisdiction in several
recent cases. See Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 778 (1984); Kulko v.
Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84, 98 (1978); Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 215 (1977). In
Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462 (1985), the Court again restated this posi-
tion, but found a contractual choice-of-law provision relevant to deciding whether a de-
fendant purposefully invoked the benefits and protections of the forum state's law. Id. at
481-82. Last, in Asahi the Court seems to have shifted directions and found that a state's
interest in applying its own law to a controversy is a relevant consideration under the
fairness or reasonableness branch of the current test of jurisdictional due process. -
U.S. -, 107 S. Ct. 1026, 1034 (1987). See generally Cox, The Interrelationship of Per-
sonal Jurisdiction and Choice of Law: Forging New Theory Through Asahi Metal In-
dustry Co. v. Superior Court, 49 U. Prrr. L. REv. 189 (1987) (arguing that the minimum
contacts test is identical to the test for determining whether a forum can choose its own
law). See infra notes 366, 372-74 and accompanying text.
76. 357 U.S. at 253 (emphasis added).
77. See supra note 53.
78. See, e.g., Louis, The Grasp of Long Arm Jurisdiction Finally Exceeds Its
Reach: A Comment on World Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson and Rush v. Savchuk,
58 N.C.L. REv. 407, 408-09, 412-13, 421-23 (1980); Perschbacher, supra note 34, at 597-99.
15
Stravitz: Sayonara to Minimum Contracts: Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superi
Published by Scholar Commons, 1988
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 39
refinement of the basic minimum contacts standard enunciated
in International Shoe.79 The analysis focused on the nature of a
nonresident defendant's activity in the forum state, and whether
the nature and quality of that activity" demonstrated that the
defendant voluntarily affiliated itself with the forum state and
received the benefits and protections of the laws of the forum
79. Although Professor Perschbacher agrees that the Hanson Court "embellish[ed]
the minimum contacts standard with the added element of 'purposeful availment,"'
Perschbacher, supra note 34, at 598, he believes that Hanson incorrectly cited Interna-
tional Shoe to support the proposition that the defendant's activities must invoke the
benefits and protections of the forum state's law for jurisdiction to be proper. Id. He
apparently views invoking benefits and protections "as an illustration, not an absolute
requirement for jurisdiction." Id. It is correct that International Shoe merely observed
that "to the extent that a corporation exercises the privileges of conducting activities
within a state, it enjoys the benefits and protection of the laws of that state." Interna-
tional Shoe, 326 U.S. at 319. But in applying the principles enunciated to the facts,
Chief Justice Stone seemed to attach significance to the concept. Id. at 320. After noting
that International Shoe's activity in Washington was "systematic and continuous," he
was careful to note as follows: "They resulted in a large volume of interstate business, in
the course of which appellant received the benefits and protections of the laws of the
state, including the right to resort to the courts for the enforcement of its rights." Id. For
further discussion of the significance of invoking the benefits and protections of the fo-
rum state law to jurisdictional analysis, see infra notes 227-33 and accompanying text.
80. The Hanson Court failed to make use of the International Shoe categories dis-
tilled from pre-International Shoe case law. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
The Hanson fact pattern illustrates how difficult it is to limit the description of a non-
resident's forum state activities to two broad classifications: casual and occasional or sys-
tematic and continuous. While a defendant's forum state activity may be systematic and
continuous in the sense that it occurs at regular intervals, it may only represent a very
limited part of the nonresident's national or international trade or business. Moreover, if
certain single acts are sufficient to confer jurisdiction, there is no significance to classify-
ing a nonresident defendant's activity as casual and occasional.
Of course, it would seem that the added "purposeful availment" requirement is a
condition precedent to jurisdiction in any event. Unless the nonresident defendant's fo-
rum state activities are purposefully undertaken, their nature and scope and relationship
to the litigation are irrelevant. In Hanson the Delaware trustee had intermittent contact
with the settlor in Florida. But because the Court viewed these contacts as resulting
from the unilateral activity of the settlor, they did not count in the Court's view.
Only rarely has the Court returned to International Shoe's categories. In Keeton v.
Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770 (1984) the court cited International Shoe's catego-
ries without directly discussing them. Id. at 774. The Court has engaged in a full scale
discussion of the International Shoe categories only twice. Both were in the only general
jurisdiction cases that the Court has decided. See Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia,
S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414-17 (1984); Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342
U.S. 437, 445-47 (1952). It would, therefore, seem reasonable to conclude that the only
significance to describing abstractly a nonresident defendant's forum state activities by
the International Shoe classifications is that if the activity is sufficiently and substan-
tially systematic and continuous, general jurisdiction may be appropriate. For a discus-
sion of these two post-International Shoe general jurisdiction cases, see infra note 213.
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state. Unfortunately, the Court failed to explain what it meant
by an activity that was sufficient to invoke the benefits and pro-
tections of the laws of the forum state.81 For example, did the
benefits and protections invoked have to be related to the forum
state activity that gave rise to the litigation or would unrelated
activity giving rise to benefits and protections suffice? 82 The
Court has never satisfactorily answered this question, nor has it
ever sufficiently clarified what it meant by the phrase "benefits
and protections" of the forum state law.
Even though the Court gave mixed signals in the 1957-1958
Term, when it decided both McGee and Hanson, the Court
made no attempt to clarify what appeared to be two radically
different approaches to jurisdictional analysis for a period of al-
most twenty years.83 Although most commentators viewed Han-
son, with its return to concerns of sovereignty and territorial
power, as abberational, viewed from hindsight McGee's amor-
phous balancing of multiple interests may well have represented
the deviation from developing doctrine. At least that reading of
McGee appeared to be correct prior to Burger King84 and Asahi.
Most commentators view the interregnum between Hanson
and Shaffer v. Heitner85 as an era of jurisdictional expansion in
which state legislatures passed long-arm statutes to reach to the
limits of due process,88 in which state courts actually found
those limits,87 and in which Hanson was largely ignored.8
81. Lilly, supra note 25, at 92 n.29 ("Hanson does not make clear what sorts of
benefits and protections (in terms of nature or substantiality) are necessary to unlock the
door to adjudicatory authority.").
82. Cf. Brilmayer, How Contacts Count: Due Process Limitations on State Court
Jurisdiction, 1980 Sup. CT. REV. 77 (arguing that unrelated contacts should not support
specific jurisdiction).
83. See generally Louis, supra note 78, at 407-10; Perschbacher, supra note 34, at
599.
84. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462 (1985).
85. 433 U.S. 186 (1977). See infra notes 96-122 and accompanying text.
86. See generally Currie, The Growth of the Long Arm: Eight Years of Extended
Jurisdiction in Illinois, 1963 U. ILL. L.F. 533, 536-37; Gorfinkel & Lavine, Long-Arm
Jurisdiction in California Under New Section 410.10 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 21
HASTINGs.L.J. 1163 (1970); Louis, supra note 78, at 408; Perschbacher, supra note 34, at
587, 594-95; Comment, Long-Arm and Quasi in Rem Jurisdiction and the Fundamental
Test of Fairness, 69 MicH. L. R.v. 300 (1970).
87. See, e.g., Cornelison v. Chaney, 16 Cal. 3d 143, 545 P.2d 264, 127 Cal. Rptr. 352
(1976); Buckeye Boiler Co. v. Superior Court, 71 Cal. 2d 893, 458 P.2d 57, 80 Cal. Rptr.
113 (1969); Gray v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 22 Ill. 2d 432, 176
N.E.2d 761 (1961).
88. See supra note 83.
1988]
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B. 1977-1985: Doctrinal Joinder
Regardless of how one views the interim period, the recent
decade from Shaffer to Asahi provided many reformulations of
the due process jurisdictional equation. 9 While frequently rec-
ognizing the relevance of McGee's multiple-interest balancing
approach, the Supreme Court seemed always to rest its decisions
on the firmer foundation of International Shoe's minimum con-
tacts test as refined by Hanson.0 Dissenting in every case in
which the Court rejected a state court's assertion of jurisdic-
tion,91 Justice Brennan was carefully constructing a new founda-
tion on which fundamentally to recast personal jurisdiction.92 As
89. See infra text accompanying notes 115-21, 132-38, and 160-65.
90. See, e.g., Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462 (1985); Keeton v. Hus-
tler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770 (1984); World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444
U.S. 286 (1980); Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84 (1978).
91. Helicopteros Nacionaes de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 419-28 (1984)
(Brennan, J., dissenting); World-Wide, 444 U.S. 299-313 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (dis-
sent also applies to Rush v. Savchuk, 444 U.S. 320 (1980)); Kulko v. Superior Court, 436
U.S. 84, 101-02 (1978) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 219-28
(1977) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
92. First, dissenting in World-Wide and Rush, Justice Brennan openly expressed
dissatisfaction with minimum contacts as the touchstone of jurisdictional due process
when he stated: "Because I believe that the Court reads International Shoe and its prog-
eny too narrowly, and because I believe that the standards enunciated by those cases
may already be obsolete as constitutional boundaries, I dissent." Rush, 444 U.S. at 299
(emphasis added). Later in his opinion, Justice Brennan observed: "It may be that af-
firmance of the judgments in these cases would approach the outer limits of Interna-
tional Shoe's jurisdictional principle. But that principle, with its almost exclusive focus
on the rights of defendants, may be outdated." Id. at 307-08.
Second, Justice Brennan started to articulate a new approach to jurisdictional due
process, in which the purposeful availment contacts doctrine of International Shoe and
Hanson was joined with the multiple-interest balancing doctrine of McGee. Justice
Brennan's approach started to take meaningful form in his World-Wide dissent when he
observed:
The existence of contacts, so long as there were some, was merely one way of
giving content to the determination of fairness and reasonableness.
Surely International Shoe contemplated that the significance of the con-
tacts necessary to support jurisdiction would diminish if some other consider-
ation helped establish that jurisdiction would be fair and reasonable. The
interests of the State and other parties in proceeding with the case in a partic-
ular forum are such considerations. McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., for
instance, accorded great importance to a State's "manifest interest in provid-
ing effective means of redress" for its citizens.
Another consideration is the actual burden a defendant must bear in de-
fending the suit in the forum. Because lesser burdens reduce the unfairness to
18
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several recent commentators have suggested,9 3 he may have fi-
nally succeeded in Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz.94 Justice
Brennan attempted to unify the divergent earlier approaches
into a single test and in doing so may have caused the fragmen-
tation so evident in Asahi.
As with the emergence of the two doctrinally distinct ap-
proaches in the thirteen-year period after International Shoe, it
is beyond the scope of this Article to analyze in detail all the
twists and turns of Supreme Court jurisdictional jurisprudence
in the current era. 5 It is necessary, however, to trace the evolu-
tion of the Court's two-branch approach to jurisdictional analy-
sis, which materialized in its present form in Burger Kifg, to
understand why the Asahi Court was so deeply divided.
Although Shaffer v. Heitner"6 is unquestionably the most
significant Supreme Court decision concerning state court juris-
diction since International Shoe, it's primary importance is its
toppling of Pennoyer's in rem branch. Nevertheless, in accom-
the defendant, jurisdiction may be justified despite less significant contacts.
The burden, of course, must be of constitutional dimension. Due process limits
on jurisdiction do not protect a defendant froni all inconvenience of travel, and
it would not be sensible to make the constitutional rule turn solely on the
number of miles the defendant must travel to the courtroom. Instead, the con-
stitutionally significant "burden" to be analyzed relates to the mobility of the
defendant's defense. For instance, if having to travel to a foreign forum would
hamper the defense because witnesses or evidence or the defendant himself
were immobile, or if there were a disproportionately large number of witnesses
or amount of evidence that would have to be transported at the defendant's
expense, or if being away from home for the duration of the trial would work
some special hardship on the defendant, then the Constitution would require
special consideration for the defendant's interests.
Id. at 300-01 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
93. Perschbacher, supra note 34, at 612-24; see also Knudsen, Keeton, Calder,
Helicopteros and Burger King-International Shoe's Most Recent Progeny, 39 U. MIAN11
L. REv. 809, 837-40 (1985); Sonenshein, The Error of a Balancing Approach to the Due
Process Determination of Jurisdiction Over the Person, 59 TEMP. L.Q. 47, 56-58 (1986);
Comment, Giving the Boot to the Long-Arm: Analysis of Post-International Shoe Su-
preme Court Personal Jurisdiction Decisions, Emphasizing Unrealized Implications of
the "Minimum Contacts" Test, 75 Ky. L.J. 885, 898-901, 905-09 (1987).
94. 471 U.S. 462, 471-78 (1985).
95. For more extensive analysis of the most recent Supreme Court personal jurisdic-
tion decisions and their underlying theories, see Greenstein, The Nature of Legal Argu-
ment: The Personal Jurisdiction Paradigm, 38 HASTINGS L.J. 855 (1987); Knudsen,
supra note 93; Perdue, supra note 17, at 508-19; Perschbacher, supra note 34; Stein,
supra note 75; Weintraub, supra note 75; Comment, supra note 93.
96. 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
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plishing that very worthy and long overdue goal,97 the majority,
speaking through Justice Marshall, gave strong support to the
defendant approach of Hanson.
The jurisdictional issue in Shaffer was complicated because
the forum state asserted quasi-in-rem 98 rather than personal ju-
risdiction. A stockholder of a Delaware corporation with its prin-
cipal place of business in Phoenix, Arizona commenced a share-
holder's derivative action in the Delaware Court of Chancery
against the corporation, its wholly-owned subsidiary," and
twenty-eight officers or directors of one or both corporate de-
fendants. 100 The complaint alleged that the individual defend-
ants breached their duties to the corporations by causing the
corporations to engage in activities in Oregon resulting in "sub-
stantial damages in a private antitrust suit and a large fine in a
criminal contempt action."'' None of the individual defendants
was a resident of Delaware.' 02 No act relevant to the cause of
action occurred in Delaware,103 and apparently none of the indi-
vidual defendants had any contact with Delaware other than
through their positions as officers and directors of the Delaware
chartered defendant or its wholly-owned subsidiary.'0 4
Nonpersonal jurisdiction was asserted over the individual
97. The application of International Shoe's standards to assertions of quasi-in-rem
jurisdiction had been proposed by many courts and commentators prior to Shaffer. The
principal cases and commentaries are collected in Silberman, supra note 75, at 34-35
n.34.
98. In Hanson the Supreme Court provided definitions for the traditional jurisdic-
tional categories as follows:
A judgment in personam imposes a personal liability or obligation on one
person in favor of another. A judgment in rem affects the interests of all per-
sons in designated property. A judgment quasi in rem affects the interests of
particular persons in designated property. The latter is of two types. In one the
plaintiff is seeking to secure a pre-existing claim in the subject property and to
extinguish or establish the nonexistence of similar interests of particular per-
sons. In the other the plaintiff seeks to apply what he concedes to be the prop-
erty of the defendant to the satisfaction of a claim against him.
Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 246 n.12 (1958). It used these same definitions in Shaf-
fer. 433 U.S. at 199 n.17 (quoting Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 246 n.12 (1958)).
99. The subsidiary was a California corporation with a principal place of business
in Phoenix, Arizona. 433 U.S. at 189 n.1.
100. Id, at 189-90.
101. Id. at 190 (footnotes omitted).
102. Id. at 191.
103. Id. at 213.
104. See id.
20
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 39, Iss. 4 [1988], Art. 3
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol39/iss4/3
1988] SAYONARA TO MINIMUM CONTACTS
defendants. Delaware law deemed Delaware the situs of owner-
ship of all stock in Delaware corporations. 0 5 Pursuant to this
statute, common stock and options of twenty-one of the twenty-
eight individual defendants"' were seized under Delaware's se-
questration procedure. 107 These defendants made special ap-
pearances to challenge on due process grounds the assertion of
jurisdiction. 08 After losing in the state courts, they prevailed in
the United States Supreme Court.
Rejecting the fiction that an action against property is not,
in essence, an action against the owner of the property,'01 the
Court, "conclude[d] that all assertions of state-court jurisdiction
must be evaluated according to the standards set forth in Inter-
national Shoe and its progeny."" 0 Applying those standards to
the nonresident, individual defendants in the case before it, the
Court emphasized the relationship among the forum state, the
litigation, and the defendants. Its approach was substantially
closer to International Shoe and Hanson than it was to McGee.
Although it referred to the "reasonableness" and "fair play"
standard of International Shoe at several places in its opin-
ion,"' the Court appeared to rely, as it had in International
Shoe, on contacts as an indication of fairness and reasonable-
105. Id. at 192 & n.9.
106. Id. at 192 & nn.7 & 8.
107. Id. at 190-91 & nn.4-6.
108. Id. at 192-93.
109. Id. at 205-06.
110. Id. at 212. Despite the passage of more than ten years since the Court con-
cluded that all assertions of state court jurisdiction must be analyzed under Interna-
tional Shoe's standards, Shaffer's reach remains in dispute. See e.g., R LEFLAR, L. Mc-
DOUGAL, & R. FELIX, AMERICAN CONFLICTS LAW § 41 (4th ed. 1986); Note, The Physical
Presence Basis of Personal Jurisdiction Ten Years After Shaffer v. Heitner: A Rule in
Search of a Rationale, 62 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 713 (1987). For earlier commentary spec-
ulating on the reach of Shaffer, see Lilly, supra note 25, at 97 n.55.
111. Concluding its historical review of personal jurisdiction developments, the
Court stated: "We think that the time is ripe to consider whether the standard of fair-
ness and substantial justice set forth in International Shoe should be held to govern
actions in rem as well as in personam." 433 U.S. at 206. In addition, in urging that
International Shoe serve as a universal standard for all forms of jurisdiction, the Court
noted as follows: "The case for applying to jurisdiction in rem the same test of 'fair play
and substantial justice' as governs assertions of jurisdiction in personam is simple and
straightforward." Id. at 207. In responding to the argument that "in rem jurisdiction
avoids the uncertainty inherent in the International Shoe standard," id. at 211, the
Court predicted that "the fairness standard of International Shoe can be easily applied
in the vast majority of cases." Id.
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ness.1 12 It found the contacts created by the ownership of stock
to be inadequate to confer jurisdiction.113
As the chartering state, Delaware obviously had a substan-
tial, if not manifest, regulatory interest in the conduct of officers
and directors of Delaware corporations." 4 The Court, however,
rejected the argument that this strong state interest alone
should permit jurisdiction, because Delaware failed to enact a
statute specifically making corporate fiduciaries of Delaware cor-
porations subject to jurisdiction.1  If the Court had been in-
clined to adopt the McGee approach, the substantial state inter-
est would have weighed heavily in favor of jurisdiction.
Moreover, the Court, in most conclusory langauge, suggested
that, even if Delaware's interest is acknowledged, the "argument
fails to demonstrate that Delaware is a fair forum for this litiga-
tion."' 8 Instead of elaborating the fairness point, the Court im-
mediately returned to the argument, which was so prominent in
Hanson,11 7 that, even if the strong state interest supported the
application of Delaware law, it did not necessarily follow that
jurisdiction could be asserted over the defendants." 8 Respond-
ing to the argument that defendant officers and directors in-
voked the benefits and protections of Delaware law, a critically
significant element of Hanson's jurisdictional analysis, the Court
stated that this argument only suggested once more that Dela-
ware law should apply to the controversy, but that it did not
"demonstrate that appellants have 'purposefully avail[ed them-
selves] of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum
State,' in a way that would justify bringing them before a Dela-
ware tribunal." 119 Finally, in language foreshadowing World-
Wide's foreseeability analysis,1 0 the Court observed that the de-
fendants "had no reason to expect to be haled before a Delaware
112. See id. at 216; accord Brilmayer, supra note 82, at 81 & n.28.
113. Id. at 213.
114. Id. at 222-23 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
115. Id. at 214. Shortly after the decision in Shaffer, the Delaware legislature en-
acted a service of process statute to reach nonresident directors of Delaware corpora-
tions. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 3114 (Cum. Supp. 1986); see J. CouND, J. FRiEDENTHAL, A.
MILLER & J. SEXTON, supra note 54, at 149, note 1.
116. 433 U.S. at 215.
117. See supra notes 74 & 75 and accompanying text.
118. 433 U.S. at 215.
119. Id. at 216 (citation omitted).
120. See infra notes 174-78 and accompanying text.
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court."' 21 Once more the Court offered no explanation for this
observation. To the contrary, logic suggests that an officer and
director of a Delaware corporation should well anticipate litiga-
tion in the courts of Delaware, especially in connection with a
shareholder's derivative suit.
Although commentators have debated Shaffer's contribu-
tion to the current two-branch approach to jurisdictional due
process, 22 Shaffer resurrected little, if any, of McGee's multiple-
interest balancing approach, while it placed heavy reliance on
the affiliational minimum contacts test of International Shoe
and Hanson.
The next Term in Kulko v. Superior Court123 the Court
continued to emphasize the relationship between the defendant
and the forum state. A couple, domiliciaries of New York, sepa-
rated and later divorced. 2 4 The wife took up residence in Cali-
fornia, but returned to New York to sign a separation agree-
ment, which provided for the couple's children to live with their
father in New York and spend holidays with their mother in
California. 25 Thereafter, the mother obtained a Haitian di-
vorce.126 Less than two years later one child asked to live with
her mother. Her father acquiesced and bought the child a one-
way plane ticket to California. 127 Two years later the other child
moved to California with a plane ticket provided by his
mother. 2 s Shortly thereafter the mother commenced an action
against the father in California seeking to (1) domesticate her
previously obtained Haitian divorce, (2) obtain full custody of
the couple's children, and (3) increase her husband's child sup-
port obligations. 2  The defendant made a special appearance to
121. 433 U.S. at 216.
122. Compare Perschbacher, supra note 34, at 600 ("[T]he Court relied on Hanson's
territorial view of minimum contacts, not McGee's interest-balancing approach.") with
Clermont, supra note 51, at 421 ("The surprising result, then, is that the formluations of
both McGee and Hanson survive: an assertion of jurisdiction apparently must pass both
the reasonableness and the power tests.") (footnote omitted).
123. 436 U.S. 84 (1978).
124. Id. at 86-87.
125. Id. at 87.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 87-88.
128. Id. at 88.
129. Id. Defendant only contested jurisdiction to increase his child support
obligation.
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challenge jurisdiction "on the ground that he was not a resident
of California and lacked sufficient 'minimum contacts' with the
State . . . to warrant the . . . assertion of personal jurisdiction
over him."'130 The California Supreme Court, with two judges
dissenting, affirmed the lower courts' rejection of the defend-
ant's jurisdictional challenge because the defendant had caused
effects in California by allowing his children to live there, and
because he invoked the benefits and protections of California
law when he sent his daughter to live with her mother in
California.
13'
The Supreme Court reversed. In its discussion of legal prin-
ciples, the Court once again strongly emphasized the affiliational
minimum contacts test derived from International Shoe, Han-
son and Shaffer, as opposed to the multiple-interest balancing
approach of McGee. Speaking for the Court, Justice Marshall
stated: "The existence of personal jurisdiction . . . depends
upon . . . a sufficient connection between the defendant and
the forum state to make it fair to require defense of the action
in the forum."' 32 Although the Court gave substantial attention
to the interests of the plaintiff and the forum state,13 the Court
rested its holding on the lack of any relevant contact between
the defendant and the forum state.1 34 As in International Shoe,
fairness and reasonableness were not independently factored
into the jurisdictional equation, but were assumed if contacts
were established. The Court expressed this view as follows:
While the interests of the forum State and of the plaintiff in
proceeding with the cause in the plaintiff's forum of choice are,
of course, to be considered, an essential criterion in all cases is
whether the "quality and nature" of the defendant's activity is
such that it is "reasonable" and "fair" to require him to con-
duct his defense in that State. '35
Undoubtedly the decision of the Court striking down Cali-
130. Id. (citation omitted).
131. Kulko v. Superior Court, 19 Cal. Sup. Ct. 3d 514, 524-25, 564 P.2d 353, 358-59,
138 Cal. Rptr. 586, 591 (1977), af'g 63 Cal. App. 3d 417, 133 Cal. Rptr. 627 (Ct. App.
1976), rev'd, 436 U.S. 84 (1978).
132. 436 U.S. at 91 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
133. Id. at 92, 98, 100. More attention was given to plaintiff and forum state inter-
ests than in any case since McGee.
134. Id. at 100-01.
135. Id. at 92 (citation omitted).
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fornia's assertion of jurisdiction was substantially influenced by
the domestic relations context in which the jurisdictional issue
was presented.136 The Court had difficulty applying principles
derived .from jurisdictional disputes arising in tort and commer-
cial contexts to litigation over custody and child support.137 Al-
though Kulko undoubtedly was consistent with the affiliational
minimum contacts approach, its substantial consideration of
plaintiff and forum state interests also appeared to validate Mc-
Gee's multiple-interest balancing approach for modern jurisdic-
tional analysis. But as in McGee, the Court failed to clarify how
these considerations are factored into the jurisdictional frame-
work established in International Shoe or how they indepen-
dently impact upon the analysis. 38 Nevertheless, Kulko may
well have laid the groundwork for the doctrinal joinder of Inter-
national Shoe and Hanson with McGee. The Court's next per-
sonal jurisdiction decision expressly attempted to divide juris-
dictional due process into a two-branch inquiry.
In deciding whether Oklahoma could assert personal juris-
diction over two New York defendants in a products liability ac-
tion arising out of an accident in Oklahoma, the Supreme Court
in World-Wide Volkswagen v. Woodson 39 explicitly divided
minimum contacts analysis into two distinct branches. Writing
for a divided Court,140 Justice White articulated this conceptual
division as follows:
The concept of minimum contacts ... can be seen to perform
two related, but distinguishable, functions. It protects the de-
fendant against the burdens of litigating in a distant or incon-
venient forum. And it acts to ensure that the States, through
their courts, do not reach out beyond the limits imposed on
them by their status as coequal sovereigns in a federal
system. 4'
136. See id. at 93, 94, 97-98. See generally Bodenheimer & Neeley-Kvarme, Juris-
diction Over Child Custody and Adoption After Shaffer and Kulko, 12 U.C. DAvis L.
REv. 229 (1979).
137. 436 U.S. at 97.
138. See supra text accompanying note 49.
139. 444 U.S. 286 (1980).
140. The Court divided 6-3, with Chief Justice Burger and Justices Stewart, Powell,
Rehnquist, and Stevens joining Justice White's majority opinion. Justices Brennan, Mar-
shall, and Blackmun each filed dissenting opinions.
141. 444 U.S. at 291-92. Commentators soon dubbed the two "related, but distin-
guishable, functions," id., the "sovereignty branch" and the "convenience branch" of a
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The Court then attempted to explain its two "related, but dis-
tinguishable, functions.' 1 42  Finding a source for protection
against inconvenient litigation in the general language of Inter-
national Shoe, 43 the Court characterized this function or
branch of minimum contacts as testing reasonableness or fair-
ness. 144 The Court identified five separate elements distilled
from prior case law to give content to this branch. They were:
(1) "burden on the defendant;' 45 (2) "the forum State's interest
in adjudicating the dispute;' 4 (3) "the plaintiff's interest in ob-
taining convenient and effective relief,114 1 at least when that in-
terest is not adequately protected by the plaintiff's power to
choose the forum;"'4 (4) "the interstate judicial system's inter-
est in obtaining the most efficient resolution of controversies;'
'1 49
and (5) "the shared interest of the several states in furthering
fundamental substantive social policies.' 50 Other than its recog-
nition, in view of modern advances in transportation and com-
munication, 15 of the diminished role of due process to protect
against inconvenient litigation, the articulation of the five ele-
ments, without further explanation or elaboration, was the
Court's only discussion of the fairness branch.
Although the Court alluded to state sovereignty and federal-
ism in International Shoe 52 and Hanson,53 these concepts had
new two-part test. See, e.g., J. COUND, J. FRIENDENTHAL, A. MILLER & J. SEXTON, supra
note 54, at 115, note 2.
142. 444 U.S. at 291-92.
143. Id. at 292.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id. (citing McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 223 (1957)).
147. Id. (citing Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84, 92 (1978)).
148. Id. (citing Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 211 n.37 (1977)).
149. Id. (citing Kulko, 436 U.S. at 93, 98).
150. Id.
151. Id. at 292-93.
152. Paraphrasing Judge Learned Hand's famous criticism of the "presence" fiction,
Chief Justice Stone, in International Shoe, acknowledged that presence is "used merely
to symbolize those activities of the corporation's agent within the state which courts will
deem to be sufficient to satisfy the demands of due process." 326 U.S. at 317 (emphasis
added) (citing Hutchinson v. Chase & Gilbert, Inc., 45 F.2d 139, 141 (2d Cir. 1930)). The
Court then recognized that sovereignty and federalism are implicated in jurisdictional
due process when it stated: "Those demands may be met by such contacts of the corpo-
ration with the state of the forum as make it reasonable, in the context of our federal
system of government, to require the corporation to defend the particular suit which is
brought there." Id. (emphasis added).
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never been given the significance they had in World-Wide. Per-
haps the Court was using "sovereignty" as a substitute for the
purposeful affiliation requirement derived from those earlier
cases.15 Hindsight and the final part of the World-Wide opinion
strongly suggest that this substitution is probably what the
Court intended by its use of sovereignty. 155 Nevertheless, the
concept of sovereignty as presented by the Court was susceptible
to a much broader and quite different interpretation. Justice
White appeared to find a structural limitation in both the origi-
nal text and the fourteenth amendment of the Constitution to
the assertion of state court personal jurisdiction.'56 He described
153. Discussing in rem jurisdiction, Chief Justice Warren observed: "Founded on
physical power, the in rem jurisdiction of a state court is limited by the extent of its
power and by the coordinate authority of sister States. The basis of the jurisdiction is
the presence of the subject property within the territorial jurisdiction of the forum
State." Hanson v. Denkla, 357 U.S. 235, 246 (1958) (emphasis added) (citations and foot-
note omitted); see supra note 68 and accompanying text.
154. See Lilly, supra note 25, at 104. Professor Lilly explained the "sovereignty"
concept in terms that parallel traditional views of minimum contacts when he wrote:
[W]hen one state manifests its sovereign power through the purported exercise
of its judicial jurisdiction, parallel prerogatives of sister states may circum-
scribe this authority. The quality, number or pattern of defendant's contacts
will determine which states can sustain their competing jurisdictional claims.
Because contacts are measured against the requirements of the due process
clause, this constitutional provision limits and distributes the judicial power
among the various states.
Id. (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
155. See 444 U.S. at 295-99. Justice White may have adopted the sovereignty con-
cept to free conventional minimum contacts analysis from the vestiges of Pennoyer's
narrow view of adjudicatory power. Of course, calling something by another name does
not really change it. Part III of the World-Wide opinion is consistent with International
Shoe and Hanson. See infra text accompanying notes 164-65.
156. Justice White articulated this structural limitation on the assertion of state
court jurisdiction as follows:
Nevertheless, we have never accepted the proposition that state lines are
irrelevant for jurisdictional purposes, nor could we, and remain faithful to the
principles of interstate federalism embodied in the Constitution. The economic
interdependence of the States was foreseen and desired by the Framers. In the
Commerce Clause, they provided that the Nation was to be a common market,
a "free trade unit" in which the States are debarred from acting as separable
economic entities. But the Framers also intended that the States retain many
essential attributes of sovereignty, including, in particular, the sovereign power
to try causes in their courts. The sovereignty of each State, in turn, implied a
limitation on the sovereignty of all of its sister States-a limitation express or
implicit in both the original scheme of the Constitution and the Fourteenth
Amendment.
444 U.S. at 293 (emphasis added) (citation omitted). No further explanation was offered
for this significant constitutional pronouncement.
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these limitations as being contained in "principles of interstate
federalism embodied in the Constitution.' 15 7 But he did not
state where in the text, or fourteenth amendment, of the Consti-
tution these principles are found.'5 8 Moreover, Justice White
failed to explain how the assertion of jurisdiction by one state
might impinge upon the sovereignty of a sister state. 59
Immediately before applying the articulated principles to
the facts of World-Wide, Justice White seemed to elevate the
sovereignty branch to a far more prominent role than the fair-
ness branch. This portion of the opinion appeared inconsistent
with the earlier articulation of the dual role played by minimum
contacts, in which each function or branch appeared equally im-
portant.160 After quoting International Shoe for the innocuous
proposition that due process prohibits a state from asserting ju-
risdiction over a defendant with which it "has no contacts, ties,
or relations,"'' Justice White emphatically stated:
Even if the defendant would suffer minimal or no inconve-
nience from being forced to litigate before the tribunals of an-
other State; even if the forum State has a strong interest in
applying its law to the controversy; even if the forum state is
the most convenient location for litigation, the Due Process
Clause, acting as an instrument of interstate federalism, may
sometimes act to divest the State of its power to render a valid
judgment.
162
This powerful language appeared to sound the death knell for
McGee's multi-interest balancing approach to jurisdictional due
process. Contemporaneous commentators certainly viewed
World- Wide that way.
6 3
Remarkably, in applying its new two-branch minimum con-
157. Id.
158. See supra note 156.
159. See id.
160. See supra note 141 and accompanying text.
161. 444 U.S. at 294.
162. Id. (citation omitted).
163. See, e.g., Clermont, supra note 51, at 422-23; Kamp, Beyond Minimum Con-
tacts: The Supreme Court's New Jurisdictional Theory, 15 GA. L. REV. 19, 20, 24, 29
(1980). See generally Lewis, The Three Deaths of "State Sovereignty" and the Curse of
Abstraction in the Jurisprudence of Personal Jurisdiction, 58 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 699,
711-18 (1983); Comment, Federalism, Due Process, and Minimum Contacts: World-
Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 1341, 1352-61 (1980).
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tacts test to the case before it, the Court not only forgot about
the fairness branch, but it also seemed to ignore the sovereignty
branch, at least insofar as sovereignty had any significance "as
an instrument of interstate federalism.116 4 The Court's analysis,
however, was perfectly consistent with International Shoe and
Hanson. The analysis focused on whether the nonresident de-
fendants had purposefully availed themselves of the benefits and
protections of Oklahoma law. The Court found that they had
not, and reversed the decision of the Oklahoma Supreme Court,
which had upheld jurisdiction over the two New York
defendants." 5
The World-Wide defendants were all participants in the
distribution of Audi automobiles. An Audi automobile manufac-
tured by one defendant,6 6 imported by another,6 7 and region-
ally distributed by a third,68 was sold by a retail dealer, the
fourth defendant, 6 9 to plaintiffs in New York. Plaintiffs later
decided to move to Arizona.170 While traveling in their Audi
from New York to their new home in Arizona, plaintiffs were
involved in an accident in Oklahoma, causing personal injury
and property damage.' 71 Claiming that their injuries resulted
from design defects in the Audi's gas tank and fuel system, they
brought a products liability action in an Oklahoma state court
against each party in the Audi's chain of distribution.1 7' The
New York regional distributor and retail dealer challenged juris-
diction. Despite the apparent absence of any connection between
the New York defendants and the forum state, the Oklahoma
Supreme Court upheld jurisdiction because an automobile sold
and distributed by these defendants was involved in an accident
in Oklahoma, and on the alternative, but speculative, ground
that these defendants derive substantial economic benefit from
automobiles that may periodically be used in Oklahoma.
17 3
164. 444 U.S. at 294.
165. Id. at 295, 298-99.
166. Audi NSU Auto Union Aktiengesellschaft. Id. at 288.
167. Volkswagen of America, Inc. Id.
168. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. Id.
169. Seaway Volkswagen, Inc. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. See id. at 290-91.
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Finding "a total absence of those affiliating circumstances
that are a necessary predicate to any exercise of state-court ju-
risdiction, 17 4 the Supreme Court reversed. The remainder of
the majority opinion is devoted largely to refuting the argument
that jurisdiction was proper because it generally was foreseeable
that an automobile purchased in New York might cause injury
in Oklahoma. 175 The Court acknowledged, however, that "fore-
seeability" is not "wholly irrelevant.' ' 76 In expressing this view,
drawn from its then most recent jurisdiction decisions,77 the
Court appeared to articulate another critically significant ele-
ment of jurisdictional analysis when it stated: "[T]he foresee-
ability that is critical to the due process analysis is . . .that the
defendant's conduct and connection with the forum state are
such that he should reasonably anticipate being haled into court
there.' 17 While some commentators view the "foreseeability of
being haled into court" requirement favorably,7 9 and others find
174. Id. at 295. The Court also noted:
Petitioners carry on no activity whatsoever in Oklahoma. They close no sales
and perform no services there. They avail themselves of none of the privileges
and benefits of Oklahoma law. They solicit no business there either through
salespersons or through advertising reasonably calculated to reach the State.
Nor does the record show that they regularly sell cars at wholesale or retail to
Oklahoma customers or residents or that they indirectly, through others, serve
or seek to serve the Oklahoma market.
Id.
175. Id. at 295-96.
176. Id. at 297.
177. Both Kulko and Shaffer mentioned, but did not attach substantial significance
to, the concept of reasonably anticipating forum state litigation. Kulko v. Superior
Court, 436 U.S. 84, 97-98 (1978); see supra text accompanying notes 120-21 (Shaffer).
178. 444 U.S. at 297. Professor Perschbacher, notwithstanding his criticism of the
concept, see infra note 180, views foreseeability in the World-Wide sense as a critically
significant element of jurisdictional due process. Perschbacher, supra note 34, at 604
("In World- Wide Volkswagen and to a greater extent in Burger King, foreseeability has
become a critical step in the analysis.").
179. See, e~g., Hay, Judicial Jurisdiction Over Foreign- Country Corporate Defend-
ants-Comments on Recent Case Law, 63 OR. L. REv. 431, 432-33 (1984) (foreseeability
"is a proper counterbalance to the local forum's inclination to favor the local plaintiff");
cf. Lewis, A Brave New World for Personal Jurisdiction: Flexible Tests Under Uniform
Standards, 37 VAND. L. REV. 1, 18-24 (1984), in which Professor Lewis urges that factors
extrinsic to the lawsuit are a more reliable indicators of the concept of "foreseeability of
forum state litigation" than are intrinsic factors. He expressed this view as follows:
How readily a court concludes that a reasonable person in the defendant's
position should have expected suit in a particular forum state on a particular
claim will vary with the source and probative value of the evidence about ex-
pectations. In the usual case the only evidence relevant to these expectations
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it useless,180 it generally is duplicative of Hanson's purposeful
that will be adducible at a hearing on jurisdiction will be intrinsic to the law-
suit-it will consist of the facts about the defendant's allegedly actionable con-
duct and the place where that conduct occurred or had reasonably foreseeable
effects. In such cases a court should proceed cautiously before concluding that
a reasonable person in the defendant's position should have expected to defend
the particular claim in the particular forum picked by the plaintiff. Neverthe-
less, the situs of the defendant's conduct at issue in the lawsuit may often be
enough, standing alone, to fairly support an inference of the required expecta-
tions. For example, if the plaintiff proves that the defendant's assertedly ac-
tionable conduct took place in or foreseeably affected State X, and State X is
the forum, may it not be fairly concluded that a reasonable potential defend-
ant (assuming he contemplated suit somewhere) should have included State X
among the states in which he might be called to account? Indeed, on close
examination, nonresident motorist statues and other widely accepted means of
securing personal jurisdiction that are rationalized in terms of contacts in fact
may be constitutionally valid today only on this broader rationale of expecta-
tions generated by the situs of the defendant's challenged activity.
A court should be far less hesitant to find that a reasonable person in the
defendant's position ought to have expected to defend a particular claim in a
particular state when extrinsic evidence of such an expectation is pre-
sent-that is, evidence about circumstances, other than the defendant's con-
duct at issue in the lawsuit, that should put the potential defendant on no-
tice of where an action might be brought. Examples of such circumstances
include forum selection clauses in contracts, other affirmative indications of
consent to jurisdiction, and state long-arm statutes that are keyed to specific
transactions. These circumstances usually will enable courts to conclude fairly
and confidentially that the hypothetical reasonable defendant who contem-
plates suit should have expected to be sued in the state designated by the long-
arm statute, contractual agreement, or other medium of consent. Fundamental
fairness does suggest, however, two caveats on this rationale. First, the evi-
dence must show that the statute, forum selection clause, or other extrinsic
source of the defendant's expectations about place of suit likely will put the
defendant on notice that his conduct might subject him to the jurisdiction of a
particular state. Second, if the extrinsic source of the defendant's expectations
about place of suit is his own agreement, that agreement must be voluntary in
the sense that the defendant could have withheld it without sacrificing a preex-
isting constitutional right.
Id. at 20-22 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted).
180. See, e.g., Maltz, Reflections on a Landmark: Shaffer v. Heitner Viewed From a
Distance, 1986 B.Y.U.L. REv. 1043, 1056-57; Perschbacher, supra note 34, at 604, in
which the author criticizes World-Wide's foreseeability analysis as follows:
Requiring a reasonable anticipation of forum litigation has its problems.
On one level, this analysis is hopelessly circular--or at least dependent on the
last Supreme Court jurisdiction opinion. ("Reasonably anticipate" is a subjec-
tive element objectively defined.) Potential defendants probably do not actu-
ally consider the possibility of litigation in an out-of-state forum, or any partic-
ular place for that matter. Assuming they do (which this test must require),
and that this element must be shown objectively, the distinction between the
foreseeability of litigation because one sells products in a distant forum
through intermediaries or whether the products arrive in the forum through
31
Stravitz: Sayonara to Minimum Contracts: Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superi
Published by Scholar Commons, 1988
760 SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 39
availment requirement. Justice White even acknowledged as
much when he observed that if "'a corporation purposefully
avails itself of the privileges of conducting activities within the
forum State,' it has clear notice that it is subject to suit
there."""1 In some situations, however, a nonresident defendant
may not invoke the benefits and protections of forum state law,
but forum state litigation nevertheless may be foreseeable. This
situation is most likely to be found in tort and other noncom-
mercial cases with individual defendants. Purposeful availment
of the benefits and protections of forum state law most often is
encountered in commercial contexts by business defendants.'2
A nonresident individual, on the other hand, may engage in con-
duct either within 83 or without'8 the state, which will have
the predictable movement of consumers is a difficult one. However, the Court
makes this distinction, over vigorous dissents in World-Wide Volkswagen.
Id. (footnote omitted); Weinberg, The Helicopter Case and the Jurisprudence of Juris-
diction, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 913, 919 (1985) ("foreseeability of the place of trial is a value
that does not seem to need heavy handed constitutional protection"); Weintraub, supra
note 75, at 502 (suggesting that World-Wide's view of foreseeability "would protect from
suit even a large, multi-state seller of high-priced goods and, perhaps more to the point,
would protect that seller's liability insurer").
181. 444 U.S. at 297.
182. See, e.g., Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 472-76, 480-82 (1985);
Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 773-75, 779, 781 (1984); Travelers Health
Ass'n v. Virginia, 339 U.S. 643, 648 (1950).
183. For example, when a nonresident motorist uses the highways of the forum
state, lie does not invoke the benefits and protections of the forum state law that are
related to the litigation in any meaningful sense. Of course, the police power of the state
protects the motorist while he is in the forum state, and, of course, the nonresident may
sue a tortfeasor in the courts of the forum state. But these types of forum state benefits
and protections are not directly related to the occurrence of an automobile accident giv-
ing rise to the lawsuit. Professor Stein expressed the view that benefits in these circum-
stances are far outweighed by the burdens imposed on the nonresident defendant. Stein,
supra note 75, at 736 (criticizing purposeful availment as a "consensual" or "fair ex-
change" doctrine, but approving jurisdiction over a nonresident motorist in an action
arising from a forum state accident because such a defendant acts within the forum's
"sphere of regulatory authority").
184. E.g., Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 787 & n.6, 789 (1984) (approved jurisdiction
over two Florida journalists in California based on the effects caused by their allegedly
libelous article in the forum state). In the tort context presented in Calder it is difficult
to see how the nonresident defendants invoked the benefits and protections of forum
state law while writing and publishing their article. It is easy, however, to discern how
these defendants reasonably should have anticipated litigation in California where the
target of their article lived and worked. But see Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84
(1978) (suggesting that the forum "effects" in a domestic relations dispute were too at-
tenuated to confer jurisdiction). For further discussion and analysis of Calder, see infra
note 207.
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foreseeable consequences from which the individual reasonably
should anticipate forum state litigation. Consequently, in many
situations World- Wide's foreseeability concept apparently has
independent significance apart from Hanson's purposeful avail-
ment requirement.
Finally, the Court contrasted the unilateral conduct of the
World-Wide plaintiffs in driving their New York-purchased au-
tomobile to Oklahoma with an attempt by a manufacturer to
serve, directly or indirectly, a foreign market. In dicta which
would deeply divide the Asahi Court, Justice White observed:
The forum state does not exceed its powers under the Due Pro-
cess Clause if it asserts personal jurisdiction over a corporation
that delivers its products into the stream of commerce with the
expectation that they will be purchased by consumers in the
forum State.185
World-Wide and its companion case Rush v. Savchuk'85 seemed
185. 444 U.S. at 297-98.
186. 444 U.S. 320 (1980). In Rush the Court struck down Minnesota's assertion of
quasi-in-rem jurisdiction arising from the garnishment of an insurance obligation. Under
this type of attachment jurisdiction, which developed in New York, see Simpson v. Loeh-
mann, 21 N.Y.2d 305, 234 N.E.2d 669, 287 N.Y.S.2d 633 (1967); Seider v. Roth, 17
N.Y.2d 111, 216 N.E.2d 312, 269 N.Y.S.2d 99 (1966), a forum state plaintiff could attach
the obligation of an insurance company doing business in the forum to defend and in-
demnify a nonresident-insured defendant.
The facts were simple. Savchuk was a passenger in an automobile driven by Rush
which was involved in a single car accident in Indiana. The car was owned by Rush's
father and was insured by State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company. 444 U.S.
at 322. Any claim by Savchuk against Rush would have been barred by Indiana's guest
statute. Id. After moving to Minnesota, Savchuk commenced an action against Rush. As
there was no basis to assert personal jurisdiction over Rush in Minnesota, "Savchuk at-
tempted to obtain jurisdiction by garnishing State Farm's obligation under the insurance
policy to defend and indemnify Rush in connection with such a suit." Id. (footnote
omitted).
The Minnesota Supreme Court upheld the exercise of quasi-in-rem jurisdiction.
Savchuk v. Rush, 311 Minn. 480, 245 N.W.2d 624 (1976). On appeal the Supreme Court
vacated the judgment and remanded for reconsideration in light of Shaffer. 433 U.S. 902
(1977). Distinguishing its garnishment statute from Delaware's sequestration procedure,
which was struck down in Shaffer, because the insurance policy was intimately related to
the litigation, the Minnesota Supreme Court again upheld jurisdiction. Savchuk v. Rush,
272 N.W.2d 888 (Minn. 1978). The Supreme Court reversed. It reiterated that the juris-
dictional "inquiry must focus on 'the relationship among the defendant, the forum, and
the litigation.'" 444 U.S. at 327 (quoting Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 204 (1977)).
Finding the relationship to Minnesota created by the "adventitious" decision of his in-
surer to do business there plainly inadequate, the Court found that Rush did not engage
in any purposeful conduct related to the forum. Id. at 328-29. It also found no significant
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plainly intended to restrict extensions of state court jurisdiction.
At the end of the 1979 Term it was becoming abundantly clear
that McGee's multiple-interest balancing was the exception and
Hanson's purposeful availment was the rule. Most commenta-
tors deplored this development 87 and found comfort only in
contact between the underlying litigation and Minnesota. The Court noted that the in-
surer's obligation had nothing to do with the substance of the litigation. If no substan-
tive connection was required, a defendant insured by a national insurance company
would be subject to jurisdiction in all fifty states. Id. at 330.
The Court also rejected the analogy to a direct-action statute, which Judge Friendly
adopted in O'Conner v. Lee-Hy Paving Corp., 579 F.2d 19 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 439
U.S. 1034 (1978), to uphold Seider jurisdiction after Shaffer, because without a direct
action statute there is no basis to reach the garnishee insurer without proper jurisdiction
over the "nominal" nonresident insured defendant. 444 U.S. at 330-31. In essence the
Court recognized that Seider attachment jurisdiction allowed jurisdiction over a nonresi-
dent defendant based on the forum state activities of his insurer. Id. at 332. Finding
"[s]uch a result plainly unconstitutional," the Court observed that "[t]he requirements
of International Shoe . . . must be met as to each defendant over whom a state court
exercises jurisdiction." Id.
The Court seemed particularly concerned with the shift in focus under Seider juris-
diction from the relationship among the defendant, the forum, and the litigation "to that
among the plaintiff, the forum, the insurer and the litigation." Id. According to the
Court, the inquiry was shifted from defendant's purposeful affiliation to plaintiffrs con-
nection with the forum. Id. The Court once more expressed its preference for the juris-
dictional approach of International Shoe and Hanson. The Court plainly found the
Seider approach "forbidden by International Shoe and its progeny." Id. But, as in
Kulko and World-Wide, it recognized that the multi-interest balancing approach of Mc-
Gee had a role in the jurisdictional equation. Unlike its ambiguous reference to the fair-
ness or reasonableness branch in World-Wide, the court in Rush attempted to explain
how the fairness elements enter the calculus. The Court stated: "If a defendant has cer-
tain judicially cognizable ties with a State, a variety of factors relating to the particular
cause of action may be relevant to the determination whether the exercise of jurisdiction
would comport with 'traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.'" Id.
Plainly, the Court was asserting that only after minimum contacts are first found under
the International Shoe-Hanson purposeful availment approach, do any other factors
enter the analysis to test reasonableness or fairness. The Court did not indicate, how-
ever, whether jurisdiction properly found under a traditional minimum contacts analysis,
could be dislodged by McGee-type factors, such as the forum state interest, or whether
those other factors might only serve to reinforce contacts-based jurisdiction, or how the
other elements are generally factored into the jurisdictional equation. For the Court's
current view of this subject, see infra text accompanying notes 245-55. But see infra text
accompanying notes 336-41.
187. See, e.g., Braveman, Interstate Federalism and Personal Jurisdiction, 33 SYR-
ACUSE L. REv. 533 (1982); Gottlieb, In Search of the Link Between Due Process and
Jurisdiction, 60 WASH. U.L.Q. 1291, 1297-1300 (1983); Jay, "Minimum Contacts" as a
Unified Theory of Personal Jurisdiction: A Reappraisal, 59 N.C.L. REv. 429 (1981);
Lewis, supra note 179, at 7-9; Lilly, supra note 25, at 102-07; Redish, Due Process, Fed-
eralism, and Personal Jurisdiction: A Theoretical Evaluation, 75 Nw. U.L. REV. 1112
(1981); Weintraub, supra note 75, at 499-503. Contra Brilmayer, supra note 82, at 84-88,
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Justice Brennan's sharp dissent, which both questioned the con-
tinuing vitality of International Shoe, 18 and vigorously advo-
cated adoption of a multiple-interest balancing approach to ju-
risdictional due process.18 9
The adoption of the sovereignty function or branch of the
minimum contacts test in World-Wide set off a firestorm of aca-
demic protest, 9 ' and the Supreme Court attempted to clarify its
view of sovereignty two years later in Insurance Corp. of Ire-
land, Ltd. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee.'9' Recognizing
that the right of a defendant to waive objections to personal ju-
risdiction undermines the sovereignty and federalism concerns
expressed in World-Wide, Justice White recanted much of his
prior analysis both in the text of the opinion' 92 and in a lengthy
91-96; Louis, supra note 78, at 423-32.
188. E.g., McDougal, Judicial Jurisdiction: From a Contact to an Interest Analysis,
35 VAND. L. REV. 1, 13-15 (1982) (finding a foundation for a "systematic interest analysis
theory" in Justice Brennan's dissent, but proposing substantial modifications); see supra
note 92 and accompanying text.
189. See 444 U.S. at 300-01; supra note 92 and accompanying text.
190. See, e.g., Braveman, supra note 187; Clermont, supra note 51; Drobak, The
Federalism Theme in Personal Jurisdiction, 68 IOWA L. REv. 1015 (1983); Gottlieb,
supra note 187; Jay, supra note 187; Kamp, supra note 163; Lewis, supra note 179; Red-
ish, supra note 187.
191. 456 U.S. 694 (1982). It is likely that the repudiation of the sovereignty branch
of the due process analysis is indirectly attributable to the negative academic response to
its articulation in World-Wide. The Court in Insurance Corp. deliberately addressed the
issue even though it was unnecessary to decide the case before it. Justice Powell cer-
tainly believed the issue did not need to be addressed when he stated: "Fair resolution of
this case does not require the Court's broad holding." Id. at 710 (Powell, J., concurring
in the judgment, but not joining the opinion of the Court). The issue in Insurance Corp.
was whether "a district court, as a sanction for failure to comply with a discovery order
directed at establishing jurisdictional facts, [may] proceed on the basis that personal
jurisdiction over the recalcitrant party has been established?" Id. at 695. FED. R. Civ. P.
37(b)(2)(A) allows a federal district court to order that "designated facts shall be taken
to be established" as a sanction for failure to comply with a discovery order. The Court
upheld personal jurisdiction over several foreign insurance companies because by failing
to comply with a discovery order, the defendants waived their right to object to jurisdic-
tion. Id. at 707-09. The Court analogized the discovery sanction to a waiver resulting
from failure to enter a timely objection to personal jurisdiction. FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(2) &
(h). Id. at 705.
192. 456 U.S. at 702-04. Contrasting federal subject matter jurisdiction with state
court personal jurisdiction, Justice White recognized that, while the former is constitu-
tionally circumscribed by Article III and may not be waived by litigants, no similar
structural limitation applies to personal jurisdiction, which may be waived by a defend-
ant. Id. He then stated: "The requirement that a court have personal jurisdiction flows
not from Art. III, but from the Due Process Clause. The personal jurisdiction require-
ment recognizes and protects an individual liberty interest. It represents a restriction on
35
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footnote.1 1 3 In addition, he repudiated the notion that the Con-
stitution imposed a structural limitation on state court personal
jurisdiction.19 4 If the Constitution contained any structural limi-
tation on state court personal jurisdiction, it would be impossi-
ble for a defendant to waive objections to the assertion of per-
sonal jurisdiction. Justice White came to this conclusion by
contrasting personal jurisdiction with federal subject matter ju-
risdiction. Recognizing that article III, section 2 of the Constitu-
tion circumscribes the scope of federal subject matter jurisdic-
tion 95  and that litigants cannot confer subject matter
judicial power not as a matter of sovereignty, but as a matter of individual liberty." Id.
at 702 (footnote omitted). Justice White concluded his textual recantation of World-
Wide's sovereignty branch as follows: "In sum, the requirement of personal jurisdiction
may be intentionally waived, or for various reasons a defendant may be estopped from
raising the issue. These characteristics portray it for what it is-a legal right protecting
the individual." Id. at 704.
193. 456 U.S. at 702-03 n.10, which states:
It is true that we have stated that the requirement of personal jurisdiction,
as applied to state courts, reflects an element of federalism and the character
of state sovereignty vis-a-vis other States. For example, in World-Wide Volk-
swagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 291-292 (1980), we stated:
[A] state court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant
only so long as there exist 'minimum contacts' between the defendant and the
forum State. The concept of minimum contacts, in turn, can be seen to per-
form two related, but distinguishable, functions. It protects the defendant
against the burdens of litigating in a distant or inconvenient forum. And it acts
to ensure that the States, through their courts, do not reach out beyond the
limits imposed on them by their status as coequal sovereigns in a federal sys-
tem. (Citation omitted).
Contrary to the suggestion of JUSTICE POWELL, post, at 713-714, our hold-
ing today does not alter the requirement that there be "minimum contacts"
between the nonresident defendant and the forum State. Rather, our holding
deals with how the facts needed to show those "minimum contacts" can be
established when a defendant fails to comply with court-ordered discovery.
The restriction on state sovereign power described in World-Wide Volkswagen
Corp., however, must be seen as ultimately a function of the individual liberty
interest preserved by the Due Process Clause. That Clause is the only source of
the personal jurisdiction requirement and the Clause itself makes no mention
of federalism concerns, Furthermore, if the federalism concept operated as an
independent restriction on the sovereign power of the court, it would not be
possible to waive the personal jurisdiction requirement: Individual actions can-
not change the powers of sovereignty, although the individual can subject him-
self to powers from which he may otherwise be protected.
Id. (emphasis added).
194. See supra notes 192-93.
195. Federal subject matter jurisdiction is even more narrowly limited by statute.
See, e.g., Owen Equip. & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 373-74 (1978) (narrowly
construing 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1968 & Supp. 1986)); Aldinger v. Howard, 427 U.S. 1, 17
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jurisdiction on federal courts by consent or waiver, Justice
White tersely observed that "[n]one of this is true with respect
to personal jurisdiction." '196 Although rejecting any structural
limit on state court personal jurisdiction, the Court acknowl-
edged that the jurisdictional reach of state courts is limited by
the individual liberty interest protected by the due process
clause. 197
Focusing on Insurance Corp.'s sovereignty retreat, certain
commentators concluded that the Court had opened the door to
full application of the multi-interest balancing approach to juris-
dictional due process espoused in McGee and to a lesser extent
in World-Wide's fairness or reasonableness branch. "98 The next
three International Shoe progeny, all decided during the 1983
Term, proved that prediction wrong, and generally unsettled the
law of personal jurisdiction.
Two of the cases-Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc. e99 and
Calder v. Jones200 -were decided on the same day and were
written by then Justice Rehnquist writing for unanimous Courts.
(1976) (narrowly construing 28 U.S.C. § 1343 (Supp. 1987), which is the jurisdictional
statute implementing 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982)). Fundamentally, Congress may not ex-
pand the allocation of judicial power-constitutional subject matter jurisdic-
tion-conferred by Article III of the Constitution. Cf. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1
Cranch) 137 (1803) (rejecting the power of Congress to confer by statute original juris-
diction on the Supreme Court not provided for in the Constitution). But as a result of
the Madisonian Compromise at the Constitutional Convention, the Constitution itself
did not mandate creation of inferior-or lower-federal courts. It left the creation of
such courts to Congress. See Redish & Woods, Congressional Power to Control the Ju-
risdiction of Lower Federal Courts: A Critical Review and a New Synthesis, 124 U. PA.
L. REv. 45, 52-55 (1975). In the years following the adoption of the Judiciary Act of 1789,
which first established inferior federal courts, it was a much debated question whether
the lower courts created by Congress must necessarily exercise all of the judicial power
not allocated by the Constitution to the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, or
whether Congress could, in statutorilly creating such courts, confer less than the Consti-
tutional maximum. The later view prevailed. Sheldon v. Sill, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 441 (1850).
Thus, Congress not only is authorized to create lower federal courts, but also is granted
the power to prescribe their jurisdiction within the outer limits established in Article III,
§ 2 of the Constitution. As a result of this development, for a federal court to have
jurisdiction over a controversy it must have proper statutory, as well as constitutional,
subject matter jurisdiction. Kroger, 437 U.S. at 371-72.
196. 456 U.S. at 702.
197. Id. at 702-03 & n.10.
198. See, e.g., Weintraub, supra note 75, at 504-05. But see Lewis, supra note 162,
at 739-42 (suggesting that state-interest factors should also be displaced by Insurance
Corp.'s individual liberty functional analysis of due process).
199. 465 U.S. 770 (1984).
200. 465 U.S. 783 (1984).
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Both arose out of libel suits against notorious national publica-
tions, one known for sexually explicit photographs2 01 and the
other for malicious gossip.20 2 It is difficult to distill any coherent
theme from either case. Both seem to mix International Shoe -
Hanson purposeful availment theory with McGee multi-interest
balancing analysis, but not in any meaningful or organized man-
ner. Moreover, neither opinion used the fairness branch factors
as collectively articulated in World-Wide.
In Keeton the Court upheld New Hampshire's jurisdiction
over a nonresident publisher based on the distribution in the fo-
rum state of the defendant-publisher's magazine which con-
tained allegedly defamatory material.203 The action was brought
201. Hustler Magazine.
202. The National Enquirer.
203. In Keeton, plaintiff-petitioner brought a diversity action in the United States
District Court for the District of New Hampshire against defendant-respondent, claim-
ing that she had been libeled in five separate issues of respondent's magazine. 465 U.S.
at 772. Petitioner, a resident of New York, had no connection with New Hampshire other
than the circulation there of another magazine, Penthouse, which she assisted in produc-
ing. Id. She admittedly brought suit in New Hampshire because it was the only state in
which the statute of limitations over her defamation claim had not run. See id. at 772-73
n.1. Respondent was an Ohio corporation with its principal place of business in Califor-
nia. Id. at 772. Its only connection with New Hampshire was the monthly circulation
there of 10,000 to 15,000 copies of the magazine. Id.
The district court dismissed Keeton's complaint on the ground that the due process
clause proscribed application of New Hampshire's long-arm statute to assert personal
jurisdiction over respondent based only on the distribution there of less than one percent
of its national circulation. Id. The First Circuit affirmed. Id. at 773. In doing so, the
court relied on three rationales: (i) plaintiff's lack of contacts with New Hampshire; (ii)
the applicability of the "single publication rule," which required damages to be awarded
for plaintiff's injuries suffered nationwide if she prevailed at trial, even though only a
small, if not insignificant, portion of her injuries were suffered in New Hampshire; and
(iii) the unfairness of applying New Hampshire's unusually long six-year statute of limi-
tations for libel actions. Id. Collectively, these factors pointed to New Hampshire's lack
of a sufficient interest in adjudicating a controversy between two nonresident parties.
In reversing, the United States Supreme Court emphasized the elements outlined in
the jurisdictional model presented by International Shoe and Hanson. The critical focus
of any in personam jurisdictional inquiry, according to Justice Rehnquist, is "on 'the
relationship among the defendant, the forum, and the litigation.'" Id. at 775 (quoting,
Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 204 (1977)). In Keeton Hustler's systematic and contin-
uous circulation of its magazine in New Hampshire was found sufficient to allow the
state to assert personal jurisdiction over a libel action arising from the contents of the
magazine. Id. at 780-81. In addition, the Court found that in entering the New Hamp-
shire market, Hustler purposely availed itself of the privilege of conducting business
there, and "no doubt would have claimed the benefit of [New Hampshire law] if it had a
complaint against a subscriber, distributor, or other commercial partner." Id. at 779.
Moreover, the Court found that the requisite foreseeability was present because "Hustler
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in New Hampshire by a nonresident plaintiff after the statute of
• . . has continuously and deliberately exploited the New Hampshire market, [and there-
fore,] must reasonably anticipate being haled into court there in a libel action based on
the contents of its magazine." Id. at 781 (citing World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Wood-
son, 444 U.S. 286, 297-98 (1980)).
In affirming the district court dismissal, the First Circuit raised troubling concerns
that the Supreme Court felt compelled to address. First, the Court agreed that the fair-
ness of subjecting Hustler to jurisdiction in New Hampshire "depends to some extent on
whether respondent's activities relating to New Hampshire are such as to give that State
a legitimate interest in holding respondent answerable on a claim related to those activi-
ties." Id. at 776. The Court, however, was very unclear about whether the interest of the
forum state is a separate element of the jurisdictional equation, or whether it is sub-
sumed within the basic test which focuses on the relationship among the defendant, the
forum, and the litigation. The Court stated: "But insofar as the State's 'interest' in adju-
dicating the dispute is a part of the Fourteenth Amendment due process equation, as a
surrogate for some of the factors already mentioned, .... we think the interest is suffi-
cient." Id.
In finding a sufficient forum state interest in Keeton, the Court focused on (i) New
Hampshire's clearly expressed interest in protecting both residents and nonresidents
from damages resulting from libel circulated there; (ii) its interest in protecting New
Hampshire citizens from falsehoods published there; and (iii) its interest in cooperating
with its sister states, through the "single publication rule," in providing a forum to liti-
gate efficiently in a single proceeding all issues and damages flowing from the nationwide
circulation of the same libel. Id. at 776-78. The Court tangentially noted, however, that
the actual applicability of the "single publication rule" to award multistate damages was
a matter of substantive law that did not enter the litigation at the jurisdictional stage.
Id. at 778 n.9.
Similarly, the Court disposed of the concern expressed by the court of appeals re-
garding the unfairness of applying New Hampshire's uniquely long statute of limitations.
Mr. Justice Rehnquist's language in this regard is instructive:
Strictly speaking, however, any potential unfairness in applying New Hamp-
shire's statute of limitations to all aspects of this nationwide suit has nothing
to do with the jurisdiction of the Court to adjudicate the claims .... The
question of the applicability of New Hampshire's statute of limitations to
claims for out-of-state damages presents itself in the course of litigation only
after jurisdiction over respondent is established, and we do not think that such
choice of law concerns should complicate or distort the jurisdictional inquiry.
Id. At 778.
Moreover, the Court unequivocally rejected the notion that a plaintiff's contact with
the forum state was a separate element that must be thrown into the jurisdictional puz-
zle. Id. at 779. Citing its decision in Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 788-89 (1984), issued
the same day, however, the Court acknowledged that a plaintiff's residence in the forum
state may well enhance a defendant's contact with the forum because of defendant's
relationship to plaintiff. Id. at 780.
The Supreme Court was either not being candid or it ignored reality in Keeton when
it endorsed a suit in New Hampshire under the "single publication" rule, but stated in a
footnote that the actual award of multistate damages is an open question to be resolved
by substantive law after the jurisdictional inquiry. If multistate damages cannot be
awarded, and ultimately that issue will raise due process concerns which the court failed
to recognize, a plaintiff in Keeton's position will have no incentive to sue, and the right
to do so will be meaningless. This aspect of Keeton was also troubling because the "sin-
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limitations of every other jurisdiction had expired. 04 The
Court's relatively brief opinion emphasized the relationship
among the defendant, the forum, and the litigation, consistent
with International Shoe and Shaffer. It also gave serious consid-
eration to the interest of the forum state 05 and rejected the no-
tion that jurisdictional due process required that plaintiffs have
minimum contacts with the forum state.10 6
The Calder Court upheld jurisdiction by California over two
nonresident, individual defendants who had not purposefully
availed themselves of the benefits and protections of California
law.2°7 In doing so the Court explicitly approved the forum "ef-
gle publication rule," which provided incentive for the action in Keeton, might allow
New Hampshire to award damages for libel committed outside New Hampshire causing
injury to plaintiff outside of New Hampshire. Plainly, New Hampshire would have no
interest in, and a "minimum contacts" analysis would preclude if from, adjucating out-
of-state torts, apart from defamation, causing injury outside of New Hampshire. In es-
sence, the single-publication rule plus the systematic and continuous, albeit limited, cir-
culation of its magazine there, gave New Hampshire a form of general jurisdiction over
Hustler.
204. 465 U.S. at 772-73 & n.1.
205. Id. at 775-78. Justice Brennan's brief concurring opinion suggested that the
emphasis on New Hampshire's interest in adjudicating the dispute between Keeton and
Hustler was inconsistent with Insurance Corp. Id. at 782 (Brennan, J., concurring). If
the due process clause, which is the only relevant part of the Constitution for this pur-
pose, restricts, as Insurance Corp. suggested, the assertion of state court jurisdiction to
protect the individual liberty interest of a nonresident defendant, then consideration of
"state interest" as part of jurisdictional analysis is inappropriate. See id. See generally
Knudsen, supra note 93, at 811-16; Lewis, supra note 179, at 7-9; Lewis, supra note 163,
at 718-27, 739 ("the Court's reasons for holding that satisfaction of sovereignty interests
is not a sine qua non of personal jurisdiction also undermine the foundations of other
government interest doctrines . . ... "); Lewis, The "Forum State Interest" Factor in
Personal Jurisdiction Adjudication: Home-Court Horses Hauling Constitutional Carts,
33 MERCER L. REv. 769 (1982).
206. 465 U.S. at 779 ("But plaintiff's residence in the forum state is not a separate
requirement, and lack of residence will not defeat jurisdiction established on the basis of
defendant's contacts."); accord Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 806-08
(1985).
207. Calder was a libel action filed in a California state court by the actress Shirley
Jones, a resident and domiciliary of California, against National Enquirer, Inc., a Florida
corporation having its principal place of business in Florida. The Enquirer publishes a
national weekly newspaper. Shirley Jones also sued the Enquirer's local distributor, and
petitioners, Calder and South, both Florida residents, who edited, and reported for, the
Enquirer respectively. 465 U.S. at 784-86. California's jurisdiction over the Enquirer,
which circulated approximately 600,000 of its weekly copies in California, was not in
question. Id. at 785 & n.2 (the Enquirer and its local distributor did not challenge juris-
diction). The Enquirer's California circulation represented more than ten percent of its
nationwide circulation and was more than twice as large as its circulation in the next
highest state. Id.
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The cause of action arose from an allegedly libelous article published in the En-
quirer accusing Jones of such heavy drinking that it prevented her from fulfilling her
professional obligations. Id. at 788 & n.9. The-article was written and edited by the indi-
vidual defendant-petitioners in Florida, based on sources located in California. Neither
Calder nor South, however, had any relevant or material personal contacts with Califor-
nia. Id. at 785-86.
In quashing service of process on the individual defendants, the California trial
court concluded that first amendment considerations should be weighed when jurisdic-
tion is sought over reporters and editors from distant jurisdictions, and concluded that
assertion of jurisdiction would have a chilling effect on the media under the circum-
stances presented. The court also found significant the presence of two corporate defend-
ants against whom plaintiff could fully satisfy her claim. Id. at 786.
The California intermediate appellate court reversed. Jones v. Calder, 138 Cal. App.
3d 128, 187 Cal. Rptr. 825 (Ct. App. 1982), aff'd, 465 U.S. 783 (1984). It found the lower
court's first amendment rationale unpersuasive and concluded that jurisdiction could be
asserted over the individual defendants because they intentionally had caused tortious
injury to plaintiff in California. The court thought it irrelevant that the intentional activ-
ity causing injury in California was performed in Florida, because the cause of action
arose out of activity intended to have an effect in California. Id. at 133-34, 187 Cal. Rptr.
at 829.
Again writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Rehnquist returned to the basic prin-
ciples presented by the jurisdictional scheme of International Shoe and Hanson. Relying
on the tripartite division of minimum contacts language in Shaffer, he observed: "In
judging minimum contacts, a court properly focuses on 'the relationship among the de-
fendant, the forum, and the litigation.'" 465 U.S. at 788 (citations omitted). He then
cited Keeton for the proposition that a plaintiff's lack of contact with the forum will not
defeat proper jurisdiction, but further observed that a plaintiff's contacts with Lhe forum
may be so substantial that jurisdiction not otherwise proper may be found as a result of
such contact. See id. Since the plaintiff in Calder lived and worked in California, and
since she was the focus of the individual defendants' activities in Florida (the writing
and editing of the article in question), the Court concluded that her cause of action arose
out of defendants' Florida activities. Consequently, since California was the focal point
of both the article and the harm suffered by plaintiff, id. at 788-89, the Court held that
in personam jurisdiction over the individual defendants was "proper in California based
on the 'effects' of their Florida conduct in California." Id. at 789.
The Court then addressed the defendants' argument that they were no more respon-
sible for the impact of the allegedly libelous article in California than a Florida welder
would be for a boiler that the welder worked on in Florida which subsequently exploded
causing injury in California. Rejecting this analogy as inapt, the Court stated that the
defendants in Calder were not charged with "untargeted negligence" but with inten-
tional acts that they knew would have a "potentially devastating impact" on plaintiff in
California. Id. The Court concluded they "must 'reasonably anticipate being haled into
court there.'" Id. at 790 (quoting World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S.
286, 297 (1980)).
The Court acknowledged that the defendants' contacts with California are not to be
equated with their employer's contacts, and that "[e]ach defendant's contacts with the
forum State must be assessed individually." Id. But in language that may have implicitly
rejected the "fiduciary shield" doctrine, the Court also observed that defendants' status
as employees did not insulate them from jurisdiction, particularly when they were the
"primary participants in an alleged wrongdoing directed at" the forum state. Id. Under
the "fiduciary shield" doctrine, a creature of New York law, the acts of a corporate offi-
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fects" test of the Restatement (Second) Conflicts of Law.208 The
individual defendants were the author and editor of an allegedly
libelous article that they knew would have its most substantial
impact in California where the plaintiff lived and worked.
cial undertaken in a corporate capacity within the forum state generally cannot be used
to predicate jurisdiction over the officer in an individual capacity. See Bulova Watch Co.
v. K. Hattori & Co., 508 F. Supp. 1322, 1347 (E.D.N.Y. 1981) (Weinstein, C.J.).
Finally, the Court plainly rejected the notion accepted by the California trial court
that first amendment considerations should enter the jurisdictional inquiry. 465 U.S. at
790. Jurisdictional analysis was already imprecise according to the Court and should not
be further complicated. Id. Besides, the Court thought the first amendment was given
sufficient consideration in defamation actions through applicable substantive law. Id. at
790-91. More than seventeen years after the late Judge Henry J. Friendly of the United
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit first advanced the proposition that sub-
stantive law adequately protects those accused of defamation, and, therefore, necessarily
vague first amendment standards should not be superimposed on jurisdictional analysis,
Buckley v. New York Post Corp., 373 F.2d 175, 182-84 (2d Cir. 1967), it appeared that
the Supreme Court had finally endorsed this position.
Another issue raised by Calder is whether the specifically targeted intentional tort
theory, which allowed California to assert jurisdiction over the individual defendants,
logically can be limited to a plaintiff's domicile. If the California statute of limitations
had run, under Keeton, Jones could have sued anywhere the National Enquirer was sys-
tematically and continuously distributed. In Keeton the Court recognized that the "rep-
utation of [a] libel victim may suffer harm even in a state in which he has hitherto been
anonymous." 465 U.S. at 777 (footnote omitted). If this was true for Keeton in New
Hampshire, it was even more true for Jones, a well known entertainment figure. Logi-
cally, the individual defendants in Calder can be said to have specifically targeted their
article to all readers of the National Enquirer wherever located. The basis on which Cali-
fornia exercised jurisdiction over the individual defendants was the effect in California of
their editing and reporting activities in Florida. Their Florida activity had a similar
harmful effect in every state in which the libel was read. The difference is only in the
scope of the injury suffered. Consequently, Keeton's "anonymous harm" theory may
have broadened the scope of Calder, and thus, the individual defendants there may be
subject to suit anywhere their employer can be sued. The individual defendants would
have this broad exposure in Calder not because the employer's contacts with the forum
state are attributable to them, but because their Florida activity caused harm in every
jurisdiction in which Jones' reputation, even if she were anonymous, suffered injury.
In Calder, the Court also apparently gave tacit approval to two, far reaching state
court decisions upholding specific jurisdiction-Buckeye Boiler Co. v. Superior Court, 71
Cal. 2d 893, 458 P.2d 57, 80 Cal. Rptr. 113 (1969), and Gray v. American Radiator &
Standard Sanitary Corp., 22 Ill. 2d 432, 176 N.E.2d 761 (1961). 465 U.S. at 789. These
cases have been viewed as pushing state court personal jurisdiction to the outer limits of
due process. See supra note 87 and accompanying text. The implicit approval of Buck-
eye Boiler and Gray in Calder stands in marked contrast to the Asahi plurality's failure
to cite, let alone discuss these significant state court decisions. Justice Brennan, in his
separate Asahi plurality opinion, stated that the Court substantially relied on Gray in
World-Wide when it first articulated the stream of commerce theory. 107 S. Ct. 1026,
1037 (1987). See infra notes 329-32 and accompanying text.
208, 465 U.S. at 787 & n.6, 789.
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The Court appeared to reach hard to justify jurisdiction in
Keeton and Calder.'0 9 One is left with the uncomfortable im-
pression that the Court might have reached a different result if
instead of Hustler and the National Enquirer, the publisher-de-
fendants in these cases had been the New York Times and the
Washington Post.
The third jurisdictional case of the 1983 Term was
Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall,21 0 in which
the Supreme Court addressed the issue of general jurisdiction
for the first time in over thirty years. 1' The Court struck down
Texas' assertion of jurisdiction over a foreign corporate defend-
ant because the defendant's contact with the forum state did not
rise to the level of "substantially systematic and continuous"
contact necessary to support jurisdiction over a cause of action
not arising out of defendant's forum state activity. 2 General ju-
risdiction raises fundamentally different concerns than does spe-
cific jurisdiction. The threshold inquiry is not focused narrowly
on the triparte relationship among the defendant, the forum,
and the litigation. Rather, general jurisdiction looks at a defend-
ant's entire affiliational relationship with the forum, whether re-
lated to the litigation or not. Accordingly, Helicopteros raised
many significant jurisdictional issues that are beyond the scope
of this Article.21
209. See Perschbacher, supra note 34, at 606-08 (suggesting that these cases "fell
outside the rigid standards established in World-Wide Volkswagen and Rush").
210. 466 U.S. 408 (1984). Commentary on Helicopteros was uniformly critical. See,
e.g., Knudsen, supra note 93, at 824-35; McDermott, supra note 32, at 41-45; Weinberg,
supra note 180; Weintraub, supra note 75, at 528-32.
211. The Court's only other general jurisdiction case decided in the post-Interna-
tional Shoe era was Perkins v. Benquet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437 (1952).
212. 466 U.S. at 415-16, 418-19.
213. In Helicopteros the Court reversed a decision of the Texas Supreme Court up-
holding in personam jurisdiction by the courts of Texas over Helicopteros, a Colombian
corporation with its principal place of business in Bogota. The suit concerned a wrongful
death action brought by the survivors of four United States citizens, all non-domiciliaries
of Texas, who were killed in the crash in Peru of a helicopter owned by Helicopteros.
Helicopteros was in the business of providing helicopter transportation for the oil and
construction industry in South America. 466 U.S. at 409. It had entered into a contract
to supply such services to the employer of the survivors' decedents, a Peruvian consor-
tium that was the alter-ego of a joint venture headquartered in Houston, Texas. Id. at
410. At the request of the joint venture, the chief executive officer of Helicopteros came
to Houston to negotiate the contract, which was later executed in Lima, Peru. Id. The
contract provided that the joint venture would make payments to an account maintained
by Helicopteros at the Bank of America in New York City. Id. at 411. Speaking for an
1988] 771
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The next Term, however, finally brought about the conflu-
eight Justice majority, Justice Blackmun summarized Helicopteros' general lack of con-
tact with Texas as follows:
Helico[pteros] never has been authorized to do business in Texas and never
has had an agent for the service of process within the State. It never has per-
formed helicopter operations in Texas or sold any product that reached Texas,
never solicited business in Texas, never signed any contract in Texas, never
had any employee based there, and never recruited an employee in Texas. In
addition Helico[pteros] never has owned real or personal property in Texas
and never has maintained an office or establishment there. Helico[pteros] has
maintained no records in Texas and has no shareholders in that State.
466 U.S. at 411 (footnote omitted).
Helicopteros' only general contacts with Texas were its purchase of approximately
80% of its helicopter fleet over an eight year period from a Texas manufacturer, the
training of its pilots and maintenance personnel in Texas, and occasional visits by its
management personnel to Texas for technical consultation over the same eight-year pe-
riod. Id.
The Texas Supreme Court upheld jurisdiction under the Texas long-arm statute,
which it interpreted to reach to the limits permissible under the fourteenth amendment's
due process clause. Id. at 412-13 & n.7. The court also held that prior Supreme Court
decisions interpreting the due process clause permit the assertion of personal jurisdic-
tions over Helicopteros under the facts presented. Hall v. Helicopteros Nacionales de
Colombia, S.A., 638 S.W.2d 870, 873 (Tex. 1982), withdrawn, 677 S.W.2d 19 (Tex. 1984);
see also Carlson, General Jurisdiction and the Exercise of In Personam Jurisdiction
Under the Texas Long-Arm Statute, 28 S. TEx. L. Rav. 307 (1986). When the Supreme
Court reviews a state court decision in such circumstances, its only basis for review is to
evaluate whether the state court correctly interpreted the ambit of the due process
clause. The Court's task in Helicopteros was considerably lightened by the plaintiff-re-
spondents' concession that their "claims against Helico[pteros] did not 'arise out of,' and
[were] not related to, Helico[pteros'] activities within Texas." 466 U.S. at 415 (footnote
omitted).
In view of this concession, which eliminated a finding of specific or transactional
jurisdiction, the only possible basis for in personam jurisdiction would have been if
Helicopteros were found to be subject to general jurisdiction in Texas. The Court began
its analysis by recognizing the distinction between specific and general jurisdiction,
describing the latter as follows:
Even when the cause of action does not arise out of or relate to the foreign
corporation's activities in the forum State, due process is not offended by a
State's subjecting the corporation to its in personam jurisdiction when there
are sufficient contacts between the State and the foreign corporation.
466 U.S. at 414 & n.9 (citing, Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437
(1952)). It then reviewed the facts of Perkins. In essence, the defendant mining com-
pany, a Philippine corporation, had carried out almost all of its corporate activities in
Ohio during the Japanese occupation of the Philippines during the Second World War.
Those activities were limited in scope during the War, but the Court nevertheless was
able to characterize them as systematic and continuous. In such circumstances the Court
held that nothing in the due process clause precluded Ohio from asserting personal juris-
diction over the mining company in connection with a cause of action that did not arise
out of its activities there. 466 U.S. at 415.
Contrasting the Texas activities of Helicopteros with the Ohio activities of the min-
ing company in Perkins, the Court predictably found that they did not constitute the
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ence of the two divergent doctrinal trends that had influenced
same kind of continuous and systematic general business contacts that give rise to gen-
eral jurisdiction. While Ohio was, as a practical matter, the principal place of business
and corporate headquarters of the mining company during the war, the only connections
Helicopteros had with Texas, apart from the one negotiating trip by its CEO, were its
purchases of equipment and the training of its personnel there.
As the Texas Supreme Court found sufficient contacts to support jurisdiction based
on Helicopteros' purchases and related training and consulting trips to Texas, the Su-
preme Court was compelled to discuss the scope of state court personal jurisdiction pred-
icated on such contacts. The Court resurrected Rosenberg Bros. & Co. v. Curtis Brown
Co., 260 U.S. 516 (1923), a pre-International Shoe decision, to support its conclusion
that "mere purchases, even if occurring at regular intervals, are not enough to warrant a
State's assertion of in personam jurisdiction over a nonresident corporation in a cause of
action not related to those purchase transactions." 466 U.S. at 418 (footnote omitted). In
Rosenberg, a unanimous Court, speaking through Justice Brandeis, held that a Tulsa-
based retail concern was not subject to personal jurisdiction in New York under the
"presence" theory, based on purchases of merchandise in, and related trips to, New York
by its officers. 260 U.S. at 517-18.
By reaffirming Perkins and Rosenberg more than thirty and sixty years respectively
after it decided those cases, it is fair to conclude that the Court settled some open ques-
tions, but its reliance on these cases raised several new issues as well. It now seems ap-
parent that a state may not assert in personam jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant
on a cause of action that neither arises from, nor is related to, the forum state activity of
the defendant, unless the defendant engages in the type of continuous and systematic
general business contacts within the forum found sufficient in Perkins. Moreover,
purchases within the forum state standing alone, even if occurring at regular intervals
over a substantial number of years, are insufficient to establish the necessary continuous
and systematic activity. To the extent that the passage of time may have eroded confi-
dence in Rosenberg and Perkins, Helicopteros appeared to revitalize those cases for
modern jurisdictional analysis.
On the other hand, several questions were raised by Helicopteros. First, despite its
clear reaffirmation of Perkins, the Court failed to provide either a satisfactory definition
of, or concrete elements to test, the type of forum state activity of a nonresident defend-
ant that is sufficiently systematic and continuous to trigger the imposition of general
jurisdiction. Perhaps the Court was unwilling to formulate specific guidelines because it
wanted to maintain a flexible case-by-case approach and not be limited unduly by a rigid
test. In addition, systematic and continuous is inherently ambiguous. See supra note 80
and accompanying text. A nonresident defendant may systematically and continuously
sell widgets or distribute publications in a particular state, but those widgets or publica-
tions may only represent a small fraction of the defendants national or international
sales or distributions. Consequently, the Court presented a classic legal continuum, one
end of which is represented by Perkins and the other by Helicopteros. After
Helicopteros a corporation may well be subject to general jurisdiction only in its state of
incorporation or in the state of its principal place of business.
Another question left open by Helicopteros is whether a meaningful distinction ex-
ists between a cause of action that "arises out of" a nonresident defendant's activity
within the forum state and one that is merely "related to" a defendant's forum state
activities. Also uncertain is whether any such distinction should have jurisdictional sig-
nificance in the context of specific or transactional jurisdiction. This question was
sharply raised by Justice Brennan's dissent, which vigorously objected to the failure of
the majority to consider the applicability of specific or transactional jurisdiction in
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jurisdictional jurisprudence for almost forty years. Although the
result in Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz 214 was understandable,
the manner in which the Court reached its decision was decid-
edly unexpected. Justice Brennan, the great jurisdictional dis-
211 hsenter of the modern era, wrote the majority opinion and in
doing so attempted fundamentally to restructure the law of per-
Helicopteros. 466 U.S. at 419-20 (Brennan, J., dissenting). In Brennan's view,
Helicopteros' acknowledged purchase contacts with Texas were "sufficiently important,
and sufficiently related to the underlying cause of action, to make it fair and reasonable
for the State to assert personal jurisdiction over [it] for the wrongful death actions filed
by the respondents." Id. at 420. The majority acknowledged the possibility of a jurisdic-
tionally meaningful distinction between "arising out of" and "related to," but declined to
express any view on the matter because the parties did not argue the point. Id. at 415 &
n.10.
Still another question raised by Helicopteros is whether Rosenberg will be further
resurrected to preclude the assertion of even specific jurisdiction based on regular
purchase contacts. In a footnote, the majority observed that the International Shoe
Court
cited Rosenberg for the proposition that "the commission of some single or
occasional acts of the corporate agent in a state sufficient to impose an obliga-
tion or liability on the corporation has not been thought to confer upon the
state authority to enforce it." . . . Arguably, therefore, Rosenberg also stands
for the proposition that mere purchases are not a sufficient basis for either
general or specific jurisdiction.
466 U.S. at 418 n.12 (citation omitted). Although the Court declined to express a view
regarding the continuing validity of Rosenberg with respect to an assertion of specific
jurisdiction, id., it appears that the entire gamut of jurisdictional case law since Rosen-
berg, would undermine the applicability of Rosenberg to specific or transactional
jurisdiction.
Finally, despite argument by the respondents that Texas had "jurisdiction by neces-
sity" over Helicopteros, the Court declined "in the absence of a more complete record"
to consider the applicability, or even the existence, of such a doctrine, which it character-
ized as "a potentially far-reaching modification of existing law." 466 U.S. at 419 & n.13.
Jurisdiction by necessity generally is thought to allow a court to assert jurisdiction when
no other forum is available to a plaintiff. In Helicopteros there were three defendants.
The Court concluded that respondents failed to carry their burden of proving that all
three could not be sued in one forum because the record was unclear whether such a suit
could have been brought in Colombia or Peru. See infra note 363. This was at least the
second time in less than seven years that the Court declined an opportunity to consider
the doctrine of "jurisdiction by necessity." See Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 211 n.37
(1977).
For recent scholarly consideration of general jurisdiction, see Brilmayer,
Haverkamp, Logan, Lynch, Neuwirth & O'Brien, A General Look at General Jurisdic-
tion, 66 TEX. L. REv. 723 (1988); Brilmayer, Related Contacts and Personal Jurisdiction,
101 HARV. L. REV. 1444 (1988); Twitchell, The Myth of General Jurisdiction, 101 HARv.
L. REV. 610 (1988); Twitchell, A Rejoinder to Professor Brilmayer, 101 HARv. L. REV.
1465 (1988).
214. 471 U.S. 462 (1985).
215. See supra note 91 and accompanying text.
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sonal jurisdiction. In general, the principles that emerge are
those that Justice Brennan long espoused in dissent.21 Never-
theless, his opinion had to accommodate the well-settled pur-
poseful availment doctrine. Consequently, Justice Brennan cre-
ated not a synthesis or merger of prior doctrine into a unified
conceptual scheme, but rather a forced linkage of two very sepa-
rate doctrines that are not easily harmonized.
As several commentators have noted, Burger King's signifi-
cance is not the Court's decision in the case before it, or even its
statement that a single contract may be a minimally sufficient
contact, but rather its importance is what the Court said about
personal jurisdiction generally.217 Accordingly, the focus of this
section of the Article is on the Court's attempt to distill a new
jurisdictional framework from its hodgepodge of prior case
law.21
8
216. Noting this recent turnaround, commentators could not resist the play on
words from Burger King's well-known advertising campaign in titling their articles. E.g.,
Perschbacher, supra note 34; Stephens, The Single Contract as Minimum Contacts:
Justice Brennan "Has It His Way", 28 WM. & MARY L. REV. 89 (1986).
217. E.g., Perschbacher, supra note 34, at 612-13 ("Justice Brennan literally recon-
structs the outlines of modern personal jurisdiction by reworking the old patchwork of
cases into a new design"), 619 ("Brennan's sweeping language and rewrite of the mini-
mum contacts test, incorporating his ideas from the past thirty years, is more than a
mere application of International Shoe and its progeny to contract cases."); Stephens,
supra note 216, at 113 ("Burger King is a more interesting case for what it implies about
personal jurisdiction generally than for what it implies about contract cases").
218. The underlying litigation arose from a dispute between Burger King corpora-
tion, a Florida corporation with its principal place of business in Miami, and one of its
franchisees. 471 U.S. at 464. Appellee, Rudzewicz, a domiciliary of Michigan, was a prin-
cipal of a corporate-franchisee of Burger King, and personally guaranteed all the fran-
chisee's obligations. Id. at 466-67. Although headquartered in Miami, Burger King had
ten regional offices which monitored the operation of franchisees on a day-to-day basis.
Id. at 466. Rudzewicz and his partner, MacShara, "jointly applied for a franchise to Bur-
ger King's Birmingham, Michigan district office in the autumn of 1978." Id. Although
Rudzewicz and MacShara essentially dealt with the Birmingham district office, they also
had communication with Burger King's headquarters in Miami. Id. at 467 & n.7. After
settling several disputes that arose during negotiations, Rudzewicz and MacShara signed
a franchise agreement with Burger King, and commenced operation of a Burger King
restaurant in Drayton Plains, Michigan. Id. at 467-68. Although successful at first, the
franchise soon experienced financial difficulty and defaulted on monthly payments due
under the agreement to Burger King. Id. at 468. When negotiations failed to resolve the
dispute, Burger King terminated the franchise and demanded that Rudzewicz and Mac-
Shara give up possession of the Drayton Plains facility. Id. When they refused and con-
tinued to operate the restaurant, Burger King commenced an action in the United States
District Court for the Southern District of Florida for breach of contract and for tortious
infringement of Burger King's trademarks and service marks as a result of the continued
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The fall of World- Wide's sovereignty branch,21 combined
with the failure of the Court explicitly to apply the fairness
branch factors during the 1983 Term trilogy of Keeton, Calder,
and Helicopteros,220 left the significance of World- Wide's fair-
operation of the facility as a Burger King franchise by Rudzewicz and MacShara. Id. at
468-69.
Rudzewicz and MacShara asserted that the district court lacked personal jurisdic-
tion "because they were Michigan residents and because Burger King's claim did not
'arise' within the Southern District of Florida." Id. at 469. After the district court re-
jected their jurisdictional challenge, Rudzewicz and MacShara answered and counter-
claimed under Michigan's Franchise Investment Law. Id. After a three-day bench trial,
the court found that defendants breached their contract and infringed Burger King's
trademarks and service marks. The court entered judgment against them in the sum of
$228,875 for contract damages and ordered defendants immediately to turn over posses-
sion of the Drayton Plains facility to Burger King. Id. Last, the court found that since
defendants failed to prove any essential element of their counterclaim, Burger King was
entitled to costs and attorneys fees. Id.
Only Rudzewicz appealed. Id. The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals reversed on
the ground that jurisdiction in the Southern District of Florida was fundamentally unfair
because the circumstances surrounding, and negotiations concerning, the Drayton Plains
franchise did not provide Rudzewicz with reasonable notice of the possibility of litigation
in Florida. Id. at 470.
The Supreme Court reversed. Pointing to the combination of the choice-of-law pro-
vision in the franchise agreement, which made the agreement subject to Florida law, and
the twenty-year term of the agreement, the Court concluded that Rudzewicz deliberately
and knowingly formed a long-term affiliational relationship with an entity headquartered
in the forum state and that as a result he should have reasonably anticipated forum state
litigation. Id. at 481-82. This analysis and conclusion satisfied the power or traditional
minimum contacts part of the new two-branch test of personal jurisdiction. Id.
Turning to the fairness or reasonableness branch, the Court concluded that
Rudzewicz failed to establish that jurisdiction in Florida would be unreasonable. Id. 482-
85. Of the five-part fairness branch, the Court only discussed two parts. First, the Court
found that the interest of the forum state weighed in favor of jurisdiction. But the
Court's language in this respect was lukewarm at best: "[W]e cannot conclude that Flor-
ida had no 'legitimate interest in holding [Rudzewicz] answerable on a claim related to'
the contacts he had established in that State." Id. at 482-83 (citations omitted). The
other factor discussed was the burden on the defendant. In that connection, Justice
Brennan indicated that, although Rudzewicz alleged litigational prejudice in Florida be-
cause of his inability to call certain Michigan witnesses, he failed to prove it. Id. at 433-
84 & n.27. The Court reiterated the point it made during its discussion of general legal
principles that most defendant convenience objections can be accommodated by a
change of venue. Id. at 484; see infra text accompanying notes 259-61.
In dicta the Court noted that it was rejecting "any talismanic jurisdictional formu-
las." Id. at 485. It made this point to ensure that the upholding of personal jurisdiction
over Rudzewicz, whom the Court noted was an experienced and sophisticated business-
man, id. at 484, did not herald the approval of jurisdiction over small consumer purchas-
ers in the seller's jurisdiction, especially in connection with mail-order purchases. Id. at
485-87.
219. See supra notes 190-97 and accompanying text.
220. Although the fairness branch per se was not discussed by any of the 1983 Term
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ness branch in some doubt. Any doubt, however, was dispelled
by Burger King.
Justice Brennan's opinion in Burger King undertook a fun-
damental transformation of jurisdictional due process by articu-
lating a new two-branch approach to state court personal juris-
diction. The first branch, devoid of any notions of sovereignty or
federalism, focused on the purposeful affiliation of a nonresident
defendant with the forum state and the relationship of the non-
resident's forum state activity to the litigation. This branch
might be characterized as the "power" or "traditional minimum
contacts" branch. 21 The other branch was resurrected intact
from World-Wide and might still be labeled the "fairness" or
"reasonableness" branch.222 But, unlike in World-Wide, in
which it was articulated and then ignored, in Burger King the
fairness branch was given a vital jurisdictional role. Justice
Brennan not only attempted to explain how the fairness branch
related to the power branch, but also partially applied it to the
facts of the case before the Court.
223
The Court's discussion of general legal principles devoted
substantially more space to the power branch than it did to the
fairness branch.224 Justice Brennan started his presentation by
tying Insurance Corp.'s repudiation of sovereignty to Interna-
tional Shoe's minimum contact analysis.225 Without any transi-
tion, Justice Brennan immediately shifted to a discussion of the
type of foreseeability that World-Wide found critical to due pro-
cess.2 As in World-Wide, fair warning or reasonable anticipa-
tion of forum state litigation was thought to provide "'a degree
of predictability to the legal system that allows potential de-
trilogy, individual fairness branch factors figured prominently in two of the three cases.
For example, the forum state interest was a significant element of the Court's analysis in
Keeton. See supra note 203. The interests of the plaintiff and the forum state were im-
portant to the decision in Calder. See supra note 207.
221. The term "power" to describe this function of due process is attributable to
Professor Clermont. Clermont, supra note 51, at 423-24; see also R. FIELD, B. KAPLAN &
K. CLERMONT, MATERIALS FOR A BASIC COURSE IN CIVIL PROCEDURE 25 (5th ed. 1987
Supp.).
222. 471 U.S. at 477.
223. Id. at 476-78, 482-85.
224. Part IIA of the opinion is Justice Brennan's articulation of the current two-
branch test of jurisdictional due process. 471 U.S. at 471-78. Less than two pages of this
part of the opinion addresses the fairness branch. Id. at 476-78.
225. Id. at 471-72.
226. Id. at 472; see supra notes 176-78 and accompanying text.
1988]
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fendants to structure their primary conduct with some minimum
assurance as to where that conduct will and will not render them
liable to suit.' "227 The fair warning requirement was satisfied,
stated Justice Brennan, "if the defendant has 'purposefully di-
rected' his activities at residents of the forum,' 228 and the litiga-
tion "'arise[s] out of or relates] to'" those activities.229
Although scholars have speculated over Justice Brennan's
use of the phrase "purposefully directed, ' 230 he apparently used
"directed" rather than "availed" because "directed" is more in-
clusive. It includes out-of-state actors causing in-state effects.
Although such a nonresident defendant would generally not in-
voke the benefits and protections of the forum state's law, such
a defendant should reasonably anticipate, or have fair warning
of, forum state litigation.2 3 ' This slight alteration of language
did not represent a groundbreaking shift in doctrine. Rather it
was an artful way of including within the critical Hanson pur-
poseful availment doctrine cases such as Calder v. Jones,232 in
which the Court upheld jurisdiction over nonresident defendants
227. Id. (quoting World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297
(1980)).
228. Id. (emphasis added) (citing Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770,
774 (1984)).
229. Id. (footnote omitted) (emphasis added) (quoting Helicopteros Nacionales de
Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414 (1984)). Although accurately quoting the
Helicopteros majority, the reference in the opinion to litigation that "relates to" defend-
ant's forum state activity is misleading. It is not clear that the Court intended any dis-
tinction between the two concepts. Although Justice Brennan, in Helicopteros, strongly
urged that specific jurisdiction could be predicated on conduct that merely "relates to,"
but does not "arise out of" defendant's forum state activity, 466 U.S. at 420, 424-28
(Brennan, J., dissenting), the majority refused to consider whether there was any juris-
dictional significance to the distinction because it was not raised by the parties. Id. at
415 & n.10. Including "related to" claims within specific jurisdiction would have repre-
sented a substantial departure from existing doctrine, and acceptance of Justice Bren-
nan's own view expressed in dissent. See supra note 213.
230. Professor Perschbacher, for example, believes that Justice Brennan carefully
chose "purposefully directed" to avoid any notion that physical acts within the forum
state, which Perschbacher apparently believes are required for purposeful availment, are
determinative of personal jurisdiction. Perschbacher, supra note 34, at 620. Perschbacher
plainly states that Justice Brennan "absorbed the purposeful availment requirement
within his purposefully directed language." Id. at 621. On the other hand, Professor
Stein states that the Burger King Court "confirmed that purposeful availment was the
sine qua non of the due process test." Stein, supra note 75, at 732. By not even mention-
ing the purposeful direction langauge, it would appear that Professor Stein failed to find
any meaningful distinction between the two terms.
231. See supra notes 182-84 and accompanying text.
232. 465 U.S. 783 (1984); see supra note 207.
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based solely on the forum effects of their out-of-state conduct. 33
The opinion then attempted to explain "why a forum legiti-
mately may exercise personal jurisdiction over a nonresident
who 'purposefully directs' his activities toward forum state resi-
dents. 23 4 Unfortunately, the Court only offered two very general
rationales for why jurisdiction is proper in these circumstances.
First, "[a] State generally has a 'manifest interest' in providing
its residents with a convenient forum for redressing injuries in-
flicted by out-of-state actors. 231 5 Second, it is unfair to allow
nonresident defendants to escape voluntarily assumed obliga-
tions arising from interstate activities.3 6 Significantly, both jus-
tifications are oriented toward the plaintiff and forum. The first
is obviously concerned with the forum state interest. The second
is concerned with fairness, but not from the defendant's per-
spective. The Court suggested that it is unfair to potential fo-
rum-state plaintiffs to permit a nonresident defendant to direct
his interstate activities in a manner in which he derives benefits
without a concomitant obligation to "account . . . for conse-
quences that arise proximately from such activities.2 37 Although
these justifications are sensible, they are in some respects incon-
sistent with the concept that due process protects the individual
liberty interest of defendants from being unfairly subjected to
state judicial power, which Justice Brennan emphasized in open-
ing this part of the Burger King opinion.23  Nevertheless, the
recognition by Burger King that purposeful direction implicates
state and plaintiff interests is a key analytical point of this Arti-
cle's thesis.38
The next portion of the opinion repeated World-Wide's dis-
cussion of foreseeability and Hanson's famous "unilateral activ-
ity," "purposeful availment," and "invoking benefits and protec-
233. 465 U.S. at 787 & n.6.
234. 471 U.S. at 473. Explanations of this sort are unusual in Supreme Court juris-
prudence. See Stein, supra note 75, at 761 ("the Court has not explained what justifies
jurisdiction").
235. 471 U.S. at 473 (citing McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 222-
23 (1957)).
236. Id. at 473-74. The Court quoted McGee for the proposition that advances in
transportation and communication have made it substantially less burdensome for a
nonresident to defend an action in a forum state. Id. at 474.
237. Id. at 474.
238. See supra notes 191-93, 197 and accompanying text.
239. See infra text accompanying notes 419-22.
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tions" language.240 Unfortunately, the Court failed to explain
how these concepts relate to, and harmonize with, the earlier
"fair warning" and "purposeful direction" language.241 The use
of different terminology to describe the same or similar concept
causes confusion and promotes litigation aimed at finding the
differences in usage meaningful. The conclusion of this section
of the opinion, which represents a significant departure from
prior case law, states:
Thus where the defendant "deliberately" has engaged in signif-
icant activities within a State, or has created "continuing obli-
gations" between himself and residents of the forum, he mani-
festly has availed himself of the privilege of conducting
business there, and because his activities are shielded by "the
benefits and protections" of the forum's laws it is presump-
tively not unreasonable to require him to submit to the bur-
dens of litigation in that forum as well.242
Here Justice Brennan states for the first time that minimum
contacts, if established, only raise a presumption of proper adju-
dicatory authority. The Court provided no direct authority for
this view243 and offered no citation of any type in support of this
novel and far reaching doctrinal shift.
After carefully dispelling any notion that physical presence
in the forum is required,244 Justice Brennan dramatically shifted
the discussion to the fairness branch: "Once it has been decided
that a defendant purposefully established minimum contacts
within the forum State, these contacts may be considered in
light of other factors to determine whether the assertion of per-
sonal jurisdiction would comport with 'fair play and substantial
justice.' ,245 Justice Brennan's list of other factors, which ap-
240. 471 U.S. at 474-76.
241. See supra note 230.
242. 471 U.S. at 475-76 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
243. The seeds of the two-branch approach were sown originally in Kulko, World-
Wide and Rush. See supra text between notes 138-52, note 186. Nevertheless, the idea
that a positive finding of minimum contacts only raises a presumption of proper jurisdic-
tion is entirely new and represents the emergence of a new analytical framework under
the due process clause.
244. 471 U.S. at 476.
245. Id. (quoting International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 320 (1945))
(emphasis added).
780 [Vol. 39
52
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 39, Iss. 4 [1988], Art. 3
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol39/iss4/3
1988] SAYONARA TO MINIMUM CONTACTS 781
pears to be nonexclusive,246 was lifted verbatim from World-
Wide. The fairness branch factors are: (1) the burden on defend-
ant, (2) the interest of the forum state, (3) the plaintiff's interest
in obtaining relief, (4) the systemic interest in obtaining the
most efficient resolution of the litigation, and (5) the systemic
interest in furthering substantive social policies. 247 Justice Bren-
nan's introduction of the fairness branch with the "once it has
been decided" 248 language is most significant. It unequivocally
implies that purposefully established minimum contacts must be
found before the due process analysis proceeds to the fairness
branch.249 The decision in Asahi, however, tends to undermine
this point.250
Significantly, and unlike the first collective articulation of
the fairness branch in World-Wide,2 51 Burger King attempted to
explain the relationship between the fairness branch and the
power branch.252 Justice Brennan made three slightly overlap-
ping observations. First, he strongly suggested that the interplay
between the two branches may result in a finding of jurisdiction
if the power or minimum contacts branch is weak, so long as the
reasonableness or fairness branch is strong.253 Second, if the
power branch is plainly satisfied by a defendant's purposeful di-
rection of activities to the forum state, the burden shifts to the
defendant to show that other factors render jurisdiction unrea-
sonable.254 Finally, and perhaps most significantly for under-
246. Introducing the fairness branch factors in World-Wide, the Court's language
suggests that its list of "other relevant factors" is not exclusive. See 444 U.S. 286, 292
(1980).
247. 471 U.S. at 477 (quoting World-Wide, 444 U.S. at 292).
248. Id. at 476.
249. No specific threshold level of minimum contacts, however, is contemplated. In
view of Justice Brennan's statement that weak minimum contacts may be offset by a
strong affirmative showing under the fairness branch, see infra text accompanying note
253. Any level of contact apparently would be sufficient for a court to proceed to the
fairness side of the equation. If this interpretation is correct, the entire significance of
the power branch is called into question.
250. See infra subpart III C.
251. See supra text accompanying notes 145-51.
252. 471 U.S. at 477-78.
253. Id. at 477. In support of this proposition, Justice Brennan cited Keeton, Calder
and McGee, which are the three Supreme Court personal jurisdiction cases approaching
the limits of due process. They are also cases in which fairness branch factors, although
not labelled as such, were given prominence. In each of these cases strong plaintiff and
forum interests seemed to overcome weak minimum contacts.
254. Id. No authority was offered for this significant proposition.
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standing the result in Asahi, Burger King suggested that juris-
diction, although proper under the power branch, may be
defeated by a strong showing under the fairness branch.
255
Notwithstanding the grudging acknowledgement that juris-
diction may be divested by the fairness branch, the opinion
seems deliberately crafted to expand rather than to restrict the
ambit of state court personal jurisdiction. Certainly, Justice
Brennan's first observation concerning the relationship between
the two branches suggested that he envisaged the fairness
branch as increasing opportunities for jurisdiction by a McGee-
like, multiple-interest balance process: "These considerations
sometimes serve to establish the reasonableness of jurisdiction
upon a lesser showing of minimum contacts than would other-
wise be required. '2 6 This conclusion is not surprising consider-
ing that the author of the Burger King opinion has consistently
been the Court's leading advocate of jurisdictional expansion.
2 57
Furthermore, the opinion contemplates a substantial burden on
defendant to show unfairness -"he must present a compelling
case. ' 258 Moreover, the Court stated that most defendant objec-
tions can be "accommodated through means short of finding ju-
risdiction unconstitutional."2 5 The Court suggested that appli-
cation of a forum's choice-of-law rules and motions for a change
of venue can often alleviate jurisdictional unfairness to defend-
ants.260 The concept that defendant objections to jurisdiction
generally can be accommodated without striking down a state's
assertion of jurisdiction is another significant element of this Ar-
ticle's thesis.26 '
Undoubtedly, Burger King was intended to expand jurisdic-
tion. It is therefore ironic that in Asahi, the Court's first post-
Burger King jurisdictional case, Brennan's two-branch due pro-
cess analysis was invoked to overturn the assertion of jurisdic-
tion by California. Even more ironic, perhaps, was the Court's
reliance on the fairness branch to reach its decision.
By the time it heard Asahi the Supreme Court definitively
255. Id. at 477-78.
256. Id. at 477.
257. See supra notes 91-94 and accompanying text.
258. 471 U.S. at 477.
259. Id.
260. Id. & nn.19-20.
261. See infra notes 430-39 and accompanying text.
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had joined the two divergent doctrinal approaches to jurisdic-
tional due process. As stated earlier, however, Burger King's
joinder of McGee's multi-interest balancing approach with Han-
son's purposeful availment analysis did not merge the two doc-
trines into a uniform test providing reasonably consistent and
predictable results. This conclusion is buttressed by the seri-
ously divided Court in Asahi, which produced two four-justice
plurality opinions and a third opinion of three justices.
III. THE Asahi LITIGATION
A. California Courts: A Mixed Result
Asahi arose from a 1978 accident between a motorcycle and
a tractor-trailer on a California highway, in which one citizen of
California was killed and another severely injured.0 2 Approxi-
mately one year later the survivor and his children filed a prod-
ucts liability action in a California state court alleging that the
"accident was caused by a sudden loss of air and an explosion in
the rear tire of the motorcycle, and. . . that the motorcycle tire,
tube, and sealant were defective. ' 26 3 The complaint named sev-
eral defendants, 64 including Cheng Shin Rubber Industrial Co.,
Ltd. (Cheng Shin), the Taiwanese manufacturer of the tire
tube.2 65 More than two years later Cheng Shin cross-claimed
against its codefendants, and filed third-party claims against
262. Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, - U.S. -, 107 S. Ct. at 1029.
263. Id.
264. The complaint named Dunlop Tire & Rubber Co. as the first defendant. Order
Denying Motion to Quash Summons, Zurcher v. Dunlop Tire & Rubber Co., No. 76180
(Super. Ct., Solano County, Cal., April 22, 1983), Appendix A to Joint Appendix, Asahi
Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, - U.S. -, 107 S. Ct. 1026 (1987) (No. 85-693).
The opinion of the Supreme Court of California indicates that Sterling May Company,
Inc., the California retailer of the motorcycle tire tube, was another original defendant.
Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 39 Cal. 3d 35, 41, 702 P.2d 543, 544, 216 Cal.
Rptr. 385, 387 (1985), rev'd, - U.S. -, 107 S. Ct. 1026 (1987). Cheng Shin's United
States subsidiary, Cheng Shin Tire USA, Inc., a California corporation which markets its
parent's products in the United States, was also an original defendant. Brief for Respon-
dent at 1-2, Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, - U.S. -, 107 S. Ct. 1026 (No.
85-693) [hereinafter cited as "Brief for Respondent"]. But see Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v.
Superior Court, 147 Cal. App. 3d 30, 194 Cal. Rptr. 741, 743 (1983) ("Cheng Shin Tire
USA, Inc.. . . apparently is not involved in this lawsuit"), vacated, 39 Cal. 3d 35, 702
P.2d 543, 216 Cal. Rptr. 385 (1985), rev'd, - U.S. -, 107 S. Ct. 1026 (1987).
265. 107 S. Ct. at 1029.
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several new parties, including Asahi Metal Industry Co., Ltd.
(Asahi), the Japanese manufacturer of the tube's valve assem-
bly.218 Cheng Shin's affirmative claims sought indemnification."'
Asahi manufactured valve assemblies in Japan 26  and sold
them to several major tire and tube manufacturers, including
Cheng Shin.269 Cheng Shin manufactured tire tubes in Taiwan,
incorporating as component parts valve assemblies purchased
from Asahi and other suppliers, 270 and sold completed tire tubes
throughout the world.2 71 Asahi apparently had no contact with
California other than the sale there of finished products by
others containing its valve assemblies.272
Asahi moved to quash service of process for lack of jurisdic-
tion.2 7 1 In support of its motion Asahi submitted an affidavit
from its president,274 indicating that it sold valve assemblies to
Cheng Shin for ten years, and that between 1978 and 1982 it
sold 1.35 million valve assemblies to Cheng Shin, which Cheng
Shin incorporated into motorcycle tubes.2 7 All of the sales from
Asahi to Cheng Shin occurred in Taiwan, and the valve assem-
266. Id. at 1029-30. The timing of Cheng Shin's cross-complaint is stated in the
opinion of the California intermediate appellate court. Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Supe-
rior Court, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 742.
Under California procedure the term "cross-complaint" is used to describe any claim
that would be designated a counterclaim, FED. R. Civ. P. 13(a) & (b), cross-claim, FED. R.
Civ. P, 13(g), or third-party claim, FED. R. Civ. P. 14(a) & (b), under federal practice. See
CAL. Civ. PRoc. CODE § 428.10(a) & (b) (West Cure. Supp. 1988); American Motorcycle
Ass'n v. Superior Court, 20 Cal. 3d 578, 584, 578 P.2d 899, 902, 146 Cal. Rptr. 182, 185
(1978); Cf. CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 422.10 (West 1973) ("The pleading allowed in civil
actions are complaints, demurrers, answers, and cross-complaints").
267. 107 S. Ct. at 1029.
268. Id. at 1030. The California Supreme Court characterized Asahi as "a major
Japanese producer of valve assemblies." 39 Cal. 3d at 41, 702 P.2d at 544, 216 Cal. Rptr.
at 387.
269. 107 S. Ct. at 1030. Cheng Shin's Supreme Court brief stated that Asahi "sold
its product to such Worldwide marketers as Honda, Yokohama, Bridgestone and Kenda,
who sell extensively in the United States and California marketplaces." Brief for Re-
spondent at 13.
270. 107 S. Ct. at 1030.
271. Id.
272. See id.
273. Id.
274. See 194 Cal. Rptr. at 742; see also Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 39
Cal. 3d 35, 41, 702 P.2d 543, 544-45, 216 Cal. Rptr. 385, 387 (1985).
275. 39 Cal. 3d at 41, 702 P.2d at 545, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 387; see also 107 S. Ct. at
1030; 197 Cal. Rptr. at 742.
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blies were shipped from Japan to Taiwan.27 1 Apparently there
was no written contract between Asahi and Cheng Shin.2
Cheng Shin submitted information indicating that approxi-
mately twenty percent of its United States sales were made in
California.278 Moreover, one of Cheng Shin's lawyers conducted
a survey of a retail outlet operated by a codefendant,2 7 9 in which
he found the following: (1) eighty-four percent of the tire tubes
offered for sale were of Japanese or Taiwanese origin;280 (2) fifty-
five percent of such tubes were manufactured by Cheng Shin;
2 l
(3) twenty-three percent of the tubes manufactured in Japan or
Taiwan had Asahi valve assemblies;8 2 and (4) twenty-three per-
cent of the Cheng Shin tubes had Asahi valve assemblies.28 3 Al-
though unscientific, this survey demonstrated that Asahi pro-
duced a substantial volume of valve assemblies, which it sold to
several major tube and tire manufacturers, and that a significant
number of these valve assemblies were component parts of prod-
ucts directly marketed in California. In addition, a Cheng Shin
manager submitted a declaration expressing the belief that
Asahi fully understood that its valve stem assemblies would be
indirectly marketed throughout the United States, including
California. 284 Asahi responded with an affidavit of its president
asserting that it never contemplated that limited sales to Cheng
Shin of valve stem assemblies in Taiwan would render it amena-
ble to jurisdiction in California.
28 5
Basing its decision largely on the information summarized
above, the California trial court denied the motion to quash the
summons.28 The brief opinion emphasized the global scope of
Asahi's business 28 7 and, accordingly, concluded that "'[i]t is not
276. 107 S. Ct. at 1030.
277. Id.
278. Id. Significantly, the record does not reveal what percentage of Cheng Shin's
worldwide sales are made in the United States. 39 Cal. 3d at 54-55, 702 P.2d at 554, 216
Cal. Rptr. at 396 (Lucas, J., dissenting).
279. 39 Cal. 3d at 41 n.1, 702 P.2d at 545 n.1, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 387 n.1.
280. See id.; see also 107 S. Ct. at 1030.
281. See 107 S. Ct. at 1030.
282. See id.
283. See id.
284. See id.
285. See id.
286. Id.
287. Id.
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unreasonable that [Asahi] defend claims of defect in [its] prod-
uct[s] on an international scale.' 288 Asahi sought review by Cal-
ifornia's intermediate appellate court,49 which directed the trial
court to grant Asahi's motion to quash.290 After the filing of a
petition for a hearing in the California Supreme Court, the
plaintiffs settled with all original defendants,291 and their com-
plaint was dismissed with prejudice.292 Nevertheless, the Califor-
nia Supreme Court stated that "the dismissal ha[d] no bearing
on the propriety of California's exercise of jurisdiction over
Asahi, '29 3 and upheld "the trial court's order denying Asahi's
motion to quash service of [the] summons.
2
1
94
Although recognizing that Asahi had no independent con-
tacts with the forum state,295 the California Supreme Court
found that "Asahi's indirect business [in California], through
Cheng Shin and others, [was] substantial. '"29 6 More significantly,
the court found that Asahi was aware that a portion of the valve
assemblies it sold to Cheng Shin would be incorporated in fin-
ished products sold in California. 97 From this finding the court
concluded that Asahi (1) should have reasonably anticipated be-
ing haled into court in California;298 (2) purposefully availed it-
self of the benefits and protections of California's laws;299 and
(3) knew that it would benefit economically from the sale in Cal-
ifornia of tubes incorporating its valves as component parts.300
Moreover, the California court found its conclusion consistent
with the dicta of the Supreme Court in World-Wide30 1 that ju-
risdictional due process is satisfied with respect to a defendant
that "'delivers its products into the stream of commerce with
288. Id. (quoting Order Denying Motion to Quash Summons, supra note 264).
289. Asahi petitioned for a writ of mandate. 194 Cal. Rptr. at 742.
290. 194 Cal. Rptr. at 744; see also 107 S. Ct. at 1030.
291, 39 Cal. 3d at 55, 702 P.2d at 555, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 397 (Lucas, J., dissenting).
The settlement was for $300,000. Stewart, Shortening California's Long Arm, A.BA. J.,
April 1, 1987, at 45.
292, 39 Cal.3d at 52 n.9, 702 P.2d at 552 n.9, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 395 n.9.
293. Id.
294. Id. at 54, 702 P.2d at 553, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 396.
295. Id. at 48, 702 P.2d at 549, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 392.
296. Id.
297. Id.
298. Id., 702 P.2d at 550, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 392.
299. Id.
300. Id. at 49, 702 P.2d at 550, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 392.
301. See id., 702 P.2d 549, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 393.
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the expectation that they will be purchased by consumers in the
forum State.' "302 Last, the California Supreme Court concluded
that jurisdiction over Asahi in connection with Cheng Shin's in-
demnification claim was both fair and reasonable.
30 3
Hearing the case under its certiorari jurisdiction,0 4 the Su-
preme Court reversed.
3 0 5
B. United States Supreme Court: A Confusing But
Unanimous Result
Although all nine justices concurred in the judgment revers-
ing the California Supreme Court, the Court was deeply divided
regarding the proper rationale for its result.
Justice O'Connor's opinion, which announced the judgment
of the Court,3086 was divided into three parts, which were desig-
nated by roman numerals.307 Part II of the opinion was further
divided into two subparts, labelled "A" and "B". 308 The only
part of the opinion in which all the other justices joined was
Part I, which simply presented the background of the case and
the decisions below. 09 Part II-A, which was joined by Chief Jus-
tice Rehnquist and Justices Powell and Scalia, presented
302. Id. at 48 n.3, 702 P.2d at 549 n.3, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 391-92 n.3 (quoting World-
Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 298 (1980)) (emphasis omitted).
World-Wide cited (with a "cf." signal) Gray v. American Radiator & Stand. Sanitary
Corp., 22 Ill. 2d 432, 176 N.E.2d 761 (1961), in support of the stream-of-commerce
proposition.
303. 39 Cal. 3d at 54, 702 P.2d at 553, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 396. Even though its deci-
sion was handed down after the United States Supreme Court decided Burger King, the
California Supreme Court did not cite Burger King in its Asahi opinion. As Burger King
was decided on May 20, 1985, and the California Supreme Court decided Asahi on July
25, 1985, it is likely that the California decision was substantially completed prior to the
release of Burger King. Even though it did not consider Burger King, the California
Supreme Court analyzed whether California's assertion of jurisdiction over Asahi was
fair and reasonable. 39 Cal. 3d at 52, 702 P.2d at 552, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 394. The court
undertook a separate fairness analysis even though it expressed doubt regarding the
"continuing relevance of the fairness determination." Id. at 52 n.8, 702 P.2d at 552 n.8,
216 Cal. Rptr. at 394 n.8. See supra notes 219-20 and accompanying text.
304. 475 U.S. 1044 (1986).
305. 107 S. Ct. at 1031, 1035.
306. Id. at 1029.
307. The Court's statement of the issue preceded Part I of O'Connor's opinion. 107
S. Ct. at 1029.
308. Id. at 1031, 1033.
309. Id. at 1029-31.
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O'Connor's view of traditional minimum contacts.1 0 Part II-B,
in which all justices except Scalia joined, contains O'Connor's
fairness or reasonableness analysis.3 11 Curiously, even though
she mustered an eight-justice majority for her fairness analysis,
O'Connor's holding, presented in Part III, appeared more firmly
grounded on minimum contacts, a part of her opinion for which
she drew only plurality support. 12 Consequently, the holding
was joined only by the same three justices who joined her mini-
mum contacts analysis.
Under the "power" or "traditional minimum contacts"
branch, the Court issued three separate opinions. Two of the
opinions divided the Court into directly conflicting four-justice
pluralities. 13 While professing to rest on fairness considerations
alone,314 the third opinion offered yet another view of the power
or minimum contacts branch. The O'Connor plurality con-
cluded that minimum contacts had not been established because
Asahi did not purposefully direct its business activity to Califor-
nia.310 Justice Brennan, joined by Justices White, Marshall, and
Blackmun, maintained that minimum contacts were established
based on Asahi's awareness that its products would be marketed
in California.1
The division between the O'Connor and Brennan pluralities
was attributable to the different interpretations each opinion
gave to World- Wide's stream-of-commerce dicta.31'8  After
World-Wide, the lower federal courts were divided on whether
mere awareness that a product left the stream of commerce in
the forum state was sufficient to establish minimum contacts, or
whether a defendant was required to exhibit more deliberate or
purposeful conduct with respect to the forum state to establish
310. Id. at 1031-33.
311. Id. at 1033-35.
312. See id. at 1029, 1035.
313. See id.
314. Id. at 1038 ("Part I1-B establishes, after considering the factors set forth in
World-Wide ... that California's exercise of jurisdiction over Asahi in this case would
be 'unreasonable and unfair.' This finding alone requires reversal ... .") (emphasis
added) (citations omitted) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment).
315. Id. at 1038 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
316. Id. at 1033.
317. Id. at 1035-36.
318. Compare id. at 1031-33, with id. at 1035-37 & nn.1-2.
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minimum contacts."l Although acknowledging the split in au-
thority,320 Justice O'Connor, without close analysis, concluded
that due process requires more than mere "awareness." She ex-
pressed this view as follows:
The "substantial connection" . between the defendant and
the forum State necessary for a finding of minimum contacts
must come about by an action of the defendant purposefully
directed toward the forum State .... The placement of a
product into the stream of commerce, without more, is not an
act of the defendant purposefully directed toward the forum
State.
3 21
The opinion then described conduct, in addition to insertion of
the product into the stream of commerce, that may indicate
"purposeful direction. 3 22
The additional conduct described were all acts that might
indicate more clearly an intent or purpose to serve the market in
the forum State. The examples given by the Court were: (1) "de-
signing the product for the market in the forum State";3 23 (2)
319. Id. at 1032-33; The Supreme Court, 1986 Term-Leading Cases, 101 HARv. L.
REV. 119, 261 & n.6 (1987). See generally 4 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 16, §
1067 n.55; Hay, supra note 179, at 433-44; Jordan & Leiner, American Jurisdiction over
Foreign Corporations in Product Liability Lawsuits: The Asahi Decision and Beyond,
21 J. WORLD TRADE L. 31, 38-43 (1987); Weintraub, Asahi Sends Personal Jurisdiction
Down the Tubes, 23 TEx. INT'L L.J. 55, 66 & nn.64-65 (1988); Casenote, Asahi Metal
Indus. Co. v. Superior Court: Minimum Contacts in California Become Minimal, 22
WILLAMETrE L. REv. 589, 595-602 (1986) (criticizing California Supreme Court's Asahi
opinion).
320. Justice O'Connor recognized that the lower courts were divided on the stream-
of-commerce theory when she stated:
Some courts have understood the Due Process Clause, as interpreted in World-
Wide Volkswagen, to allow an exercise of personal jurisdiction to be based on
no more than the defendant's act of placing the product in the stream of com-
merce. Other courts have understood the Due Process Clause and the above-
quoted language in World-Wide Volkswagen to require the action of the de-
fendant to be more purposefully directed at the forum State than the mere act
of placing a product in the stream of commerce.
107 S. Ct. at 1032.
321. Id. at 1033 (emphasis in original) (citations ommitted).
322. See infra text accompanying notes 323-26. Justice O'Connor unfortunately also
emphasized the lack of any direct physical ties between Asahi and California when she
stated: "Asahi does not do business in California. It has no office, agents, employees, or
property in California. It does not advertise or otherwise solicit business in California. It
did not create, control, or employ the distribution system that brought its valves to Cali-
fornia." 107 S. Ct. at 1033 (citation omitted).
323. 107 S. Ct. at 1033.
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"advertising in the forum State"; 24 (3) "establishing channels
for providing regular advice to customers in the forum State;
s25
or (4) "marketing the product through a distributor who has
agreed to serve as the sales agent in the forum State. '326 Al-
though "designing," "advertising," "advising," or "marketing"
with specific reference to the forum state tends to establish in-
tent to serve that market, these are activities that almost invari-
ably would be undertaken by manufacturers of final consumer
products or of replacement parts.327 It would be highly unusual
for a nonreplacement component part manufacturer to engage in
these types of consumer oriented activities. This is especially so
with respect to a component part that is attached to, and not
readily separable from, the final consumer product such as the
valve stem of a tire tube. A literal reading of the O'Connor plu-
rality suggests that a foreign component part manufacturer
could not be sued in a jurisdiction in which its product was sys-
tematically and continuously distributed with its knowledge and
acquiescence over many years so long as the manufacturer did
not engage in consumer oriented activity in the forum state. In
addition, O'Connor's emphasis on forum-state market activity
may permit even a final product manufacturer to escape juris-
diction by insulating the manufacturing process from the distri-
328bution process.
The O'Connor plurality view is also at odds with the semi-
nal stream-of-commerce case of the post-International Shoe era,
Gray v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp.329 Al-
though only an Illinois Supreme Court decision, Gray, which up-
held jurisdiction over a domestic component part manufac-
324. Id.
325. Id.
326. Id.
327. Replacement parts are component parts that a consumer purchases and either
replaces himself or has an expert replace. Examples are automobile batteries, spark
plugs, and engine filters.
328. Cf. Hutson v. Fehr Bros., Inc., 584 F.2d 833 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S.
983 (1978) (precluding jurisdiction over a remote distributor that maintained no control
over the markets in which its products left the stream of commerce). Professor Wein-
traub apparently believes that Asahi will encourage manufacturers to use multiple layers
of independent distributors to avoid product liability. Weintraub, supra note 319, at 69-
70.
329. 22 Ill. 2d 432, 176 N.E.2d 761 (1961).
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turer,330 has on at least two occasions been cited with approval
by the Supreme Court. 31 Significantly, Justice O'Connor failed
even to mention Gray. In discussing World-Wide's stream-of-
commerce language, Justice Brennan, on the other hand, ac-
knowledged that Gray was cited by the Court in World-Wide
and implied that Gray is a classic example of the stream-of-com-
merce theory. Thus, O'Connor's plurality is in direct conflict
with the Supreme Court's prior, albeit implicit, approval of
Gray. If anything, the facts in Asahi establish far more substan-
tial forum state market penetration by the component part man-
ufacturer than was evident in Gray.3 2 The only material factual
distinction, of course, is that Asahi was an alien corporation,
while the component part maker in Gray was a domestic corpo-
ration.33 This distinction, however, seems to have no signifi-
cance for "power" branch analysis. It plays a critical role, how-
ever, under the "fairness" branch. 34
In contrast to the O'Connor view, Justice Brennan, joined
by Justices White, Marshall, and Blackmun, thought that mere
awareness that a product was being distributed in the forum
state was sufficient to establish minimum contacts under the
power branch. Responding to the O'Connor plurality's require-
ment of "something more," Justice Brennan stated:
I see no need for such a showing, however. The stream of com-
merce refers not to unpredictable currents or eddies, but to the
regular and anticipated flow of products from manufacture to
distribution to retail sale. As long as a participant in this pro-
cess is aware that the final product is being marketed in the
forum State, the possibility of a lawsuit there cannot come as a
surprise. Nor will the litigation present a burden for which
there is no corresponding benefit. A defendant who has placed
goods in the stream of commerce benefits economically from
the retail sale of the final product in the forum State, and indi-
330. Id. at 434, 438, 176 N.E.2d at 762, 764.
331. Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 789 (1984); World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v.
Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 298 (1980).
332. Compare Asahi, 107 S. Ct. at 1030, rev'g 39 Cal. 3d at 41 & n.1, 48-49 & nn.4-5,
702 P.2d at 545 & n.1, 549-50 & nn.4-5, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 387 & n.1, 392 & nn.4-5, with
Gray, 22 Ill. 2d at 438, 442, 176 N.E.2d at 764, 766.
333. The component part manufacturer in Gray, Titan Valve Manufacturing Corpo-
ration, apparently had its principal place of business in Ohio. See 22 Ill. 2d at 434, 438,
176 N.E.2d at 762, 764.
334. See infra notes 385-86 and accompanying text.
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rectly benefits from the State's laws that regulate and facilitate
commercial activity.
35
Concurring in the judgment, Justice Stevens expressed the
view that "[a]n examination of minimum contacts is not always
necessary to determine whether a state court's assertion of per-
sonal jurisdiction is constitutional. ' 336 This statement is not only
remarkable in light of forty-two years of decisional history since
International Shoe first articulated the minimum contacts test,
but is also inconsistent with the jurisdictional framework estab-
lished in Burger King.s 7 Nevertheless, this reasoning permitted
Justice Stevens to concur in the judgment based on reasonable-
ness branch factors alone without deciding whether minimum
contacts were first established under the power branch. Al-
though Justice Stevens failed to join in Justice Brennan's opin-
ion, which found that minimum contacts were established based
on Asahi's awareness that its component parts were being dis-
tributed by others in California, his position was substantially
closer to Brennan's view than it was to the view of the O'Connor
plurality. After suggesting that Asahi's regular course of dealing
with Cheng Shin amounted to more than mere placement of a
product into the stream of commerce,338 Justice Stevens con-
cluded his opinion as follows:
Whether or not this conduct rises to the level of purposeful
availment requires a constitutional determination that is af-
fected by the volume, the value, and the hazardous character of
the components. In most circumstances I would be inclined to
conclude that a regular course of dealing that results in deliv-
eries of over 100,000 units annually over a period of several
years would constitute "purposeful availment" even though the
item delivered to the forum State was a standard product mar-
keted throughout the world.
39
335. 107 S. Ct. at 1035 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment).
336. Id. at 1038 (Stevens, J. concurring in part and concurring in the judgment)
(emphasis added).
337. See supra notes 243-49 and accompanying text.
338. 107 S. Ct. at 1038 ("Over the course of its dealings with Cheng Shin, Asahi has
arguably engaged in a higher quantum of conduct than '[t]he placement of a product
into the stream of commerce, without more. .. .' ") (citation omitted) (bracket in origi-
nal) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
339. Id.
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Although expressly not endorsing either minimum-contacts
view,340 Justice Stevens's position is most sensible. Instead of
taking a black or white view of the stream-of-commerce theory,
Stevens would evaluate each component parts case by three ob-
jective criteria (i.e., volume, value, and hazardous character). In
Asahi, no reliable statistics established how many Asahi valves
were annually marketed, albeit indirectly, in California.
14
The two power branch pluralities are irreconcilable. Al-
though neither engages in sufficient analysis of the unique
problems posed by component part manufacturers, the Brennan
plurality has the better view. A manufacturer can take steps to
preclude the distribution of its product in a particular jurisdic-
tion if it is concerned with defending lawsuits there.3 42 Obvi-
ously, a manufacturer of a component part has no economic in-
centive to limit deliberately the market for its product. Asahi,
for example, is in the business of selling valve stem assemblies.
To the extent that Cheng Shin and other tube and tire manufac-
turers sell their own products incorporating Asahi's components
throughout the world, including the United States, and specifi-
cally including California, Asahi indirectly benefits. The finan-
cial success of a component part manufacturer, particularly a
manufacturer of a part that is not readily separable from the
finished product, is directly tied to the success of the final prod-
uct manufacturer. Consequently, to the extent that a manufac-
turer benefits, both economically and legally, from the distribu-
tion by others of a product incorporating its component part, it
is not unreasonable to have the manufacturer stand behind that
product if it causes injury.
Although Justice O'Connor's opinion failed to find mini-
mum contacts, it went on to evaluate the fairness branch fac-
340. Id. ("I see no reason in this case for the Court to articulate 'purposeful direc-
tion' or any other test as the nexus between an act of a defendant and the forum State
that is necessary to establish minimum contacts.").
341. See 39 Cal. 3d at 41 & n.1, 49 n.5, 702 P.2d at 543 & n.1, 550 n.5, 216 Cal. Rptr.
at 387 & n.1, 392 n.5, rev'd, 107 S. Ct. 1026, 1030 (1987). Justice Steven's flexible stream-
of-commerce concept may be even broader than the view of the Brennan plurality.
Under Stevens's view knowledge or awareness of forum state distribution apparently is
not required of a component part manufacturer if the requisite "volume, value and haz-
ardous character" requirements are satisfied.
342. Cf. 39 Cal. 3d at 50, 702 P.2d at 551, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 393 ("[T]he component
part manufacturer can structure its conduct to protect itself from the risk of liability in
the forum state.").
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tors3 3 and concluded that California's assertion of jurisdiction
over Asahi was, in any event, unreasonable. 44 Justice Brennan
agreed, finding Asahi the "rare" case in which the fairness
branch defeats the power branch. 45 Justice Stevens also joined
O'Connor in her fairness branch analysis. Only Justice Scalia
failed to join this part of the O'Connor opinion. 4
Although it mustered the support of eight Justices, Part II-
B of her opinion, containing Justice O'Connor's fairness analysis,
is wooden and overly conclusory. Even assuming the relevance of
the fairness branch to jurisdictional due process, which this Arti-
cle vigorously disputes,347 Justice O'Connor's analysis of the in-
dividual factors ignored several important considerations. Two
themes dominated her discussion. One is that the international
context of this jurisdictional dispute required special caution.
3 48
The other is that the plaintiff and forum state had little or no
interest in jurisdiction over Asahi because the original plaintiffs
settled their claims. 49 Justice O'Connor discussed each fairness
branch factor in the order that they were articulated in World-
Wide,350 and reiterated in Burger King.51
The burden on the defendant, Justice O'Connor concluded,
was "severe. ' 352 Her rationale for this conclusion was that the
distance between Japan and California is substantial and also
that jurisdiction in California would have compelled Asahi to
submit its dispute with Cheng Shin to a foreign judicial sys-
tem.35 3 Obviously, the distance concern will be present for al-
most any alien defendant, except perhaps for those found in
parts of Mexico and Canada, and every state or federal court
represents a foreign judicial system to an alien defendant. In ad-
dition, the Court implied that the burden factor only weighs
heavily against jurisdiction because of the meager interest of the
343. 107 S. Ct. at 1033.
344. Id. at 1034-35.
345. See id. at 1035.
346. See supra text accompanying note 311 and infra note 403 and accompanying
text.
347. See infra Part IV-A.
348. 107 S. Ct. at 1034-35.
349. Id. at 1034.
350. See supra notes 143-50 and accompanying text.
351. See supra notes 245-47 and accompanying text.
352. 107 S. Ct. at 1034.
353. Id.
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plaintiff and forum. 5 4 Moreover, and perhaps most significantly,
O'Connor's defendant "burden" concerns are fundamentally at
odds with the emerging global economy in general, and the sub-
stantial volume of trade between Japan and California in partic-
ular. 55 What was said by the Court thirty years ago in McGee,356
and reiterated twenty-two years later in World-Wide,357 con-
cerning the nationalization of commerce, is equally true today
with regard to the internationalization of commerce.3 58 Last, as
aptly put by Professor Weintraub, "[t]he Court's description of
defendant's burden reads as though product liability insurance
did not exist and insurance and legal professionals were not for
hire to assist Asahi.
'359
The Court next turned to the interests of the plaintiff and
the forum. For this purpose Cheng Shin was considered the
plaintiff. The interests of the plaintiff and the forum state in
having this litigation resolved in California were deemed
"slight." 360 Cheng Shin's interest was thought to be seriously un-
dermined by the settlement of the claims of the original plain-
tiffs. 6' In language that fundamentally misperceives its mission
under the due process clause, the Court stated that "Cheng Shin
has not demonstrated that it is more convenient for it to litigate
its indemnification claim against Asahi in California rather than
in Taiwan or Japan. '362 If California's exercise of jurisdiction is
354. See id. Justice O'Connor stated:
When minimum contacts have been established, often the interests of the
plaintiff and the forum in the exercise of jurisdiction will justify even the seri-
ous burdens placed on the alien defendant. In the present case, however, the
interests of the plaintiff and the forum in California's assertion of jurisdiction
over Asahi are slight.
Id.
355. Appendix to Brief of Amicus Curiae California Manufacturers Ass'n in Support
of Respondent at A-2 to A-5, Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 107 S. Ct. 1026
(1987) (No. 85-693).
356. 355 U.S. 220, 222-23 (1957).
357. 444 U.S. 286, 293 (1980).
358. See supra note 355.
359. R. WEINTRAUB, COMMENTARY ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS § 4.8, at 10 (1987
Supp.).
360. 107 S. Ct. at 1034.
361. Id. ("All that remains is a claim for indemnification asserted by Cheng Shin, a
Taiwanese corporation, against Asahi. The transaction on which the indemnification
claim is based took place in Taiwan; Asahi's components were shipped from Japan to
Taiwan.").
362. Id.
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constitutional, it does not matter, at least for purposes of the
due process clause, whether Taiwan or Japan are more conven-
ient fora.36 3 Moreover, to the extent that California is an incon-
venient forum, Asahi could seek dismissal under the common-
law doctrine of forum non conveniens 4
O'Connor also found that California's interest was substan-
tially diminished by the lack of a California plaintiff,6 5 and be-
cause of uncertainty over whether "California law should govern
the question whether a Japanese corporation should indemnify a
Taiwanese corporation on the basis of a sale made in Taiwan
and a shipment of goods from Japan to Taiwan.
'366
Several problems are raised by this reasoning. First, the
original plaintiff only settled when the case was in the California
Supreme Court. If jurisdiction was proper when asserted,
36
7 it
should not be dislodged because of subsequent litigational devel-
opments.368 The Court strongly implied that the result would be
different if there had been no settlement.36 If this is a correct
363. The Court tends to be unduly concerned with alternative fora in cases having
foreign country defendants. Cf. Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466
U.S. 408, 419 n.13 (1984). Refusing to consider the doctrine of "jurisdiction by necessity"
in Helicopteros, the Court concluded that "respondents failed to carry their burden of
showing that all three defendants could not be sued together in a single forum. It is not
clear from the record, for example, whether suit could have been brought against all
three defendants in either Columbia or Peru." Id.
364. See infra notes 431-42 and accompanying text.
365. 107 S. Ct. at 1034 ("Because the plaintiff is not a California resident, Califor-
nia's legitimate interests in the dispute have considerably diminished.").
366. Id.
367. Defendants are generally required to raise objections to personal jurisdiction at
the outset of a litigation. See FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b), (g) & (h). If not so raised, the defense
is waived. FED. R, Civ. P. 12(h)(1).
368. See infra text accompanying notes 443-44, and note 445.
369. See 107 S. Ct. at 1034-35. The Court concluded its fairness branch analysis as
follows: "Considering the international context, the heavy burden on the alien defendant,
and the slight interests of the plaintiff and the forum State, the exercise of personal
jurisdiction by a California court over Asahi in this instance would be unreasonable and
unfair." Id. at 1035.
The commentators generally assume that California could have properly asserted
jurisdiction over Asahi if the original plaintiffs had sued Asahi. See, e.g., Jordan &
Leiner, supra note 317, at 36 n.9 ("One must assume, however, that the unreasonable-
ness of the exercise of jurisdiction over Asahi was largely due to the fact that the injured
California plaintiff(s] had left the case."). Stewart, supra note 289, at 46 (quoting Profes-
sor Andreas Lowenfeld of New York University School of Law as suggesting "that the
Court's outcome would have been different if the claim against Asahi Metal was 'by the
guy who fell off the motorcycle.' "); Tunick, Getting to a Foreign Company Whose Prod-
uct Hurt Your Client, TH COMPLEAT LAWYER, Winter 1988, at 61, 63 ("If this case had
68
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reading of the opinion, then a potential defendant will not know
if any particular conduct or activity in, or in connection with,
the forum state will subject it to jurisdiction. Second, the em-
phasis on the lack of a forum-state plaintiff is plainly inconsis-
tent with the Court's prior view that a plaintiff need not have
minimum contacts with the forum state, which it expressed in
Keeton7  and Calder.3 71 Third, although there is some doubt on
the point,3 72 applying California law to the indemnity claim, as
the court suggested, but did not decide, may have been uncon-
stitutional.373 But this point is also inconsistent with Keeton, in
which the Court implied that choice-of-law concerns enter the
litigation only after jurisdiction is established and that "such
...concerns should not complicate or distort the jurisdictional
inquiry. '374 Moreover, a state's capacity to choose, or not choose,
its own law had previously been deemed irrelevant to personal
jurisdiction.3 7 5 Consequently, it would appear that Asahi repre-
sents a doctrinal shift by the Court regarding the significance of
choice of law for jurisdictional purposes. Whether a state may
constitutionally apply its own law to a controversy is now rele-
vant to analysis of the forum state interest factor under the fair-
ness branch.
The Court's discussion of California's interest, moreover, ig-
nored that Cheng Shin not only had pending claims against
Asahi, but that it apparently also had unresolved crossclaims
against its codefendants, at least one of which was a California
citizen. 76 While California may not have been concerned about
involved a suit against Asahi by the injured motorcyclist, the outcome of the inquiry into
reasonableness and fairness may well have been completely different."). But cf. Wein-
traub, supra note 319, at 66-67 (based on O'Connor's minimum contacts analysis); Re-
cent Development, 22 TEx. INT'L L.J. 403, 407 (1987) (same).
370. 465 U.S. at 779; accord Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 806-11
(1985). See supra note 203.
371. 465 U.S. at 788. See supra note 207.
372. See Weintraub, supra note 319, at 68-69 & nn.78-81.
373. 107 S. Ct. at 1034.
374. 465 U.S. at 778.
375. See supra note 75.
376. The California Supreme Court stated that "Cheng Shin has named numerous
defendants in its cross-complaint." 39 Cal. 3d at 53, 702 P.2d at 553, 216 Cal. Rptr. at
395. The Court recognized that California has an interest in resolving all cross-claims in
a single proceeding to avoid inconsistent verdicts. Id. at 53 & n.10, 702 P.2d at 553 &
n.10, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 395 & n.10. At least two original defendants were California cor-
porations, but one was an affiliate of Cheng Shin, and, therefore, was unlikely to have
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the resolution of indemnification claims between two aliens, it
most certainly had an interest in resolving similar claims against
its own citizens. 7
The Court concluded its discussion of the forum state inter-
est factor by acknowledging that jurisdiction over Asahi would
deter foreign component part manufacturers from making un-
safe products. 378 This admission was in response to the Califor-
nia Supreme Court's assertion that California "had an interest
in 'protecting its consumers by ensuring that foreign manufac-
turers comply with the state's safety standards.' "79 Notwith-
standing its acknowledgment of California's interest, the Court
concluded that the interest could be effectuated without assert-
ing jurisdiction over Asahi "because similar pressures will be
placed on Asahi by purchasers of its components as long as
those who use Asahi components in their final products, and sell
those products in California, are subject to the applicability of
California tort law."380 This belief was mere speculation by the
Court.38 ' It is inappropriate for the Court to ignore a legitimate
state interest by asserting that it may be accommodated indi-
rectly, and perhaps less effectively, in some other manner.
Last, Asahi's forum-state interest analysis is also inconsis-
tent with Keeton. California's interest in protecting its citizens
from harmful products, even if only component parts, is at least
as substantial, if not more substantial, than New Hampshire's
interest in protecting its citizens from reading libel in sexually
been a cross-defendant of Cheng Shin. See supra note 264. But see Stewart, supra note
291, at 45 (suggesting that after the original plaintiffs' "claims were settled for $300,000,
divided between the two defendants [Cheng Shin and the California seller of tires], the
only remaining part of the lawsuit was Cheng Shin's indemnification claim against Asahi
Metal.").
377. See 39 Cal. 3d at 52-53 & nn.9-10, 702 P.2d at 552-53 & nn.9-10, 216 Cal. Rptr.
at 395 & nn.9-10.
378. 107 S. Ct. at 1034 ("The possibility of being haled into a California court as a
result of an accident involving Asahi's components undoubtedly creates an additional
deterrent to the manufacture of unsafe components .... ").
379. Id. (quoting 39 Cal. 3d at 53, 702 P.2d at 553, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 395).
380. Id.
381. See Weintraub, supra note 319, at 64 ("The assumption that customers will
place 'similar pressures' on Asahi is unwarranted. The customers may not be able to
match Asahi's bargaining power. Moreover, 'similar pressures' are a pale substitute for
the incentives for safe manufacture that result from the risk of recoveries by injured
Californians.").
[Vol. 39
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explicit magazines."' In both Keeton and Asahi the parties were
nondomiciliaries of the forum state. In Keeton that was true
from the outset of the litigation. In Asahi the original dispute
involved citizens of California on both sides of the litigation.
38 3
The final two fairness branch factors are "'the interstate ju-
dicial system's interest in obtaining the most efficient resolution
of controversies; and the shared interest of the several States in
furthering fundamental substantive social policies.' ''38s  The
opinion never directly addressed these concerns, but simply sug-
gested that in the international context these factors concern the
policies of other nations. 5 Justice O'Connor, therefore, con-
cluded that jurisdiction in the international context required
special caution:
The procedural and substantive interests of other nations in a
state court's assertion of jurisdiction over an alien defendant
will differ from case to case. In every case, however, those in-
terests, as well as the Federal interest in its foreign relations
policies, will be best served by a careful inquiry into the rea-
sonableness of the assertion of jurisdiction in the particular
case, and an unwillingness to find the serious burdens on an
alien defendant outweighed by minimal interests on the part of
the plaintiff or the forum State. "Great care and reserve should
be exercised when extending our notions of personal jurisdic-
tion into the international field.""88
The Court's concern was unwarranted. First, although some
commentators have suggested that permitting extensive jurisdic-
tion over foreign country defendants may inhibit trade,387 others
382. In Keeton the Court recognized a state's interest in asserting jurisdiction over
those who commit torts within its borders, 465 U.S. at 776, and found that "[t]his inter-
est extends to libel actions brought by nonresidents. False statements of fact harm both
the subject of the falsehood and the readers of the statement. New Hampshire may
rightly employ its libel laws to discourage the deception of its citizens." Id. (emphasis in
original).
383. See supra notes 261-64 and accompanying text.
384. Asahi, 107 S. Ct. at 1034 (quoting World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson,
444 U.S. 286, 292 (1980)).
385. Id. at 1034 ("In the present case, this advice calls for a court to consider the
procedural and substantive policies of other nations whose interests are affected by the
assertion of jurisdiction by the California court.") (emphasis in original).
386. Id. at 1034-35 (quoting United States v. First Nat'l City Bank, 379 U.S. 378,
404 (Harlan, J., dissenting)).
387. See, e.g., Born, Reflections on Judicial Jurisdiction in International Cases, 17
GA. J. INT'L & CoMp. L. 32-33 (1987); Kennedy, Stretching the Long-Arm in Asahi Metal
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have expressed the view that limited jurisdiction over alien de-
fendants may well result in an unfair advantage to foreign man-
ufacturers."s8 A domestic manufacturer subject to state court ju-
Industry Co., Ltd. v. Superior Court: Worldwide Jurisdiction After World-Wide Volk-
swagen?, 4 B.U. INT'L L.J. 327, 336-41 (1986) (criticizing the California Supreme Court's
Asahi decision); Recent Development, 27 VA. J. INT'L L. 915, 925-26 (1987).
388. Brief for Respondent at 27-28; R. WEINTRAUB, supra note 359, at 11; Wein-
traub, supra note 319, at 65. On November 19, 1987 Representative Dan Glickman (D-
Kan.) introduced a bill to amend the Judicial Code to provide specifically for personal
jurisdiction in federal district courts over foreign manufacturers whose products cause
injury to a United States citizen if the foreign manufacturer "knew or reasonably should
have known that its product would be imported for sale or use in the United States." 133
CONG. REc, H10,785 (daily ed. Dec. 1, 1987) (statement of Rep. Glickman). The bill also
provides for simplified service of process on foreign manufacturers. Id. In addition, the
bill allows removal of actions commenced in state courts by foreign citizens against a
United States citizen "for injury that was sustained outside the United States and re-
lates to manufacture, purchase, sale, or use of a product outside the United States." H.R.
3662, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987). Last, the bill provides for choice of law as follows:
The law of the place where any injury to person or property occurred shall
govern all issues concerning liability and damages in any civil action com-
menced in or removed to any court of the United States which is brought by a
citizen or subject of a foreign state against a United States citizen for injury
that was sustained outside the United States and that relates to the manufac-
ture, purchase, sale or use of a product outside the United States.
Id. The choice of law provision is to prevent foreign plaintiffs injured abroad from taking
advantage of more favorable American tort law.
In addition to providing a remedy for injured American consumers, the bill is aimed
at removing the competitive advantage of foreign manufacturers. In introducing the bill,
Representative Glickman expressed these concerns:
Currently, the judicial system of the United States unfairly places Ameri-
can businesses and consumers at a disadvantage in the international market-
place. Foreign nationals can sue American businesses in American courts and
have the courts apply our uniquely broad standards of legal responsibility and
damages to American business conducted overseas.
By contrast, foreign competitors of those American businesses in the inter-
national markets are held accountable only under the less generous laws of the
foreign jurisdiction in which they are marketing their products. Thus, Ameri-
can businesses are exposed to far more sweeping financial exposure in connec-
tion with their sales to purchasers abroad than are their foreign competitors.
At the same time that we are subjecting American businesses to greater
exposure than foreign counterparts operating in the same markets, our judicial
system has failed to protect the interests of American consumers injured by
goods produced overseas. Under present legal rules, American courts often can-
not assert personal jurisdiction over foreign companies, making it impossible
for injured American consumers to hold foreign manufacturers fully accounta-
ble for their negligence or intentional misconduct.
As a result, American consumers are less protected from injuries caused by
the growing number of foreign-produced goods sold in this country. Moreover,
this creates a competitive disadvantage for American businesses in their home
markets since foreign producers who sell products in this country are not sub-
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risdiction must factor into its cost of doing business the
possibility of incurring liability in state court litigation,38 even
if insurance can be obtained to protect against any potential lia-
bility.3 90 If a foreign manufacturer of the same or similar prod-
uct does not have to take account of such costs, it has an obvi-
ous competitive advantage.
In addition, with the substantial amount of foreign manu-
factured goods annually imported into the United States,391 a
significant volume of component parts are likely to be indirectly
distributed here on behalf of manufacturers that do not engage
in the type of consumer or market oriented activities that the
O'Connor plurality found necessary to establish minimum con-
tacts.3 92 In some circumstances an injured United States citizen
may have no effective remedy unless jurisdiction can be ob-
tained over a foreign component part manufacturer. The manu-
facturer of the finished product and others in the product's dis-
tribution chain may be insolvent or, even if not insolvent, may
have insufficient assets to satisfy a judgment. 93 Although un-
likely, in some circumstances a foreign component part manu-
facturer may be the only party liable. 94 Accordingly, the Court's
excessive concern with "foreign relations policies" 9 5 was plainly
unwarranted.
C. Asahi's Impact on Burger King's Framework
Curiously, Justice O'Connor only cited Burger King for its
quoted reiteration of International Shoe's minimum contacts
ject to the same financial exposure as American producers. The end result is
that American products end up costing more because they must be priced to
include greater liability costs.
133 CONG. REc. H10, 785 (daily ed. Dec. 1, 1987) (statement of Rep. Glickman).
389. See id.
390. See generally Priest, The Current Insurance Crisis and Modern Tort Law, 96
YALE L.J. 1521 (1987).
391. See supra note 355 and accompanying text & text accompanying note 280.
392. See supra text accompanying notes 322-26.
393. See Weintraub, supra note 319, at 67.
394. Id. at 67-68 (discussing Hedrick v. Daiko Shoji Co., 715 F.2d 1355 (9th Cir.
1983), modified sub nom. Hedrick v. Pine Oak Shipping, S.A., 733 F.2d 1335 (9th Cir.
1984), one of the stream-of-commerce cases disapproved by the O'Connor plurality in
Asahi).
395. 107 S. Ct. at 1035.
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test, 96 and Hanson's "purposeful availment" rationale. 97 There
were no other references to Burger King in her opinion. Never-
theless, Justice O'Connor followed the two-branch approach, but
without recognizing the relationship and interplay between the
branches as articulated by Justice Brennan in Burger King. A
majority of the Court could not have been obtained if O'Connor
rested her opinion on the power or traditional minimum con-
tacts branch.398 Only Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Pow-
ell and Scalia joined that part of her opinion.399 Plainly Burger
King contemplated a positive finding under the power branch
before a Court proceeds to the fairness branch.40 0 As the
O'Connor plurality failed to find minimum contacts, Burger
King's teaching regarding the relationship between the two
branches was ignored.
Justice Brennan's separate four-justice plurality, on the
other hand, was consistent with the analytical structure estab-
lished in Burger King. Joined by Justices White, Marshall, and
Blackmun, Brennan found jurisdiction proper under the power
branch, and then moved to the fairness branch.40 1 Justice Bren-
nan did not undertake a separate analysis of the fairness branch
factors. He agreed with the O'Connor plurality's fairness conclu-
sion, finding Asahi, as stated earlier, the "rare" case in which
the fairness branch overcomes purposefully established mini-
mum contacts under the power branch.0 2 As Justice Scalia
joined only O'Connor's power branch analysis,0 3 it might rea-
sonably be inferred that he agreed with the Burger King frame-
work (i.e., that fairness branch analysis is unnecessary in the ab-
sence of a positive finding under the power branch). If this is a
396. Id. at 1031.
397. Id.
398. See supra text accompanying notes 309-12.
399. See supra text accompanying note 308.
400. See supra text accompanying notes 248 & 249.
401. See supra text accompanying note 317 & text accompanying and preceding
note 335. Justice Brennan only analyzed the power branch because he concurred in the
fairness analysis of Justice O'Connor.
402. 107 S. Ct. at 1035 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment).
403. The reporter's introduction indicating the division of the Court stated that
"Justice O'Connor announced the judgment of the Court and delivered ... the opinion
of the Court with respect to Part II-B, in which THE CHIEF JUSTICE, Justice BREN-
NAN, Justice WHITE, Justice MARSHALL, Justice BLACKMUN, Justice POWELL,
and Justice STEVENS join .... ." 107 S. Ct. at 1029.
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correct statement of Justice Scalia's view, then apparently five
justices, the Brennan plurality plus Scalia, endorsed the Burger
King framework. This conclusion, however, is weakened by the
joinder of Justices White and Blackmun in the separate opinion
of Justice Stevens, which purported to rely exclusively on the
fairness branch. 04 As Stevens failed to join either power branch
plurality, he apparently viewed the fairness branch as an inde-
pendent check on the assertion of jurisdiction, and believed that
jurisdiction can at least be denied based on the fairness branch
alone without regard to, and without first finding, minimum con-
tacts under the power branch. Therefore, it is not possible to
ascertain the views of Justices White and Blackmun concerning
the continuing validity of Burger King's requirement of a posi-
tive finding under the power branch before the fairness branch
becomes relevant.
The confusion emanating from the splintering of the Court
in Asahi leaves the state of personal jurisdiction seriously unset-
tled. First, the relationship and interplay between the two
branches is more clouded after Asahi. The Court's resolution of
the interplay between the branches will be critically significant.
If the Court determines that minimum contacts must be estab-
lished before the fairness branch becomes relevant, and if the
O'Connor plurality's view of the stream-of-commerce doctrine
prevails, an injured forum-state plaintiff may not be able to ob-
tain jurisdiction over a component part manufacturer and may
be left without a remedy.40 5 In these circumstances the strong
plaintiff and forum-state interest factors, found lacking in
Asahi, but present when an injured forum state citizen is the
plaintiff, could not be considered by a court because of the fail-
ure initially to find minimum contacts under the power branch.
Under the Burger King structure these concerns are only fac-
tored into the calculus under the fairness branch.
Second, as one recent commentary suggested, it may well be
that "[t]he uncertainties in deciding whether minimum contacts
404. Id. at 1038 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
405. See Weintraub, supra note 319, at 66-67 ("The manner in which Justice
O'Connor cites cases favorably and with disapproval indicates that component part mak-
ers are intended to be exempt from jurisdiction, even in suits by injured consumers in
the state where the finished product caused blood to flow.") (footnotes omitted) (em-
phasis added).
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exist probably will lead courts to avoid the issue whenever they
can rule out jurisdiction '406 under the fairness branch.07 Courts
will understandably take this approach in cases raising the
stream-of-commerce theory because the Supreme Court was un-
able to express a majority view on that subject in Asahi. Viewing
the Asahi result narrowly, one can safely conclude that the fair-
ness branch alone may preclude jurisdiction, but whether the
fairness branch alone can create or uphold jurisdiction is uncer-
tain. 08 If the fairness branch could uphold jurisdiction, then the
entire relevance of the "power" or "traditional minimum con-
tacts" branch will be called into serious question, and the multi-
ple-interest balancing approach of McGee will have finally pre-
vailed over the traditional minimum contacts approach of
International Shoe, Hanson, and Shaffer.
IV. CRITICISM OF TwO-BRANCH ANALYSIS AND A SIMPLIFIED
APPROACH TO JURISDICTIONAL DUE PROCESS
A. Burger King's Framework is Flawed
The current two-branch test of state court personal jurisdic-
tion represents an attempt to accommodate the two doctrinally
divergent approaches to jurisdictional due process. 09 In making
the accommodation, the current test attempts to factor into the
equation every element that has ever been deemed relevant to
406. The Supreme Court, 1986 Term-Leading Cases, supra note 319, at 266 (foot-
note omitted).
407. See, e.g., Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. British-Am. Ins. Co., 828 F.2d 1439,
1442 (9th Cir. 1987) ("Because we find that the exercise of personal jurisdiction ... is
unreasonable, we need not determine whether the first two prongs of the test are satis-
fied."). But cf. Mason v. F. LLI Luigi & Franco Dal Maschio Fa G.B. s.n.c., 832 F.2d 383,
385-86 (7th Cir. 1987) (distinguishing Asahi on fairness branch factors and finding juris-
diction proper under both power and fairness branches).
408. Some commentators view a positive power branch finding as essential to juris-
diction. The Supreme Court, 1986 Term-Leading Cases, supra note 319, at 266 n.47
("Because the International Shoe standard requires both minimum contacts and reason-
ableness, a court still must decide whether minimum contacts exist when it finds juris-
diction reasonable."). Cases have reached the same conclusion. E.g., Camelback Ski
Corp. v. Behning, 307 Md. 270, 513 A.2d 874 (1986), vacated, - U.S. -, 107 S. Ct.
1341 (1987) (remanded for reconsideration in light of Asahi), in which the Maryland
Court of Appeals concluded that convenience and forum state interest, "while factors
worthy of serious consideration, cannot alone serve as the foundation for assumption of
jurisdiction." Id. at 286, 513 A.2d at 882.
409. See supra Part II A.
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jurisdictional analysis.4 10 No doubt, the object is to ensure that a
particular assertion of state court jurisdiction is fair and reason-
able.411 This is obviously a worthy and appropriate goal. Never-
theless, as Asahi amply demonstrates, the current test is difficult
to apply, and it is unlikely to promote consistent and predict-
able results.41 2
Accordingly, the Burger King jurisdictional framework is
fundamentally flawed and should be discarded. As suggested
earlier, Burger King contemplated a fluid balancing process be-
tween the power and fairness branches.4 13 A weak power branch
can be bolstered by a strong fairness branch. The fairness
branch factors, which were first collectively articulated in
World-Wide,1 4 and repeated verbatim in Burger King4" and
Asahi,416 are: (1) the burden on defendant; (2) the interest of the
forum state; (3) the plaintiff's interest in obtaining relief; (4) the
interstate judicial system's interest in efficiency; and (5) the so-
cietal interest in furthering fundamental substantive social poli-
cies. 4117 Unfortunately, the five factors418 do not uniformly add or
subtract weight from the fairness branch side of the test. They
represent three separate categories of interests, two of which di-
rectly conflict.
The first factor (burden on defendant) generally conflicts
with the second and third factors (the plaintiff and forum state
interests). This is particularly true when the plaintiff is a forum
state citizen. The fourth and fifth factors attempt to weigh sys-
temic and societal interests (efficiency and substantive social
policy). Consequently, to balance the impact of the fairness
branch on a positive finding under the power branch it appears
necessary first to resolve the conflict between defendant, and
plaintiff and forum considerations presented by the first three
factors. Once that nebulous process is accomplished, it is further
necessary to factor in the systemic efficiency and societal sub-
410. See supra Part II.
411. See supra notes 23-28 and accompanying text.
412. See infra notes 443-45 and accompanying text.
413. See supra text accompanying notes 251-57.
414. See supra text accompanying notes 145-50.
415. See supra text accompanying notes 222 & 247.
416. 107 S. Ct. at 1033-34.
417. See Burger King, 471 U.S. at 477.
418. See supra note 246 and accompanying text.
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stantive policy elements of the fourth and fifth factors. The
whole process seems unduly prolix and complicated. Moreover,
the superficial and conclusory analyses of the fairness branch in
Burger King and Asahi provide little guidance on how to under-
take this process.
In addition, there are sound reasons why each of the fair-
ness branch elements should not be factored separately into the
due process jurisdictional analysis. As stated above, other than
the burden on the defendant factor, the fairness branch evalu-
ates plaintiff, forum, systemic, and societal concerns.41 Consid-
eration of each of these interests is fundamentally at odds with
Insurance Corp.'s repudiation of World-Wide's sovereignty
branch.420 Insurance Corp. concluded that nonresident defend-
ants are protected from certain assertions of state court jurisdic-
tion not as a matter of sovereignty or federalism, but because
the due process clause protects the "individual liberty inter-
est"421 of defendants. Just as World- Wide's sovereignty branch
fell because it implicated concerns having nothing to do with a
defendant's "individual liberty interest," the second through
fifth fairness branch factors422 should likewise fall. The fourth
and fifth factors are especially inappropriate because they ap-
pear to raise structural concerns423 that, if factored into the
equation, are certainly paradoxical to the notion that due pro-
cess protects defendants. The second and third factors, raising
plaintiff and forum concerns, even if they are not structural lim-
itations on state judicial power, are equally inconsistent with In-
surance Corp.'s rationale. Justice Brennan even acknowledged
as much in his brief concurring opinion in Keeton,424 and several
commentators have criticized the use of plaintiff and forum in-
419. See supra text following note 418.
420. See supra notes 190-197 and accompanying text.
421. 456 U.S. 694, 702 (1982). See supra notes 192-93 and accompanying text.
422. See supra text accompanying notes 144-50, 247 and 417.
423. Although not precisely the same as the structural limitations that Justice
White in World-Wide thought were found in the Constitution, see supra notes 156-57
and accompanying text, the fourth and fifth fairness branch factors are sufficiently anal-
ogous to be treated similarly under Insurance Corp. Cf. Bearry v. Beech Aircraft Corp.,
818 F.2d 370, 373 (5th Cir. 1987) (quoting Ashahi, 107 S. Ct. at 1034) (suggesting that
Asahi represents a retreat from Insurance Corp. because it required "consideration of
'the shared interest of the several states in furthering fundamental substantive social
policies,'" which is the fifth fairness branch factor).
424. 465 U.S. 770, 782 (1984) (Brennan, J., concurring).
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terests in deciding personal jurisdiction issues.425
The underlying rationale for Insurance Corp.'s rejection of
sovereignty and federalism as limitations on state jurisdictional
power was expressed as follows: "[T]he requirement of personal
jurisdiction may be intentionally waived, or for various reasons
a defendant may be estopped from raising the issue. These char-
acteristics portray it for what it is-a legal right protecting the
individual. ' 426 Just as a defendant could not waive structural
limitations on personal jurisdiction if such limitations were
found in the Constitution, a defendant should not be able to
waive structural concerns relating to the interstate judicial sys-
tem's interest in efficiency (the fourth fairness branch factor), or
the societal interest in furthering fundamental substantive social
policies (the fifth fairness branch factor).427 In addition, if the
forum-state interest factor militates against assertion of jurisdic-
tion, it is inconsistent for a defendant to be able to waive that
state interest. It can reasonably be inferred that Justice
O'Connor concluded in Asahi that efficiency and fundamental
social policy would best be served if California did not assert
jurisdiction over the dispute between Cheng Shin and Asahi.428
If this inference is correct, the acknowledged right of Asahi to
waive objection to jurisdiction is manifestly inconsistent with
these significant systemic and societal concerns. Accordingly, the
second through fifth fairness branch factors cannot withstand
scrutiny under Insurance Corp. and should be abandoned by the
Court.
The first fairness branch factor (burden on defendant)
should also not be factored separately into jurisdictional analysis
under the due process clause. 429 As Justice Brennan himself rec-
ognized in Burger King, "a defendant claiming substantial in-
convenience may seek a change of venue. '430 Transfer of venue,
of course, is only feasible within a unitary judicial system such
425. See supra note 205.
426. 456 U.S. 694, 704 (1982) (emphasis added).
427. In Burger King Justice Brennan suggested that "the potential clash of the fo-
rum's law with the 'fundamental substantive social policies' of another State may be
accommodated through application of the forum's choice-of-law rules." 471 U.S. 462, 477
(1984) (footnote omitted).
428. See supra text accompanying notes 384-85.
429. See infra text accompanying notes 430, 439-442.
430. 471 U.S. at 477 (footnote omitted).
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as the federal system. Outside of a unitary system, a defendant
claiming substantial inconvenience may move for dismissal
under the common-law doctrine of forum non conveniens,431
which allows dismissal of an action otherwise jurisdictionally
proper on the ground that the forum is inconvenient and a more
convenient alternative forum is available. Although the aca-
demic community has engaged in much recent debate regarding
the independent significance of forum non conveniens, 3 2 the fo-
431. In Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501 (1947), Mr. Justice Jackson, speaking
for a bare majority, described and defined the doctrine as follows:
The principle of forum non conveniens is simply that a court may resist
imposition upon its jurisdiction even when jurisdiction is authorized by the
letter of a general venue statute.
The doctrine leaves much to the discretion of the court to which plaintiff
resorts, and experience has not shown a judicial tendency to renounce one's
own jurisdiction so strong as to result in many abuses.
If the combination and weight of factors requisite to given results are diffi-
cult to forecast or state, those to be considered are not difficult to name. An
interest to be considered, and the one likely to be most pressed, is the private
interest of the litigant. Important considerations are the relative ease of access
to sources of proof; availability of compulsory process for attendance of unwill-
ing, and the cost of obtaining attendance of willing, witnesses; possibility of
view of premises, if view would be appropriate to the action; and all other
practical problems that make trial of a case easy, expeditious and inexpensive.
There may also be questions as to the enforcibility of a judgment if one is
obtained. The court will weigh relative advantages and obstacles to fair trial. It
is often said that the plaintiff may not, by choice of an inconvenient forum,
"vex," "harass," or "oppress" the defendant by inflicting upon him expense or
trouble not necessary to his own right to pursue his remedy. But unless the
balance is strongly in favor of the defendant, the plaintiff's choice of forum
should rarely be disturbed.
Factors of public interest also have place in applying the doctrine. Admin-
istrative difficulties follow for courts when litigation is piled up in congested
centers instead of being handled at its origin. Jury duty is a burden that ought
not to be imposed upon the people of a community which has no relation to
the litigation. In cases which touch the affairs of many persons, there is reason
for holding the trial in their view and reach rather than in remote parts of the
country where they can learn of it by report only. There is a local interest in
having localized controversies decided at home. There is an appropriateness,
too, in having the trial of a diversity case in a forum that is at home with the
state law that must govern the case, rather than having a court in some other
forum untangle problems in conflict of laws, and in law foreign to itself.
Id. at 507-09 (footnotes omitted). See generally 15 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER,
FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 3828 (2d ed. 1986).
432. See, e.g., Stein, Forum Non Conveniens and the Redundancy of Court-Access
Doctrine, 133 U. PA. L. REv. 781 (1985); Stewart, Forum Non Conveniens: A Doctrine in
Search of a Role, 74 CALIF. L. REV. 1259 (1986); Comment, Considerations of Choice of
Law in the Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens, 74 CALIF. L. REV. 565 (1986).
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rum non conveniens doctrine seems a more appropriate vehicle
than the two-branch approach of Burger King for taking ac-
count of defendant burden and other fairness factors.
Forum non conveniens became a firmly established part of
American procedural law forty-one years ago in Gulf Oil Corp. v.
Gilbert,4 33 in which the Supreme Court articulated a multi-inter-
est balancing test to determine whether an action should be dis-
missed under the doctrine.434 The Court identified both pri-
vate4 5 and public436 interests that should be evaluated. The
private interest elements, which parallel the defendant burden
concerns of the fairness branch, consider items related to litiga-
tional convenience.437 The public interest elements implicate
such fairness branch factors as the forum state interest, and the
systemic efficiency and substantive social policy factors.43
As recognized by the Court in Gilbert, however, the factors
most likely to be pressed by a defendant making a motion to
dismiss on forum non conveniens grounds are the private inter-
est factors, which include
the relative ease of access to sources of proof; availabiity of
compulsory process for attendance of unwilling, and the cost of
obtaining attendance of willing, witnesses; possibility of view of
premises, if view would be appropriate to the action; and all
other practical problems that make trial of a case easy, expedi-
tions and inexpensive.
439
An appropriate analysis of these items generally will be
unique to each case.440 Recognizing that the private interest ele-
ments are highly fact specific, the Supreme Court has main-
tained that "[t]he forum non conveniens determination is com-
mitted to the sound discretion of the trial court. ' '441 While it is
433. 330 U.S. 501 (1947).
434. Id. at 508-09; Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 257 (1981) ("where the
court has considered all relevant public and private interest factors, and where its bal-
ancing of these factors is reasonable, its decision deserves substantial deference."). See
supra note 431.
435. 330 U.S. at 508.
436. Id. at 508-09.
437. See infra text accompanying note 439.
438. Among the public interest factors are forum state interests (first fairness
branch factor) and choice of law (part of the fifth fairness branch factor).
439. 330 U.S. at 508.
440. See 15 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, supra note 431, at 296 & n.45.
441. Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 257 (1981).
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reasonable for forum non conveniens to be a doctrine of discre-
tion, it is highly inappropriate for the jurisdictional due process
inquiry similarly to be committed to trial court discretion.442 A
constitutional limitation on state judicial power ought to be
based on more generally applicable neutral principles.
Undoubtedly, the two-branch approach of Burger King will
also undermine consistency and predictabiilty in jurisdictional
decision making. The Court has stated the "Due Process Clause
.. . gives a degree of predictability to the legal system that al-
lows potential defendants to structure their primary conduct
with some minimum assurance as to where that conduct will and
will not render them liable to suit. '443 When a defendant has
notice that its activity, conduct, or business in, or in connection
with, a particular forum will subject it to suit there, it "can act
to alleviate the risk of burdensome litigation by procuring insur-
ance, passing the expected costs on to customers, or, if the risks
are too great, severing its connection with the State.
'444
None of these worthwhile goals can be achieved if jurisdic-
tion depends on who the plaintiff happens to be, or whether the
action is partially settled. Only if jurisdictional analysis focuses
on the relationship among the defendant, the forum and the liti-
gation, with particular emphasis on the nature, both qualita-
tively and quantitatively, of the defendant's forum state activity,
can predictability be served.445
442. See Stewart, supra note 432, at 1278-79.
443. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980).
444. Id.
445. These points can be illustrated by analysis of the Asahi facts. The Court im-
plied that the result might have been different if the original plaintiffs had not settled.
See supra note 369 and accompanying text. Asahi's connection and relationship to the
forum remained the same without regard to whether the original plaintiffs settled. It
seems particularly unreasonable to have jurisdictional authority shift with litigational
developments. Suppose the plaintiffs sued Asahi as an original defendant along with
Cheng Shin and the others. Then suppose plaintiffs settled during or on the eve of trial.
In such circumstances it would be foolish, wasteful, and unreasonable to dismiss any
cross-claims between or among defendants. Yet, in a way this is what happened in Asahi
when the Court emphasized that the lack of a forum state interest, resulting from the
lack of a forum plaintiff, precluded jurisdiction by California. See supra note 365. It is
important to note that Asahi, as a third-party defendant, challenged jurisdiction at a
time when the original plaintiffs were still in the litigation. See supra text accompanying
notes 273, 291-92.
Moreover, had plaintiffs remained in the litigation and not asserted a direct claim
against Asahi, it is unclear whether the third-party claim would have withstood a juris-
dictional attack. If personal jurisdiction would have still been lacking, the conceptual
810 [Vol. 39
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B. Suggested Approach
Forum non conveniens can deal more appropriately with the
highly fact-specific determination of litigational convenience
than can the fairness branch with its amorphous fluid balancing
of interests. How then should jurisdictional due process be de-
termined? Jurisdiction should rise or fall by traditional mini-
mum contacts analysis emphasizing the triparte relationship
among the defendant, the forum, and the litigation.
If properly applied, the concept of "purposeful direction"
should be the linchpin of jurisdictional analysis. It is important
that "purposeful direction," rather than "purposeful availment,"
be the critically significant element because the former includes
out-of-state actors, and perhaps even some in-state actors,446
who cause forum effects, but who do not avail themselves of the
benefits and protections of forum state law in any meaningful
sense.447 The "foreseeability" analysis of World-Wide is unnec-
essary because forseeability in the World- Wide sense always will
be present if purposeful direction is found. While "purposeful
direction" will be simple enough to establish in most cases, in
some situations it will not be obvious. For example, as in Asahi,
it will not be obvious with respect to a remote component part
manufacturer who engages in no consumer oriented market ac-
tivities, but who, nevertheless, voluntarily enters into an agree-
ment with a final product manufacturer knowing that the final
product incorporating the component part will be marketed in
the forum state. Here, as suggested earlier, the most sensible so-
lution to the dilemma is provided by Justice Stevens's concur-
rence in Asahi.44s The decision should be based, according to
Justice Stevens, on the "volume, the value, and the hazardous
framework of liberal party and claim joinder of most modern procedural systems would
have been severely undermined. See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 13, 14, 18, & 20. Cheng Shin
would have faced two trials instead of one and risked inconsistent results. See Dittman
v. Code-A-Phone Corp., 666 F. Supp. 1269, 1273-1274 (N.D. Ind. 1987). See supra note
376. If the result would have been different had the original plaintiffs not settled, then
the result is neither logical nor neutral principle based. Plaintiffs would, in that event,
still have no interest in Asahi. Only the third-party plaintiff, Cheng Shin, would be inter-
ested in Asahi, which was the case even after plaintiffs settled.
446. Cf. supra note 183.
447. See supra notes 183-84 and accompanying text.
448. See supra notes 338-41 and accompanying text.
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character of the components.""" In addition, the length of time
that the component parts have been sold to the final product
manufacturer should be considered. Certainly a distinction
should be made between a one time shipment of ten valve stem
assemblies, and a ten-year relationship in which between 100,000
and 500,000 such valves are delivered annually.
If exclusive reliance on traditional minimum contacts is to
prove workable, the Court must take a fairly liberal view of the
quality and quantity of contact sufficient to invoke jurisdiction.
To the extent that a defendant claims unfairness, application of
the forum's choice-of-law rules, and motions to change venue or
dismiss on forum non conveniens grounds should, as Justice
Brennan himself recognized in Burger King,4 50 mitigate any liti-
gational unfairness. If the Court adopted the liberal approach to
minimum contacts suggested here, the time, expense, and energy
currently expended on motions to dismiss for lack of personal
jurisdiction, would no doubt be transferred to motions related to
choice of law and change of venue or forum non conveniens. De-
fendant resources would be better spent on these latter motions.
Once a court has jurisdiction, it can afford to take the time to
reach a more reasoned decision on choice of law, and venue'or
forum non conveniens issues.
It might be said that this suggested approach turns the
clock back rather than forward. In a simplistic way it does. The
current approach, however, is unsatisfactory. The suggested one-
branch approach at least focuses on the individual liberty inter-
est of defendants, which is what the due process clause protects.
Moreover, to the extent that the fairness branch factors need be
taken into account, the power branch, as aptly recognized by
Justice Brennan in Burger King, implicitly factors into the
calculus plaintiff and forum state concerns.451 To double count
these concerns as contemplated by two-branch analysis runs
afoul of Insurance Corp.'s explanation of what and whom the
due process clause protects.
449. 107 S. Ct. at 1038 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring the in the
judgment).
450. See supra text accompanying notes 259-61.
451. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 473-74 (1984). See supra notes
234-37 and accompanying text.
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V. CONCLUSION
Perhaps one day jurisdiction, venue, forum non conveniens,
and choice of law will be merged into a single doctrine.452 That
day, however, does not appear to be near. In the interim, the
Supreme Court continues to struggle with the jurisdictional
framework it created in Burger King. Despite its unanimous
judgment, Asahi demonstrates that the Court lacks harmony in
resolving jurisdictional issues under the due process clause.
It has been suggested that Asahi heralds the dominance of
the fairness branch over the power branch.453 Currently the fair-
ness branch can dislodge proper jurisdiction under the power
branch.454 The Court has not determined whether the fairness
branch can create or uphold jurisdiction independent of the
power branch.455 If a future decision affirms a positive role for
the fairness branch, the multi-interest balancing approach of
McGee will have prevailed, Justice Brennan will have finally had
it "HIS WAY," and we will have to say "sayonara" to minimum
contacts.
Nevertheless, if the more than forty-two years of decisional
history since International Shoe is a reliable guidepost, Asahi is
only another, albeit unfortunate, way station in the evolution of
jurisdictional due process.
452. See Stein, supra note 432, at 841-46. Cf. Ehrenzweig, From State Jurisdiction
to Interstate Venue, 50 ORE. L. REv. 103, 113 (1971) ("'Jurisdiction must become
venue.' ").
453. See supra notes 406-07 and accompanying text.
454. 107 S. Ct. at 1035 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and in the judgment) (char-
acterizing Asahi as a rare case in which fairness defeats power).
455. See supra note 408 and accompanying text.
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